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Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources

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Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, and the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan

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Note by the Secretary-General

In its resolution 2006/43, the Economic and Social Council requested the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its sixty-first session, through the Council, a report on the implementation of that resolution. The Assembly, in its resolution 61/184, also requested the Secretary-General to submit a report to it at its sixty-second session. The present report, which has been prepared by the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, is submitted in response to the resolutions of the Assembly and the Council.

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Report prepared by the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia on the economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan*

Summary

The occupation of Palestinian territory by Israel continues to deepen the economic and social hardship for Palestinians. Citing the right to self-defence from such actions as the continuation of attacks by Palestinian militants on Israeli civilians, the launching of rockets into Israeli cities from the Gaza Strip and the capture of an Israeli corporal, the Israeli army continues to mount military operations in the occupied Palestinian territory, employing arbitrary detention, disproportionate use of force, house demolitions, severe mobility restrictions and closure policies. However, there has been a marked decline in Palestinian-Israeli violence in Gaza since the ceasefire of 26 November 2006.

The Israeli closure system remains a primary cause of poverty and humanitarian crisis in the occupied Palestinian territory, and restricts Palestinian access to health and education services, employment, markets and social and religious networks.

The fiscal situation deteriorated significantly following the legislative elections of January 2006. In line with the principles set by the Quartet on 30 January 2006, the election results led donors to reconsider their aid to the Palestinian Authority. Palestinian GDP declined by approximately 8 per cent in the third quarter of 2006 compared to the same period in 2005. Economic indicators continue to show negative trends. Unemployment and poverty rates remained high, estimated at 30 and 64 per cent respectively, while 65 per cent of households rely on informal borrowing to subsist.

Israeli settlements, land confiscation and the construction of a barrier in the occupied Palestinian territory, contrary to the Geneva Convention and other norms of international law, isolate occupied East Jerusalem, bisect the West Bank and curtail normal economic and social life.

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Refugees, women and children bear the brunt of these measures. Malnutrition and other health problems afflict a growing number of Palestinians at a time of curtailed access to needed services. In the Gaza Strip alone, 57.5 per cent of children from 6 to 36 months old and 44.9 per cent of pregnant women are anaemic.

I. Introduction

1. In its resolution 2006/43, the Economic and Social Council stressed the importance of reviving the Middle East peace process on the basis of Security Council resolutions, including 242 (1967), 338 (1973), 425 (1978), 1397 (2002), 1515 (2003) and 1544 (2004), and the principle of land for peace as well as compliance with the agreements reached between the Government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people. In the same resolution, the Economic and Social Council urged all parties to respect the rules of international humanitarian law and to refrain from violence against the civilian population in accordance with the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949.[1] The Council, convinced that the Israeli occupation has gravely impeded efforts to achieve sustainable development and a sound economic environment in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan, and concerned by the formidable impact on the economic and social conditions of the Palestinian people caused by the construction of the wall and its associated regime inside the occupied Palestinian territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, and the resulting violation of their economic and social rights, including the right to work, to health, to education and to an adequate standard of living, recalled in this regard the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,[2] the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights[2] and the Convention on the Rights of the Child,[3] and affirmed that these human rights instruments must be respected in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem and the occupied Syrian Golan. The Council stressed the need to preserve the national unity and the territorial integrity of the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, and to guarantee the freedom of movement of persons and goods in the territory, including the removal of restrictions on going to and from East Jerusalem, and the freedom of movement to and from the outside world. It also stressed that the wall being constructed at an accelerated pace by Israel in the occupied Palestinian territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, is contrary to international law and is isolating East Jerusalem and dividing up the West Bank and is seriously debilitating to the economic and social development of the Palestinian people, and[4] calls in this regard for full compliance with legal obligations laid out in the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice rendered on 9 July 2004 (see A/ES-10/273 and Corr.1) and in General Assembly resolution ES-10/15. In that resolution, the Assembly reaffirmed the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people and the Arab population of the occupied Syrian Golan to all their natural and economic resources, and called upon Israel, the occupying Power, not to exploit, endanger or cause loss or depletion of those resources; it also reaffirmed that Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem and the occupied Syrian Golan, are illegal and an obstacle to economic and social development and called for the full implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions and requested the Secretary-General to submit to the Assembly, through the Council, a report on the implementation of the resolution.

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[1] United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 75, No. 973.

[2] See General Assembly resolution 2200 A (XXI), annex.

[3] United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 1577, No. 27531.

2. In its resolution 61/184, the General Assembly reaffirmed the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people and the population of the occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources, including land and water, and called upon Israel, the occupying Power, not to exploit, damage, cause loss or depletion of, or endanger the natural resources in the occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem and in the occupied Syrian Golan. The Assembly recognized the right of the Palestinian people to claim restitution as a result of any exploitation, damage, loss or depletion, or endangerment of their natural resources resulting from illegal measures and actions taken by Israel, the occupying Power, in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem. The Assembly stressed that the wall being constructed by Israel in the occupied Palestinian territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, is contrary to international law and is seriously depriving the Palestinian people of their natural resources, and called in this regard for full compliance with the legal obligations stipulated in the 9 July 2004 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice and in resolution ES-10/15. The Assembly called on Israel, the occupying Power, to cease the dumping of all kinds of waste materials in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan, which gravely threaten their natural resources, namely the water and land resources, and poses an environmental hazard and health threat to the civilian populations. The Assembly further called upon Israel to cease its destruction of vital infrastructure, including water pipelines and sewage networks, which, inter alia, has a negative impact on the natural resources of the Palestinian people. The Assembly requested the Secretary-General to submit a report to it at its sixty-second session on the implementation of the resolution.

II. Occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem

Death and injuries

3. Citing the right to self-defence from such actions as the continuation of attacks by Palestinian militants on Israeli civilians, the launching of rockets into Israeli cities from the Gaza Strip and the capture of an Israeli corporal, the Israeli army continues to mount military operations in the occupied Palestinian territory. However, there has been a marked decline in Palestinian-Israeli violence in Gaza since the ceasefire of 26 November 2006. From January 2006 to February 2007, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs recorded 697 Palestinian fatalities and 3,558 injuries as a direct result of the conflict. A total of 132 Palestinian children were killed and 515 injured.[4] No fewer than 28 of those killed and 120 of those wounded attended schools run by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). One of the deaths in the West Bank and two of the injuries in the Gaza Strip occurred while the pupils were inside their classroom.

4. In the 15 unmarked Israeli minefields in the West Bank and the Jordan Valley,[5] at least 21 casualties related to mines or explosive remnants of war were recorded from January to May 2006 (6 killed, 15 injured), mostly children.[6] In addition, Israel has introduced the use of dense inert metal explosive missiles in Bayt Hanun

[4] www.ochaopt.org/documents/PoC_tables_Feb07.xls.

[5] See Portfolio of Mine Action Projects 2006, at www.mineaction.org.

[6] *Landmine Monitor 2006*, at www.icbl.org/lm/2006/palestine.html#tnB75.

and elsewhere in the Gaza Strip, causing an increasing number of injuries that necessitate amputations.[7]

5. From January 2006 to February 2007, internal Palestinian violence, characterized by tensions between the main Palestinian factions, armed confrontations between established security organs, the creation of new security bodies, the proliferation of weapons in the Gaza Strip and the hardening of political positions, caused 248 fatalities, of which 20 were children; 1,350 injuries were recorded.[8] It should be noted that the most significant increase in Palestinian deaths and injuries was a result of intra-Palestinian violence. The Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process calculated a tenfold increase in 2006 over 2005.

6. From January 2006 to February 2007, attacks by Palestinian armed elements reportedly killed 29 Israelis and injured 524.[8]

Arbitrary arrests and detentions

7. As at March 2006, over 9,400 Palestinian political prisoners remained in Israeli prisons, 421 of whom had been imprisoned for over 10 years. Since January 2006, Israeli authorities have arrested an average of 500 Palestinians per month in serial raids on towns, particularly Bayt Hanun, Nablus and Jenin.[9]

8. About 120 Palestinian women political prisoners remain in Israeli jails, including two under 18 years of age.[10] According to the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), 8 female detainees have given birth in prison; 3 are imprisoned with their babies; 31 are not allowed to care for their children; 6 have been deprived of family visits; and 8 have been diagnosed with chronic psychological problems.

9. As at 30 September 2006, the Israeli army was detaining 389 Palestinian children, including two 12-year-old boys. It is reported that Israeli authorities have used physical coercion on 60 per cent of the children.[11]

10. At the end of December 2006, Israeli authorities were detaining 20 United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) West Bank staff members and denying UNRWA access to them.

Population displacement

11. The ongoing construction of the barrier in the West Bank has contributed to population displacement throughout the West Bank and occupied East Jerusalem.

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[7] Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, John Dugard (A/HRC/4/17), para. 10.

[8] www.ochaopt.org/documents/PoC_tables_Feb07.xls.

[9] A/HRC/4/17, paras. 10 and 43.

[10] See website of the Women's Organization for Political Prisoners, www.wofpp.org/english/december.html.

[11] Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict (A/61/529-S/2006/826), para. 65.

Of the 32.9 per cent of Palestinians living in Jerusalem who recently changed their place of residence, 17.3 per cent did so because of the barrier.[12]

12. Although population data will not be updated until the census is conducted later in 2007, the closures of the towns and villages of the West Bank, the circumvention of occupied East Jerusalem, the construction of the barrier, physical isolation and the closures imposed on the Gaza Strip have most likely led to internal migration patterns.

Property destruction and confiscation

13. In 2006, UNRWA recorded a total of 233 Palestinian structures demolished by the Israeli army in the West Bank. Of those, 115 were residential homes, 74 agricultural sites, 35 commercial stores and 9 public facilities. According to the Palestinian Bureau of Statistics, 29,314 households currently live in Israeli-damaged homes, 28,997 in Gaza Strip and 317 in the West Bank.[13]

14. Nablus was the most affected area. On 26 August 2006, 19 houses were demolished by the Israeli authorities in Nablus city. A total of 23 commercial roadside structures, used by farmers to market their produce, were demolished in Bardala village and in Marj Na`ja in the Jordan Valley for alleged lack of permits. For the same reason, the Israeli army demolished 14 livestock barracks in Zbeidat, Khibat Atuf, Frush Beit Dajan, Jiftlik and Ash Shuna.

15. Confiscation orders continued to be issued by the Israeli authorities throughout 2006. According to UNRWA, land confiscation orders were issued for 3,845 dunums in the southern West Bank (in Al Khadr, Um Salmuna, Halhoul, Yatta, Ad Dahiriyah and Beit Ummar), 1,768 dunums in the northern West Bank (in Deir Ballut, Burgin, Hajjah, Faroun, Asira and Kufur Laqef) and 1,337 in the central West Bank (mostly in Anata and Bir Nabala).

16. During 2006, the Israeli Jerusalem municipality used its home-demolition budget of 4 million new Israeli sheqalim (NIS) to flatten 68 Palestinian homes. According to a report issued by the Land Research Center in February 2007, the Jerusalem municipality conducted 10 more forced evictions of Palestinian inhabitants predicated on the state of disrepair of their homes.[14] In 2006, Palestinian inhabitants of occupied East Jerusalem lost 6,000 m^2 of residential space. The Israeli Committee against House Demolitions reported that the municipality had also confiscated building machinery, especially cement mixers, forcing higher prices for building cement, and increased the rate of financial guarantees required for courts to suspend demolitions. Israeli authorities have given forewarnings of more demolitions of Palestinian homes in 2007.

17. From March 2006 to the end of January 2007, in the Gaza Strip, the Israeli army damaged 3,077 refugee shelters and demolished 210, affecting 3,356 families.

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[12] Badil Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights and the Norwegian Refugee Council/Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, *Displaced by the Wall: Pilot Study on Forced Displacement caused by the Construction of the West Bank Wall and its Associated Regime in the Occupied Palestinian Territories* (Bethlehem and Geneva, 2006). Also available from www.badil.org/publications/Books/Wall-Report.pdf.

[13] "A Report about Housing Conditions in the Palestinian Territory, 2006", Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics.

[14] Land Research Center report, 19 February 2007.

This is a major deterioration from 2005, when 116 shelters were damaged and 37 were demolished.

18. The Gaza Strip also saw a vast increase in land levelling and excavating operations. At least 6,516 dunums of agricultural land were bulldozed in the Gaza Strip.

19. On 27 June 2006, the Israeli Air Force destroyed six transformers of the Gaza Strip's only domestic power plant, which supplied 43 per cent of Gaza's daily needs. Full electrical capacity has since been restored to Gaza by means of technical assistance from Egypt and financial support from Sweden.[15]

20. No quantification of the demolition and confiscation losses in the occupied Palestinian territory, including occupied East Jerusalem, currently exists. However, the direct damages from the military offensive by Israel from 26 June to 28 August 2006 were estimated by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) at US$ 46 million in the Gaza Strip alone.

21. In April 2006, the Israeli army narrowed the "safety zone" for artillery shelling, allowing targeting much closer to Palestinian homes and populated areas, which contributed substantially to the increase in the loss of life and property. The assault on Bayt Hanun confined 40,000 residents to their homes under curfew, as Israeli military operations resulted in the destruction of 279 homes, an 800-year-old mosque, public buildings, electricity networks, schools and hospitals, orchards, water and sanitation networks; paved roads were ripped up with specially designed back-hoes.[16] UNDP estimated infrastructure damages at $2,372,970.

Mobility restrictions and closure policies, including access to humanitarian assistance

22. The Agreement on Movement and Access signed by the Palestinian Authority and the Government of Israel under the auspices of the Quartet contains specific provisions for the movement of people and goods within the occupied Palestinian territory and outside it.

23. The first of the six points of the Agreement was the re-opening of the Rafah border crossing with Egypt, which opened on 15 November 2005. It was the first historical instance of Palestinian Authority control over an international land border crossing. From 26 November 2005 to 25 June 2006, Rafah was continuously open for passengers travelling in both directions.

24. Following an attack by Palestinians on an Israeli military post at Kerem Shalom and the capture of an Israeli soldier on 25 June 2006, the crossing was closed and access by the Border Assistance Mission of the European Union to the Rafah terminal was restricted by the Israeli authorities on security grounds. Since then, the crossing has been opened on an exceptional basis, such as during peak periods of movement by students or pilgrims. Overall, Rafah was open for an average of 14 per cent of scheduled days between 25 June and 15 December 2006. Infrequent and sporadic openings of the crossing have led to large crowds gathering

[15] See A/HRC/4/17, para. 19. See also "Act of Vengeance: Israel's Bombing of the Gaza Power Plant and its Effects", in *B'Tselem* (September 2006), available from www.btselem.org/English/Summaries/200609_Act_of_Vengeance.asp.

[16] A/HRC/4/17, para. 10.

at the terminal on designated days, leading to public insecurity. Although the mandate of the mission was renewed in November 2006, its access to the terminal remains restricted because of Israeli security concerns.

25. The Karni crossing remained closed for over 50 per cent of the scheduled time. Openings were often only partial, owing to perceived security threats by Israel. Both imports into Gaza and exports from the Strip to Israel, the West Bank and beyond suffered as a result. However, in the period from November 2006 to March 2007, exports through Karni increased by 115 per cent, which was an improvement, though still short of the targets of the Agreement on Movement and Access. Food imports plummeted in April and May, resulting in a drastic fall in Gaza's strategic reserves of wheat flour and the closure of main bakery outlets along the Strip. Import restrictions were eased in May under heavy international pressure. Gaza exports, however, experienced the deepest and most sustained restrictions during 2006. Only 12 export truckloads, on average, were able to leave Gaza from January to November 2006, a mere fraction of the 400 trucks per day envisaged for the end of 2006 under the Agreement. The effect of export restrictions on Gaza producers was severe, with some millions in lost revenues for the period.

26. The Sufa crossing is the main passage point for the import of aggregates used for construction into the Gaza Strip, and is covered by the Agreement on Movement and Access. The crossing was closed on 14 February. Since then it has not opened regularly. Overall, the crossing remained open for 60 per cent of scheduled days during the first year of implementation of the Agreement, restricting the importation of aggregates into the Gaza Strip. One effect of the restriction has been to raise the price of aggregate building materials in the Gaza Strip.

27. The Agreement provided for measures to ease the movement of Palestinians and commercial goods within the West Bank. The decrease in West Bank checkpoints, which had been verified at the end of 2005, was reversed in 2006. According to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the number of physical obstacles in the West Bank grew from 475 in January 2006 to 550 in February 2007. The main impact of these measures has been the fragmentation of the Palestinian economy in the West Bank and serious disruptions to normal links between communities and public services, employment and land.

28. The target date for establishing bus convoys to link the West Bank with the Gaza Strip, in accordance with the Agreement, was 15 December 2005; for establishing truck convoys, the date was 15 January 2006. Neither deadline was met and there has been no movement towards implementation of this provision of the Agreement.

29. The construction of a seaport has not started, and no discussions on security arrangements, reconstruction and operation of the airport have been held. The Israeli army occupied the Gaza airport for five months up to the week of 22 November 2006. Airport damages as a result of the Israeli military operation amount to an estimated $16 million.

30. The access of holders of West Bank identification cards to occupied East Jerusalem has deteriorated further since the introduction of new, elaborate terminal systems restricting access from both the Bethlehem (south) and Ramallah (north) directions. According to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, since January 2006, the Israeli army has barred Palestinian pedestrians and vehicles

from using 8 of the 12 routes to occupied East Jerusalem. Increasingly restricted access to occupied East Jerusalem impedes the ability of UNRWA to deliver refugee services to the West Bank, as 65 per cent of its West Bank field office staff are West Bank identification card holders.

31. In the West Bank, among the thousands of incidents of delayed and denied access reported by UNRWA staff, a good number affected the delivery of emergency humanitarian assistance, in particular through the hindrance of the movement of Agency or contracted vehicles transporting food aid, medicines, mobile health teams or food distribution teams. Regular programmes were affected by the impeded movement of teachers, social workers and field office staff, and the imposition of curfews on West Bank camps, villages and towns further added to the disruption of Agency services. The West Bank field office has lost an estimated 832 man-days since March 2006.

Barrier

32. Israel continues construction of the barrier, contrary to General Assembly resolution ES-10/15, in which the Assembly acknowledged the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice that the construction of the barrier in the occupied Palestinian territory, including in and around occupied East Jerusalem, was contrary to international law.

33. The construction of the barrier is having a major humanitarian impact on Palestinian communities living in the West Bank. On 30 April 2006, the Israeli Cabinet approved a second revision of the barrier route. Accordingly, the barrier will be 703 km long, an increase of 33 km compared to the previous plan.[17] The Emmanuel and Ari'el settlement groups will be split into separate fingers surrounding more than 25,500 Palestinians on three sides, with one access route on the east side of the barrier. As a result, 10,771 Palestinians from Deir Ballut, Rafat and Az Zawiyah villages will remain on the west side of the barrier, between the Green Line and the barrier. Though this will leave three Palestinian villages east of the barrier, the environmental impact on their lands will be considerable. According to the new revised route, the barrier will move approximately one and a half kilometres northwards from road 465 and incorporate olive groves and land from Rantis village. Beit Iksa village and surrounding lands will become part of the Biddu/Beit Surik enclave (about 46,321 people), currently surrounded by the barrier on three sides and closed by road 443 northwards. Al Walaja village will be encircled by the barrier and isolated from its farmland. Many sections of the barrier in the south, originally planned to be built on the Green Line, will be moved inside the West Bank.[18]

34. As at February 2007, 58 per cent of the barrier had been completed (408 km) and 9 per cent was still under construction. Construction advanced in occupied East Jerusalem, where about 55 per cent of the plans had been completed and 10 per cent were under construction. As a result, about 3,000 Bedouins living in the Ma'ale Adumin area, most of whom are refugees, are likely to be forcibly displaced. Once completed, 80 per cent of the barrier will lie within the occupied Palestinian territory and only 20 per cent on the Green Line. Furthermore, 575 km^2 (about

[17] See the website of the Israeli Ministry of Defense at www.seamzone.mod.gov.il.

[18] Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, preliminary analysis of the humanitarian implications of the April 2006 barrier projections.

10 per cent of the West Bank area) will be isolated between the barrier and the Green Line in the "seam zone". On the basis of the current route, 60,500 Palestinians living in that area will be severely affected in their access to the West Bank and main sources of livelihoods, and 31,400 will be completely encircled by the barrier.[19]

35. Palestinian communities located east of the barrier are facing increasing difficulties in reaching their farm and grazing land in the closed areas. Although the Government of Israel maintained that the barrier would not affect ownership of land and residents' access to their sources of livelihoods,[20] the Israeli permit regime and the erratic operation of gates are severely hindering Palestinian farming practices. Over 230 km^2 of the West Bank's most fertile land (some 15 per cent of all West Bank agricultural land) has already been confiscated in connection to the construction of the barrier[21] and the risk of further dispossession is very high owing to the inability of Palestinian farmers to secure continuous access to their land.

Israeli settlements

36. According to military sources, Israel's Civil Administration (the military administration in the occupied Palestinian territory) has handed over thousands of dunums of Palestinian lands in the Jordan Valley for illegal settlement construction and army bases.[22] Meanwhile, Israel authorized the establishment of a new settlement, Maskiot, in the Jordan Valley issuing a permit for the first 30 of 100 residential units. Construction of the units has not yet started.[23]

37. In March 2006, the Israeli settler population in the West Bank totalled 246,100. Their growth rate remains high, at 5.1 per cent, in contrast with the 1.8 per cent general population growth rate in Israel.[24] According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics as at January 2007, settlers numbered 260,000, in addition to some 200,000 living in occupied East Jerusalem.

38. Israeli military orders confirmed the confiscation of 1,328 dunums in occupied East Jerusalem, reportedly for the expansion of the Almon settlement near Ma'ale Adumim, which bisects the West Bank. In mid-2006, the Government of Israel authorized the near doubling of the Ramat Shlomo settlement (with about 2,000 units) in occupied East Jerusalem.[25] Some 2,700 to 3,000 Jahalin Bedouin now face further displacement by the end of 2007 to make room for the expansion of the Ma'ale Adumim E1 Block and the construction of the barrier.[26]

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[19] Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, West Bank barrier route projections, July 2006.

[20] Summary legal position of the Government of Israel (A/ES-10/248, annex I).

[21] United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Report on UNCTAD's Assistance to the Palestinian People, July 2006 (TD/B./53/2).

[22] Foundation for Middle East Peace, "Jordan Valley Short Takes", *Settlement Report*, vol. 17, No. 1 (January-February 2007).

[23] European Union Presidency statement on the Israeli-Palestinian relations (press release 544/2006, 27 December 2006; available from www.eu2006.fi/en_GB.

[24] "Population in Israel and West Bank settlements, 1995-2005", *Report on Israeli Settlement in the Occupied Territories*, vol. 16, No. 5 (September-October 2006).

[25] *Kol Ha'Zeman* (26 May 2006).

[26] Report of the Badil Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, 7 March 2007.

39. More than 3,500 housing units were under construction in West Bank settlements in October 2006, compared to 4,144 in October 2005.[27] Formerly temporary West Bank outposts have become permanent, as in the notable cases of Neve Erez, Nofei Prat, Palgei Mayim and Zayit Raanan in the Ramallah area.[28]

Natural resources, water and environment

40. The construction of the barrier has closed off the access of Palestinians to 95 per cent of their own water resources (630 million m^3 of 670 million m^3 annually) by destroying 403 wells and 1,327 cisterns.[29] It has cut off access of owners to 136 wells providing 44.1 million m^3 of water annually. The barrier has closed 46 springs (23 million m^3/year) and 906 dunums of underground water (99 per cent of underground West Bank water).[30] Consequently, over 7,000 Palestinian agriculture-dependent families have lost their livelihood[29] in a region where water resources are scarce and increasingly costly to develop.[31] The latest barrier route will isolate another 62 springs and 134 wells in the "seam zone".[32]

41. The quantity and quality of water supply and sanitation services for Palestinians in the occupied Palestinian territory are insufficient, inefficient and unreliable. The overall daily average of water consumption per capita in the occupied Palestinian territory is 85 litres (75 in the West Bank and 95 in the Gaza Strip), far below the minimum standard recommended by the World Health Organization (WHO) of 150 litres. Only 45 per cent of domestic water services meet WHO quality standards in the Gaza Strip, where high chloride and nitrate concentrations abound. In the West Bank, 87 per cent of the population accesses piped water, where 220 unserved communities rely on rainwater harvesting and costly water purchases, subjecting them to waterborne diseases and deeper impoverishment.

42. Israeli settlements and the behaviour of settlers put strain on the environment, as seen in the destruction of hundreds of fruit-bearing trees in 2006 by burning, felling and uprooting. Settlements occasionally direct their sewage flow on to agricultural lands of Palestinian farmers, affecting the West Bank villages of Yatta, Wadi Fukin and Nahhalin.[33]

43. While Israel's settlement practices are the primary cause of environmental degradation, weak and fragmented wastewater and waste management also play a role. The lack of solid waste disposal services leads to increased burning. Smoke from waste burning was the principal air pollutant for 48.4 per cent of exposed households in 2006 in the occupied Palestinian territory.[29]

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[27] Peace Now report in *Ha'aretz* (3 October 2006).

[28] *Yediot Aharonot* (16 November 2006).

[29] Data supplied by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics.

[30] See Palestinian Agricultural Association, "Impact of occupation and globalization on the agricultural sector in the Occupied Palestinian Territories", presentation at World Social Forum 2007, Nairobi (20–25 January 2007).

[31] UNDP, "Water rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territory", *Human Development Report* (New York: UNDP, 2006).

[32] See Applied Research Institute — Jerusalem, "The Effect of the Israeli Segregation Wall on the Palestinian Natural Resources", October 2006. Available from www.poica.org/editor/case_studies/view.php?recordID=929.

[33] See "Foundation for Middle East Peace Settlement Timeline", *Settlement Report*, vol. 16, No. 4 (July-August 2006) and vol. 17, No. 1 (January-February 2007).

Palestinian fiscal crisis

44. The fiscal situation of the Palestinian Authority was already considered unsustainable by the end of 2005. The fiscal situation further deteriorated following the victory of Hamas in the legislative elections in January 2006. Those electoral results led to a significant review of donor policies towards the Palestinian Authority. In March 2006, a number of key donors started rechannelling their financial support to Palestinians away from the Palestinian Authority pending its commitment to the three principles laid down by the Quartet on 30 January 2006, namely, the renunciation of violence, the recognition of Israel, and the acceptance of previous agreements and obligations, including the road map. For its part, Israel withheld Customs and Value Added Tax (VAT) revenues from the Palestinian Authority amounting to roughly $60 million per month plus interest, or approximately 50 per cent of the Palestinian Authority's monthly budget. Through the Quartet and other channels, the United Nations worked to facilitate the release of Palestinian Customs and tax revenues through agreed mechanisms; following the meeting of Mahmoud Abbas and Ehud Olmert in December 2006, Israel authorized a transfer of $100 million. The transfer was made in January 2007. The United Nations views that as a first positive step, and encourages a return to regular transfers as agreed between the parties.

45. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the financial resources of the Palestinian Authority shrank by 60 per cent, from $1.2 billion in the third quarter of 2005 to $0.5 billion by the same quarter of 2006.[34] This decline put significant strain on Palestinian institutions, particularly those providing basic public services and security, and all but halted salary payments to approximately 165,000 Palestinian Authority employees (supporting an estimated one quarter of the Palestinian population).

46. Loss of public salaries was partially compensated by the distribution of cash allowances to public sector workers and social hardship cases. Overall, the equivalent of 40 per cent of salaries was paid through the temporary international mechanism of the European Commission and Presidential accounts in 2006.[35] In addition, the international community channelled some $450 million, equivalent to 15 per cent of GDP and 90 per cent of Government revenues for the year, in direct humanitarian assistance to Palestinians through United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations. Together, these measures helped to mitigate the full effect of the fiscal crisis of the Palestinian Authority in 2006.

Public health and food insecurity

47. Under the temporary international mechanism, which supported the payment of allowances and non-salary costs for the health sector, health workers received, on average, up to 60 per cent of their normal wages from April 2006 to January 2007. Nevertheless, the financial crisis has left the public health system unable to sustain care levels, especially as 2006 was a non-investment year. Hospitals lack adequate supplies, equipment maintenance, cleaning agents and the hygienic environments necessary to control infections.

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[34] IMF, *West Bank and Gaza: Recent Fiscal and Financial Developments*, October 2006.

[35] IMF, *Mission Statement: 17 December 2006*.

48. The 15-week public workers strike over unpaid wages further crippled health services and put more pressure on clinics run by international and non-governmental organizations. Meanwhile, the Augusta Victoria Hospital in occupied East Jerusalem, which serves West Bank Palestinians, actually saw a 30 per cent decrease in in-patient numbers, due to the barrier and associated movement restrictions.[36]

49. Access to reproductive health care, including antenatal, delivery and post-natal care has been jeopardized by the long closures, the financial crisis of the Ministry of Health and the ongoing Israeli military incursions. Both primary and secondary services have declined, especially as the large majority of delivery and newborn care services (80 per cent of the deliveries in six Health Ministry hospitals in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip) are unable to perform regular maintenance. Pregnant women with post-natal complications may also be at greater risk when discharged too early from hospital owing to lack of staff and space. Emergency obstetrics has become a priority.

50. Five UNRWA mobile clinics in the "seam zone" and frontier villages are increasingly becoming the only accessible health-care services for residents of remote localities, seeing 11,200 patients monthly in 2006. Logistical constraints foiled plans to facilitate access to primary health-care services in isolated rural areas through five additional health points.

51. Food insecurity disproportionately affects women and children. A study conducted by UNRWA in September 2006 revealed that 57.5 per cent of children from 6 to 36 months and 44.9 per cent of pregnant women in the Gaza Strip were anaemic. Of children under 5, 22 per cent were vitamin A-deficient;[37] 20 per cent showed signs of iodine deficiency (32 per cent in the West Bank and 3 per cent in the Gaza Strip); and 4.1 per cent suffered from clinical vitamin D-deficiency (rickets) in the Gaza Strip. The increased incidence of non-communicable diseases, such as diabetes mellitus, cardiovascular diseases and cancer represents an epidemiological shift that imposes additional burdens on the scarce human and financial resources.

52. Significantly, 65 per cent of households rely on informal borrowing to subsist.[38] Data indicate that the majority endures a lower quality of life, including reduced caloric intake and greater economic dependency and aid reliance. The lower per capita GDP led to a decline in food consumption of 8 per cent. Palestinian households also reuse wastewater at a rate of 45.3 per cent, up from 44.7 per cent in 2005 and 39.3 per cent in 1999.[29]

53. Mental health is an increasing concern in the occupied Palestinian territory. Comprehensive data are lacking, but localized studies have shown that stressors such as severe movement restriction and lack of access to education and health care are present in everyday life. About one in four people reports suffering from some sort of psychological strain.

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[36] Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict (A/61/529-S/2006/826), para. 67.

[37] WHO considers a major public health problem a prevalence above 20 per cent.

[38] UNCTAD, op. cit., para. 8.

Youth and education

54. The public workers' strike disrupted education services. The majority of public schools were totally or partially closed, affecting some 70 per cent of students.[39]

55. In the 2006/07 academic year, no student in Gaza was able to attend technical training centres in the West Bank because none received permits to travel there. Only 10 students applied, down from the 277 who had been rejected in the previous school year.

56. Although 2005/06 examination scores improved over the previous year, educational achievement continues to wane. Only 50 per cent of West Bank eighth-grade students passed their mathematics examinations, and only 56 per cent passed their science examinations.

57. Internal closures forced teachers in the Gaza Strip away from their duty stations. Since October 2000, UNRWA schools have lost 277,973 days at a cost of over $5,559,460. During the 2005/06 scholastic year, UNRWA teachers, including those at the Gaza training centre, recorded a total loss of 13,674 teaching days. This represented an improvement over the 56,000 recorded lost during the previous reporting period.

Economic indicators

58. The unemployment rate rose to 30 per cent in the third quarter of 2006 from 29.4 per cent at the end of 2005, affecting 265,000 Palestinians and their dependants.[40] Although this rate might appear to be relatively stable under the crisis circumstances, further analysis reveals discrepancies between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the latter showing an increase of 2.2 per cent.[41] The refugee population is affected by a higher unemployment rate (32.7 per cent in November 2006) that is rapidly rising.[42] In the first half of 2006, refugee unemployment rose 5.7 per cent over the rate for the same period in 2005.[29] Young people (20-24 years) had the highest unemployment rate: 32.3 per cent in the West Bank and 53.7 per cent in Gaza Strip. Around 44,000 young people are expected to enter the labour force annually.[42] It should be noted that, while the 2005/06 employment rate appears to have remained relatively stable, the rate is now about twice that of 1999. Moreover, income derived from formal employment is likely to have fallen, thus explaining the sharp rise in poverty.

59. The number of Palestinians living in poverty in the occupied Palestinian territory is estimated at 64 per cent.[41] The most pronounced increase was seen in the Gaza Strip, where 87.7 per cent of households live below the official poverty line.[43]

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[39] UNICEF, "Six months without pay spark teachers' strike in Gaza and West Bank", New York, 5 September 2006.

[40] In a context of protracted crisis, the standard unemployment definition might be somehow deficient, since a considerable number of people simply no longer seek employment. A "relaxed definition" of unemployment is here applied, by adding to the total number of unemployed people (according to International Labour Organization standards) the number of people currently not engaged in active job hunting (commonly defined as "inactive").

[41] Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Humanitarian Monitor* (November 2006).

[42] UNRWA, *Prolonged crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territories: socio-economic impacts of the new phase on refugees and non-refugees* (November 2006).

[43] UNRWA, *Prolonged crisis in the occupied Palestinian territories: recent socio-economic trends* (November 2006).

The number of Palestinians living in deep poverty throughout the occupied Palestinian territory rose by 64.3 per cent to affect some 1,069,200 people.[43] At the end of the second quarter of 2006, the number of poor Palestinians increased to 2.1 million, compared with 1.3 million at the end of 2005.[29]

60. Palestinian GDP declined by approximately 8 per cent in the third quarter of 2006, compared to the same period in 2005. That decline was considerably less than was initially expected, mainly on account of both official and private inflows, including increased humanitarian assistance. Effects were felt the hardest in the Gaza Strip, where closures and poverty rates have been most prevalent.

61. Poverty, unemployment, closures and land loss are all causes of the current Palestinian housing shortage. However, a bigger crisis is looming: 401,867 of the households in the occupied Palestinian territory will need to build new housing units during the next 10 years. Official statistics, however, reveal that only 117,909 households will be able to do so.[13]

62. According to IMF, the banking sector in the occupied Palestinian territory remains sound, despite the depressed economy. Private sector deposits continued to expand slowly in 2006, and banks have continued to extend credit.[35]

63. Two aspects of Israeli controls over the Palestinian economy have been discussed above: intensifying closures within and around the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and the withholding of Customs and VAT revenues since the first quarter of 2006. In addition to these, a new set of external financial controls has been introduced with the implementation of the temporary international mechanism of the European Commission. These controls are designed to ensure that Palestinian Authority government channels are bypassed while still allowing for public institutions to function and aid to be transferred to social hardship cases.

Status of women

64. A large majority of women in households (83 per cent) are not at all involved in economic activities. Younger females mostly assume the domestic work and are least involved in economic activities.[44]

65. In occupied East Jerusalem, as elsewhere in the West Bank affected by closures and the barrier, many families are reluctant to let their daughters go through the degrading experience of waiting at checkpoints or barrier crossing points, to be searched and subjected to harassment by Israeli soldiers, or have to walk long distances to avoid such experiences. Consequently, families are now much more likely to pressure young women to drop out of school and not pursue a higher level of education.

66. The general fragmentation of Palestinian communities has exacerbated the isolation of women; rural women constitute a particularly vulnerable group. Attendance at rural girls' schools declines further at each education level. While women account for 44.8 per cent of public sector workers in rural communities, the public sector strike and the withholding of wages have had a devastating effect on the overall poverty rate, which in rural areas has reached an alarming 59.4 per cent.

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[44] Report of the Graduate Institute of Development Studies, available at www.unige.ch/iued/new/information/ publications/pdf/ReportVIII_ES-EN.pdf.

67. Since family coping mechanisms are exhausted, children and women (especially pregnant women) are most vulnerable to domestic and gender-based violence.

III. Occupied Syrian Golan

68. The Syrian Golan remains under the Israeli occupation that began in 1967. Israel prevents the return of the Arab population of the occupied Syrian Golan expelled in 1967. As at March 2005, 27 of the 33 Israeli settlements, developed as agricultural colonies, produce wine, beef, fruit and mineral water for Israeli domestic and export markets at preferential terms, to the detriment of the produce of the Syrian Arabs.[45]

69. In April 2006, Israel began the construction of three new tourist settlements on the occupied Lake Tiberias lowlands.[45] Matzok Orvim is a new neighbourhood that expands the settlement of Qela, where tenders for 300 dunums of settlement construction were published in 2006. Another 100 families are expected to join the settlement by summer 2007.[46] Katzrin, the largest settlement in the occupied Syrian Golan, grows by 100 residents annually.[47] On 2 July, the Avne Eitan settlement in the southern Golan announced the arrival of 20 former Gaza settler families with a plan to build them 60 homes, plus 40 homes for more newcomers. Their settlers receive a 35-dunum land allotment.[45] In December 2006, the Interior Minister announced the intention to facilitate accelerated settlement construction near the border with the Syrian Arab Republic.[48] Israel officially seeks to double its Golan Heights settler population in the next 10 years.[49]

70. The Ministry of Health of Israel funds one basic health clinic operated by the Golan Arab community. The community operates and funds five health clinics by itself, providing basic maternal and newborn health services, including vaccinations. When necessary, Syrian Arab patients seek treatment in clinics inside the Israeli settlements, or at distant referral hospitals in Israel. In June 2006, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) opened an emergency and diagnostic medical centre in Majdal Shams and provided two ambulances, addressing long-assessed needs.[50]

71. Israel replaced the Syrian curriculum with its own educational system in 1967. Israel now operates six elementary schools, three junior high schools and two high schools for Syrian Arabs.

72. The destruction by Israel of fruit trees belonging to Syrian Arabs has continued. Israel is harvesting all the Banyas River's estimated 121 million m^3 of water per year.[51] The Golan Heights supply one third of Israel's water consumption,

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[45] Data contributed by the Syrian Arab Republic, Prime Ministry, State Planning Commission.

[46] *Ma'ariv* (11 October 2006).

[47] *Washington Post* (30 October 2006).

[48] Foundation for Middle East Peace, "Golan Update", *Settlement Report*, vol. 17, No. 1 (January-February 2007).

[49] *Washington Post* (30 October 2006).

[50] "Majdal Shams Hospital" project, occupied Golan: ICRC statement (20 June 2006) available at www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/conference29-statement-200606.

[51] Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories (A/61/500), para. 84.

while Israel sells water to Syrian Arabs at prices higher than those charged to Israeli settlers.[45] Israel has confiscated Arab-owned acreage traditionally used for pasture, and that has transformed production, commercial and land-use patterns and eliminated traditional rural and pastoral occupations. Indigenous Syrian livestock production and trade have decreased. Trade in Syrian Arab-produced apples, olive oil and honey are dependent on Israeli markets. This year, ICRC helped to transport 10,000 tons of Arab-produced Golani apples to the Syrian market.[52] Israel helped to facilitate this transport and subsidized the farmers.

73. The Syrian Arab labour force in the occupied Syrian Golan numbers approximately 6,500 workers, of whom some 750 work in local services. Another 3,200 work in Israel in agriculture and construction. Local opportunities in the construction sector remain limited due to planning criteria, particularly those restricting Syrian Arab housing.

IV. Conclusions

74. A combination of intensified external and internal closures, the withholding of vital financial assistance from the Palestinian Authority and intensified conflict in 2006 have led to a measurable deepening of the socio-economic crisis in the occupied Palestinian territory. All social and public health indicators reveal declining standards in living conditions, social and spatial dismemberment, growing despair and violence. This crisis on the ground was accompanied by a weakening capacity of Palestinian institutions to independently provide for the essential services and welfare of the Palestinian population.

75. The crisis has been partly offset by increased international investment through alternative funding channels. The situation prompted the United Nations country team to launch a common appeal in December 2006 which, at $453 million, was double the amount requested in 2005. Increasing proportions of international assistance were shifted from long-term development support to immediate emergency response. While these temporary measures served to stabilize the situation to a significant degree, they were not expected to contribute to the long-term improvement of socio-economic conditions in the occupied Palestinian territory. Nor were they expected to be a substitute for the direct responsibility of local parties, or for a rejuvenated political process that could address the underlying issues of the conflict.

[52] "Occupied Golan: ICRC supports local communities by transporting apples" (2 March 2007), at www.alertnet.org/thenews/fromthefield/220224/191cfd29ce6b306bf05478513bcdf60e.htm.

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Item 6 (a) of the provisional agenda**
Implementation of and follow-up to major United Nations conferences and summits: follow-up to the International Conference on Financing for Development

Summary by the President of the Economic and Social Council of the special high-level meeting of the Council with the Bretton Woods institutions, the World Trade Organization and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (New York, 16 April 2007)

I. Introduction

1. The special high-level meeting of the Economic and Social Council with the Bretton Woods institutions, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was held on 16 April 2007. The overall theme of the meeting was "Coherence, coordination and cooperation in the context of the implementation of the Monterrey Consensus".

2. The 2007 meeting was preceded by extensive consultations within the Economic and Social Council, and between the President and members of the Bureau of the Council and the management of the Bretton Woods institutions, WTO and UNCTAD, meetings with members of the executive boards of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank and members of the UNCTAD Trade and Development Board. In the course of those consultations and meetings, the agenda and the format of the special high-level meeting were discussed and agreed upon.

3. Four sub-themes were selected to serve as the focus of substantive discussions in four parallel round tables that took place during the meeting. The four sub-themes were: (a) Good governance at all levels; (b) Voice and participation of developing countries in international economic decision-making, including the Bretton Woods institutions; (c) Realizing the Doha Development Agenda: effective use of trade and

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** E/2007/100.

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investment policies; and (d) Aid effectiveness and innovative financing for development. The meeting had before it a note by the Secretary-General (E/2007/10) that provided background information and suggested possible questions on each of the four sub-themes.

4. The meeting featured a brief opening plenary, which included statements by the President of the Economic and Social Council, Dalius Čekuolis; the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon; the President of the General Assembly, Haya Rashed Al Khalifa; the Deputy Chairperson of the Development Committee, Alejandro Werner; the President of the Trade and Development Board, Mohamed Saleck Ould Mohamed Lemine; the Deputy Managing Director of IMF, Murilo Portugal; and the Deputy Director-General of WTO, Valentine Rugwabiza. The opening plenary was followed by the four round tables, which allowed for a free-flowing discussion among the participants. A resumed afternoon plenary was devoted to reporting back on the round-table discussions and to further debate, open to all stakeholders, including civil society and the business sector.

5. The co-chairs and lead discussants of the round tables were as follows:

Round table A: Eckhard Deutscher, Executive Director, World Bank (Germany) and Willy Kiekens, Senior Executive Director, IMF (Belgium), as co-chairs, with Marjatta Rasi, Undersecretary of State for International Development Cooperation and Policy (Finland), as lead discussant;

Round table B: Clifford Marica, Minister of Trade and Industry (Suriname) and Svein Aass, Executive Director, World Bank (Norway), as co-chairs, with Murilo Portugal, Deputy Managing Director, IMF, as lead discussant;

Round table C: Ruud Treffers, Director-General for International Cooperation (Netherlands) and Mohamed Saleck Ould Mohamed Lemine, President of the Trade and Development Board, UNCTAD, as co-chairs, with Signe Ratso, Director, Directorate General for Trade, European Commission and Lakshmi Puri, Director of the UNCTAD Division for Trade in Goods and Services and Commodities, as lead discussants;

Round table D: Brigitte Girardin, Minister Delegate for Cooperation Development and Francophonie of France and Baledzi Gaolathe, Minister of Finance and Development Planning (Botswana), as co-chairs, with Hilary Benn, Secretary of State for International Development (United Kingdom), and José Antonio Ocampo, Under-Secretary-General for Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations Secretariat, as lead discussants.

6. The 2007 meeting had a significant number of participating executive and alternate directors of the Boards of the World Bank and of IMF. Other participants included ministers, vice-ministers and other high-level national officials in the areas of finance, foreign affairs and development cooperation, as well as senior representatives of United Nations agencies and other international organizations (see E/2007/INF/1). Representatives of non-governmental organizations and the business sector also participated actively in the plenary meetings and round tables.

7. A number of participants pointed out that the current world economic situation was particularly favourable to promoting development objectives related to the sub-themes selected for the 2007 meeting. Annual global growth was about 5 per cent, inflation was tame and financial stability had improved in relation to previous

decades. Gross national product was expanding in most regions of the world and forecasts for 2008 indicated similar progress. Nevertheless, serious downward risks persisted: a sharper than expected slowdown in the biggest economy; reversal of the liberalization trend if the Doha round of trade negotiations failed; possible revival of inflationary pressures and increased volatility in financial markets. It was important, therefore, for countries to bolster domestic financial foundations, and for IMF symmetrical surveillance to be strengthened, and multilateral consultations on global imbalances under the aegis of the IMF to be assisted in narrowing those imbalances.

8. What follows is a summary of the salient issues discussed in the morning and afternoon plenary meetings and in the round tables. The summary reflects observations, analyses, initiatives and recommendations put forward by participants in the course of the meeting. Several participants referred to possible themes that might be addressed by the Economic and Social Council Development Cooperation Forum in July 2007, the General Assembly High-Level Dialogue on Financing for Development in the fall 2007, and the twelfth session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD-XII) in April 2008. In my concluding remarks, I suggested that one of our tasks ahead was to ensure that the 2008 spring meeting significantly contributes to the preparation for, and success of, the Financing for Development Review Conference to be held in Doha, Qatar in the second half of 2008. The summary is structured largely on the basis of the four sub-themes mentioned above.

II. Governance at all levels

9. Most participants agreed that enhancing governance implied parallel advances on various crucial fronts. A broad framework of reference encapsulating the rule of law, sound economic policies, protection of human rights, effective democratic institutions, equitable income distribution and gender equality were necessary. That also called for strengthened bilateral and multilateral cooperation with countries making efforts on those fronts and in enhancing governance institutions. It was noted that the Bretton Woods institutions, particularly the World Bank, were actively collaborating with such efforts, and harmonizing work with other bilateral and multilateral stakeholders working in that area. It was also noted that since good governance was a prerequisite to ensure the effectiveness of official development assistance (ODA), governance constituted a key pillar of the development cooperation of many donors. Yet, good governance could not simply be imposed from outside; the principles of commitment and ownership by the recipient country were also essential.

10. A number of representatives pointed out that there was a need for greater coherence within and among the major international organizations while maintaining a diversity of donors in development cooperation. Several indicated that it would be important to support the recommendations of the United Nations High-level Panel on System-wide Coherence. They concurred with the Panel's vision of "delivering as one" and shared the view that the operational approach that contemplated one programme, one leader, one budgetary framework and, where appropriate, one office in the recipient country, offered a good starting point. In that regard, however, some other participants indicated that it still remained to be decided if the Panel's recommendations provided the adequate and needed answers.

11. Several discussants stressed the critical importance of good governance in multilateral institutions. It was a crucial factor in effective international cooperation. Multilateral institutions, including international financial institutions, should adopt the highest standards of performance and be accountable for their own actions. Transparency and appropriate participation of all relevant actors were key determinants of good governance at the national and international levels.

12. In the view of a number of participants, reducing corruption was crucial in the fight against poverty since corruption often affected the most vulnerable. The ratification of the United Nations Convention against Corruption by all countries was important. It was noted that developed countries had been slower in ratifying the Convention than developing countries. Some speakers stated that strengthening oversight agencies, together with civil society and the media, was a critical factor in combating corruption.

13. Peer reviews, drawing from civil society, the business sector and the media could also be an effective instrument to enhance good governance and combat corruption. It was suggested that the international community could assist by trying to agree on what constituted, in broad terms, a sound governance profile that could provide a benchmark for peer review.

14. Several speakers stated that good governance also implied transparent and fair market rules, effective opportunities for entrepreneurship and provision of adequate infrastructure. Some representatives stressed the need to promote business ethics in a variety of ways, including incorporating the subject in high school and university curricula for students. More generally, education was seen as critical to building capacities to promote good governance and effective institution-building. The work of the Global Compact was also seen as a significant factor in drawing together a range of principles related to business ethics, corporate social responsibility and fighting corruption.

15. According to a number of discussants, it was important at the same time that there be an adequate oversight of the financial sector to prevent financial crises. Sound management of fiscal accounts and an adequate mobilization of domestic resources to provide public services were two key dimensions of good governance. The improvement of the (progressive) tax system and the strengthening of the tax administration, particularly to combat evasion, should continue to be seen as a key task of Governments. Some participants urged further strengthening of international cooperation in tax matters to, inter alia, improve global monitoring over illicit international transactions and concealment of income and to reduce tax evasion.

16. Several speakers pointed out the importance of better international support for development and poverty eradication efforts in middle-income countries, including enhancing governance. The recent Intergovernmental Conference on Development Cooperation with Middle-income Countries, held in Madrid on 1 and 2 March 2007, had focused on that issue and considered the most suitable forms of support for those countries. The outcome of that conference was made available to members of the United Nations (A/62/71-E/2007/46) as well as other relevant forums.

17. A number of discussants also noted that good governance implied bringing together civil society and the business sector for the achievement of the goals of a number of Governments. That cooperation was particularly important in the delivery of some public services. Many participants emphasized the need for the

decentralization and strengthening of governance at the local and community levels. There were calls to enhance participatory decision-making, transparency and accountability, including the measurement of results of actions taken at the local level. It was considered important to set up structures that encouraged women and the poorest segments of the population to participate in local-level decision-making.

III. Voice and participation of developing countries in international economic decision-making, including the Bretton Woods institutions

18. Numerous representatives recalled that the Monterrey Consensus had called for broadening and strengthening the participation of developing countries and countries with economies in transition in international economic decision-making and norm-setting. They converged on the need to achieve that through a transparent, open and democratic process. Recently, some forms of participation in limited groups, such as the Group of 7 and the Group of 20, had allowed developing countries more interaction with larger actors in the international scene. In the view of a number of participants, that was a positive development. Yet, other participants expressed some skepticism regarding the value of such an approach since only a very limited number of developing countries, which were not necessarily representative, were invited to participate.

19. It was widely noted that the Bretton Woods institutions were considering the issue and that several first steps had been taken in some areas to increase the voice of developing countries. The members of IMF had, in September 2006, agreed on an ad hoc increase in the quota for China, Mexico, the Republic of Korea and Turkey. Moreover, IMF had adopted a road map for a new quota formula, a major determinant of voting power, to be finalized not later than the spring of 2008. The quota review under the new formula, together with a decision regarding basic votes to ensure that as a minimum the share of the voting power of low-income countries was preserved when the quota review materialized, was a necessary first step to correct current anomalies. Action on that front was a priority matter since it had a direct bearing on enhancing the effectiveness and legitimacy of IMF.

20. Some participants questioned whether the approved road map and the decision on basic votes would really lead to meaningful changes that addressed underrepresentation. The developed countries, with only one sixth of the world's population, had over 60 per cent of the IMF total vote, and the largest economy had "veto" power on matters requiring an 85 per cent majority. At the origin of IMF, basic votes represented about 11 per cent of total voting power and currently they represented close to only 2 per cent. The situation was unlikely to change sufficiently with the limited approach taken so far. Many discussants converged on the importance of assigning a relatively large weight to economic size in any quota formula, as well as significant weight to the population variable, while ensuring an adequate representation to small economies and countries. It also seemed important that IMF pay more attention to the mechanism of double majority (requiring 85 per cent of voting power and three quarters of the membership) and consider its use on a wider scale, for special matters. That, together with universal membership and a decision-making process characterized by consensus, fostered the participation of all.

21. It was noted that the question of adequate representation by developing countries and transition economies in the World Bank would gather momentum after the decision on that issue was taken in IMF. Technical work on that issue was proceeding in the World Bank, and the outcome of such work would be discussed by the Development Committee at its meeting in October 2007. In the meantime, efforts to strengthen the offices of executive directors with constituencies including a large number of developing countries, as well as cooperation efforts to build the capacities of developing countries and transition economies to deal with international financing issues, should continue.

22. In the view of several discussants, addressing changing public perceptions regarding the legitimacy of the Bretton Woods institutions was urgent. After the Asian crisis their credibility had suffered. Some countries seemed to be opting out of IMF through early repayment of loans, and a large number of countries were accumulating reserves as a form of self-insurance. Some representatives, however, stressed that those actions signalled positive economic conditions in the respective countries. Some speakers noted that the climate for reform was currently ripe. The economic and balance-of-payments situation of a considerable number of developing countries had improved and more developing economies in several regions were stronger. Some participants emphasized that adequate participation was also important in all bodies that set financial norms or global policies, not just the Bretton Woods institutions.

IV. Realizing the Doha Development Agenda: effective use of trade and investment policies

23. An overarching concern in the dialogue was the urgency of a successful conclusion of the Doha round of trade negotiations. Numerous participants were encouraged by the decision in New Delhi the previous week to set the deadline for end-2007 to promote a new draft text for the negotiations. In that respect, some participants expressed cautious optimism about the possibility of successfully concluding the Doha round by that date. Currently, the real challenge was more political than technical. Several speakers underscored the responsibilities incumbent on the principal actors towards a timely and meaningful completion, while others stressed that the Doha round should be about both freer trade and fairer trade. Some pointed out that there were four key deliverables in the Doha round: (a) substantially enhanced, predictable and additional market access to developing countries; (b) levelling the playing field, which entailed enhancing the rule-based framework against arbitrary action by stronger trading partners; (c) policy space so that countries could benefit from trade liberalization and a better deal with the cost of adjustment; and (d) assistance to developing countries in adjusting to trade liberalization.

24. For some discussants, as expressed in the Development Committee Communiqué of 15 April 2007, the success of the Doha round not only meant new trade opportunities but also strengthened in important ways the multilateral trading system. It was a major shared concern that the window of opportunity was drawing to a close. Failure in the Doha round would weaken multilateralism and increase the dependence of developing countries on regional and bilateral agreements. Also, there was a risk that new forms of protectionism would gather momentum. The

challenge today was effective leadership and readiness to compromise by key actors which, under present conditions, required a great deal of political courage. The changing role of a significant number of countries was also noted, namely through the emergence and active participation of new coalitions of developing countries with significant negotiating power.

25. A number of speakers pointed out the large potential gains of broader and widespread liberalization. It would promote more investment opportunities in a number of areas, for both domestic and foreign investors, benefiting the developing countries. It would also assist in enhancing the investment climate, which should lead to additional foreign direct investment. On the latter issue, a few representatives expressed a view that foreign direct investment should be directed to specific sectors and regions in need of infrastructure and increased economic activity with guidance from Governments.

26. According to several participants, the variety of estimates of benefits from liberalization as a result of the Doha round showed that gains were not clear cut. New agricultural market access would benefit a limited number of competitive agricultural exporters. There could be an erosion of the advantages for preference-receiving countries. For poor countries much of the gain would likely accrue from the liberalization of access under mode 4 (movement of natural persons) of the General Agreement on Trade in Services, the removal of non-tariff barriers and trade facilitation. The 3 per cent exemption for least developed countries of duty and quote-free access to developed country markets could exclude virtually all the products in which least developed countries were competitive, making them dependent on the good will of trade partners for market access. Given the above, many representatives argued that trade liberalization should be managed in a deliberate and gradual manner with increased assistance to deal with preference erosion.

27. A recurring concern expressed in the deliberations was the special needs of certain groups of countries: least developed countries, landlocked developing countries and small island developing States. It was noted that sufficient policy space was particularly necessary for such countries owing to their structural constraints and specific vulnerabilities. Trade facilitation was critical for adequate progress in the exports of all of those countries. Landlocked countries required assistance to transit their goods expeditiously and to lower transport and insurance costs. Moreover, countries in those groups should not be required to undertake commitments that were too costly to implement. Some representatives stressed that WTO members should not impose commitments on WTO-acceding countries that they themselves were not undertaking as, for example, in some areas of services.

28. Many representatives underlined that building competitive productive capacity was essential in order to respond to new trading opportunities. In a large number of low-income countries capacity expansion for exports was as important as market access. Some participants emphasized that strengthening productive capacities required solid and competitive domestic firms with the requisite skills and technology and the adequate infrastructure so that products could be efficiently financed, produced, transported and traded. To that end, developing countries needed to supplement domestic efforts, private and public investments, with foreign direct investment and, where appropriate, ODA, particularly in export-oriented industries. Yet, in designing those elements of the country's development strategy, it

should be recognized that no single set of policies was likely to be universally valid. Such policies should always be designed in the light of country-specific conditions.

29. A large number of representatives mentioned the key role of aid for trade as a critical response to the capacity-building issue. Aid for trade could be a necessary catalyst for leveraging investment, entrepreneurship and reform. Such aid, in the view of some discussants, should be predictable, avoid the introduction of burdensome conditionality and be adequately financed, additional to other development assistance and preferably grants. It would require greater cooperation and coherence among WTO, UNCTAD, the World Bank, IMF and among trade, finance and development ministries in donor and beneficiary countries. It was also noted that international financial institutions had an important role in assisting developing countries to establish mechanisms for risk mitigation, for example management of foreign exchange risks and partial risk guarantees to encourage more foreign investment in infrastructure projects.

30. Several participants pointed out that world trade was expanding at a swift pace and that a new geography of trade relations was emerging, with a significant number of developing countries playing an increasing role. The new situation had opened up opportunities for more rapidly expanding South-South trade by exploiting emerging new complementarities. The conclusion of the third round of the Global System of Trade Preferences as well as trilateral (South-South-North) cooperation was particularly important for developing countries to take full advantage of opportunities offered by the current situation.

V. Aid effectiveness and innovative financing for development

31. According to many participants, aid effectiveness was a critical factor in international cooperation outcomes. Enhancing that effectiveness involved efforts in many areas, and those efforts should accompany parallel efforts to increase aid volumes. Some participants stressed the importance of giving a stronger voice to developing countries in improving the aid architecture, including monitoring of the volume and composition of aid flows and policies to enhance effectiveness. The Development Cooperation Forum to be launched in July 2007 would constitute a good opportunity to give a stronger voice to developing countries in reviewing the evolution of the aid architecture.

32. Some representatives indicated that efficient aid delivery involved action on many fronts, several of which were particularly important: (a) as much aid as possible should be available on a predictable basis; (b) specific conditions and challenges of delivering aid to fragile States deserved special consideration; (c) there was a need to ensure that aid was better distributed so as to avoid "donor darlings" and "donor orphans"; (d) the issue of aid effectiveness in the United Nations system should be addressed to make the United Nations development assistance channels more attractive to donors; (e) the progress that had been made on innovative sources of finance should be built on; and (f) there was a need to ensure that development aid would lead to "climate proof" aid programmes to prevent environmental degradation.

33. A number of participants emphasized the need to improve aid effectiveness by enhancing ownership, coordination and harmonization of donors, streamlining conditionalities and expanding budget support. In the view of several discussants,

more needed to be done to ensure true country ownership. A larger share of aid could go to budget support in the recipient country with parliamentary oversight in the allocation of resources. More efforts were necessary to align aid programmes with the national development strategy and to take into account country systems and capacities. Some discussants expressed concern that a considerable part of development assistance was spent on procurement from donor countries and international consultants.

34. It was pointed out that research by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 30 developing countries had found that those countries were receiving one mission per country per day on average. That showed that more effective coordination among donors was necessary. For some discussants, however, more coordination raised the danger of "donor monopoly". Others felt that donor coordination was not so essential. In any event, the recipient country should take the lead in enhancing coordination efforts and aid effectiveness efforts should focus mostly on achieving results.

35. Regarding aid flows, several representatives expressed concern at the decline of ODA in real terms in 2006. That was mostly due to much lower amounts of debt relief which, in the recent past, had constituted a substantial part of total aid. That decline had to be seen in the perspective of commitments made by donor countries to substantially increase aid, something they had done from 2002 to 2005, and the flows required to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. Strong additional efforts were necessary for many donors to meet the target they had set for 2010, including the Group of 8 target of doubling aid to sub-Saharan Africa in that same year. Indeed, the need to scale-up aid flows had figured prominently in the spring 2007 meetings of the Bretton Woods institutions.

36. Some discussants questioned the approach that included humanitarian aid and debt relief in the aid flows. Humanitarian aid and debt relief did not provide fresh resources for development projects or programmes. Moreover, the actual value of debt that could not be paid was necessarily lower than its nominal or book value. Other participants stressed that the priority was on humanitarian aid and that development aid should be aimed where it could help generate growth and, in the long run, help people lift themselves out of poverty. In that context, it was mentioned that Iraq expected support and assistance from the international community, including the Bretton Woods institutions, WTO and other multilateral institutions, in fulfilment of commitments regarding reconstruction and the International Compact with Iraq.

37. Addressing aid predictability, several speakers highlighted the potentially negative impact of stop-and-go aid flows. Abrupt changes in aid disbursements made it difficult to implement development programmes in low-income countries and had an adverse impact on macroeconomic stability. It also made financial planning much more complex in multilateral development agencies such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). A number of participants stressed that increased aid effectiveness and showing the concrete results of aid in international cooperation were crucial for a smooth mobilization of official resources, as it would help policy makers convince their parliaments that financing development was money well spent. For example, it was important to note that the number of people living on less than one dollar a day had fallen below the one

billion mark and that child mortality in several countries, particularly in Africa, had declined substantially.

38. It was pointed out that aid predictability, together with other critical issues related to aid effectiveness, would be addressed at a high-level meeting in Ghana in 2008 to take stock of the implementation of the Paris Declaration. An OECD Development Assistance Committee working party had been established to prepare the meeting. Hope was expressed that the process of reviewing implementation of the Paris Declaration would reach beyond the confines of OECD/DAC and that there would be adequate participation of developing countries.

39. A number of participants questioned the prominence given to aid effectiveness in the current discussions. Issues such as tax evasion, particularly tax havens that facilitated an evasion of the order of US $255 billon annually, and reduction of non-essential or superfluous expenditures to free resources for achieving the Millennium Development Goals had to be tackled.

40. Several representatives also stressed the key role of business. Development assistance was not a long-term solution; aid dependence had to be reduced. Creating productive employment and an enabling environment for private investments had to be prioritized. Aid could be used to leverage such investments. Moreover, it was stated that the private sector could play, and in some countries it already did play, an essential role in development financing. Tapping the resources of the private sector was one of the most important challenges a country and its entrepreneurs faced.

41. Some discussants pointed out that a careful analysis of the structural adjustment programmes of the Bretton Woods institutions was necessary to ensure that the policies advocated in such programmes did not impact adversely on those that they were aiming to lift out of poverty. At the same time, they called for more coherence between aid, trade and financial policies of donor countries. Several participants emphasized the importance of the gender dimension in development finance, in particular, the effective participation of women in the implementation of aid programmes and the adoption of gender-sensitive budgeting.

42. In the view of several participants, fragile States and least developed countries, small island developing States and landlocked developing countries, many of which were in sub-Saharan Africa, required special attention. Cooperation efforts, including ODA, technical assistance and commitments in multilateral trade negotiations, had to be better tailored to their specific conditions.

43. The recent launching of new innovative financing mechanisms was addressed by a substantial number of speakers. It was emphasized that innovative sources of finance complemented official aid; they were not a substitute. The aim was to mobilize additional resources and channel them on a predictable and stable basis. The launching and implementation of the International Drug Purchase Facility (UNITAID) had shown that collecting additional funds through innovative sources of finance, such as levies on air flight tickets, was feasible. Besides, consumers on balance had not reacted negatively. Some participants, however, questioned the approach of earmarking taxes by targeting specific businesses. A number of representatives noted the potential for synergy among some of those initiatives, in particular to make progress in the health front with UNITAID, Advanced Market Commitments (AMCs) and the International Financial Facility for Immunization (IFFIm).

44. Several representatives proposed that the experience gained through pilot schemes of innovative sources of finance be scaled up. In the view of some representatives, other options also deserved attention, such as the following: the Philippines had experienced positive results with debt equity swaps, a scheme which had been endorsed in a recent Association of Southeast Asian Nations summit and deserved further study by the United Nations; Spain had proposed the creation of a fund to facilitate the use of remittances for development purposes, while working together with the private sector to reduce the costs of transfers and considering a high-level international dialogue on that issue; and the proposed Costa Rica consensus was geared to mobilize additional ODA support for low-income and middle-income countries that increased social spending by cutting military expenditures.

45. It was noted by many participants that the halfway point to 2015 was about to be reached; only seven and a half years were left to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. It was thus important to move the development agenda forward at a faster pace. The unique format and comprehensive nature of the Monterrey Consensus allowed it to be an effective multi-stakeholder mechanism to help in that endeavour. It had brought together and given voice to all parties with a stake in development. The Financing for Development process provided the opportunity to foster rapid and substantial progress in achieving the Millennium Development Goals and other internationally agreed development goals, as well as other aspects of national development strategies. One of the most constructive aspects of that process was the integrated and coordinated contribution of the United Nations, the Bretton Woods institutions, WTO, UNCTAD and other major stakeholders. Indeed, the sub-themes chosen for deliberations in the special high-level meeting in 2007 were all central to development cooperation.

United Nations A/62/77

General Assembly

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7 May 2007

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Sixty-second session
Item 115 (a) of the preliminary list*
Elections to fill vacancies in subsidiary organs and other elections

Election of seven members of the Committee for Programme and Coordination

Note by the Secretary-General

1. In accordance with Economic and Social Council resolution 2008 (LX) and General Assembly decision 42/450, the members of the Committee for Programme and Coordination are nominated by the Council and elected by the Assembly.

2. The membership of the Committee in 2007 is as follows (term of office expires on 31 December in the year indicated):[1] Algeria (2007); Argentina (2008); Armenia (2008); Belarus (2008); Benin (2008); Brazil (2008); Bulgaria (2008); Central African Republic (2008); China (2007); Comoros (2009); Cuba (2008); France (2009); Ghana (2007); Haiti (2009); India (2008); Indonesia (2008); Iran (Islamic Republic of) (2008); Israel (2008); Italy (2008); Jamaica (2007); Japan (2007); Kenya (2007); Pakistan (2008); Portugal (2008); Republic of Korea (2007); Russian Federation (2009); Senegal (2008); South Africa (2008); Switzerland (2008); Uruguay (2008) Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) (2009); and Zimbabwe (2009).

3. The General Assembly, at its sixty-second session, will be called upon to elect seven members, on the nomination of the Economic and Social Council, to fill the vacancies in the Committee that will occur on 31 December 2007 upon the expiration of the terms of office of the following members: Algeria, China, Ghana, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya and Republic of Korea.

4. In accordance with General Assembly decision 42/450, the vacancies are to be filled as follows:

(a) Three members from African States;

(b) Three members from Asian States;

(c) One member from Latin American and Caribbean States.

* A/62/50.

[1] There are two vacancies in the Group of Western European and Other States for members whose term of office would begin on the date of election. One term will expire on 31 December 2008 and the other on 31 December 2009.

07-33306 (E) 290507

5. By its decision 2007/201 B, the Economic and Social Council nominated the following seven Member States for election by the General Assembly at its sixty-second session for a three-year term beginning on 1 January 2008: Bangladesh, China, Jamaica, Kenya, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Niger and Republic of Korea.

6. The geographical distribution of the nominated Member States is as follows:

(a) African States (three vacancies): Kenya, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and Niger;

(b) Asian States (three vacancies): Bangladesh, China and Republic of Korea;

(c) Latin American and Caribbean States (one vacancy): Jamaica.

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General Assembly
Economic and Social Council

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General Assembly
Sixty-second session
Item 56 (d) of the preliminary list*
Sustainable development: protection of global climate for present and future generations of mankind

Economic and Social Council
Substantive session of 2007
Geneva, 2-27 July 2007
Item 13 (e) of the provisional agenda**
Economic and environmental questions: environment

Products harmful to health and the environment

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The present report is submitted in compliance with General Assembly resolution 39/229, in which the Secretary-General was requested to report every three years, through the Economic and Social Council, on products harmful to health and the environment, including the review of the publication of the Consolidated List of Products Whose Consumption and/or Sale have been Banned, Withdrawn, Severely Restricted or Not Approved by Governments. The List, containing restrictive regulatory decisions on chemicals and pharmaceuticals, is prepared based on information already available in bodies of the United Nations system, as part of an effort to disseminate information internationally on products harmful to health and the environment.

The report provides an overview of activities undertaken by United Nations entities and other major developments in the area of environmentally sound management of chemicals since the previous triennial review in 2004. It also contains recommendations for consideration by the Economic and Social Council.

* A/62/50.
** E/2007/100.

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I. Introduction

1. The issue of products harmful to health and the environment was first discussed by the General Assembly in 1979. In its resolution 37/137, the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to prepare a Consolidated List of Products Whose Consumption and/or Sale Have Been Banned, Withdrawn, Severely Restricted or Not Approved by Governments[1] on the basis of the work already being undertaken within the United Nations system. In its resolution 39/229, the Assembly decided, inter alia, that an updated Consolidated List should be issued annually and that the data should be made available to Governments and other users through direct computer access. In accordance with that decision, the format of the List has been kept under continued review, in cooperation with the relevant organs, organizations and bodies of the United Nations system, with a view to its improvement, taking into account its complementary nature, the experience obtained and the views expressed by Governments. In the same resolution the Assembly also requested the Secretary-General to inform the Assembly, at its forty-first session and every three years thereafter, through the Economic and Social Council, on the implementation of the aforementioned resolutions.

2. In response to its resolution 2001/33, in which the Council requested the Secretary-General to look into the possibility of using online dissemination, in addition to preparing it for printing, List data was posted on the website of the Office for Economic and Social Council Support and Coordination of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs in September 2003. In its most recent resolution concerning the List, 2004/55, the Council requested the Secretary-General to continue to update the electronic version of the Consolidated List, while printing only new data to complement previously printed issues for the benefit of those, particularly in developing countries, who may not have easy access to the electronic version.

3. The present report, covering the eighth triennial review of the Consolidated List, is prepared in compliance with the aforementioned and other relevant resolutions of the General Assembly (38/149 and 44/226) and of the Economic and Social Council (1998/41, 2001/33 and 2004/55). It provides an overview of major recent developments, reported by organizations of the United Nations system, regarding products that are harmful to human health and the environment, and makes proposals regarding the possible impact of those developments on the format, content, coverage, production schedule and distribution pattern of the List.

II. Review of the Consolidated List

A. Format, scope and content

4. Continuous review of the format and content of the Consolidated List have made it possible to expand its coverage and scope. While the List, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 37/137, has remained easy to read and understand, the number of products listed and the number of Governments reporting have increased

[1] See A/41/329-E/1986/83, A/44/276-E/1989/78, A/47/222-E/1992/57, A/50/182 and Corr.1-E/1995/66 and Corr.1, A/53/156-E/1998/78, A/56/115 and Corr.1-E/2001/92 and Corr.1 and A/59/81-E/2004/63.

regularly with each new issue. Thus, whereas the first issue of the List covered fewer than 500 products (both pharmaceuticals and chemicals) regulated by 60 Governments, the two most recent issues (one containing pharmaceuticals and the other, chemicals) together contain over 1,100 products regulated by 115 Governments.

5. The scope of information contained in the List has remained essentially the same over the years. The List is divided in two parts. Part I, compiled by the United Nations, the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), contains the text of restrictive regulatory decisions taken by competent national authorities on both pharmaceutical (monocomponents, combinations and groups) and chemical (agricultural and industrial) products. Consumer products have been included only when they are hazardous because of their chemical composition. Psychotropic and narcotic substances covered by international conventions are included only in cases where a country has notified WHO either that the substance is controlled more rigorously than is provided for under the relevant international conventions or that the substance has been subjected to national control before being considered for international scheduling. The List does not include many widely used industrial chemicals to which occupational exposure limits have been assigned by national authorities. Information on those products is available in publications of the International Labour Organization (ILO).[2] Similarly, relevant information on food additives, which fall outside the scope of the List, is considered by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission.[3] The regulatory information in the List also includes references to the relevant legal and statutory documents to enable the user to ascertain the legal context and scope of the regulations. There are, in addition, bibliographic references to scientific and technical studies by international organizations relating to chemical products. The List also includes an alphabetical and classified listing by use category of products, and three indexes: scientific and common names, trade/brand names and Chemical Abstract Service registry numbers.

6. WHO regularly provides explanatory comments regarding information on related national regulatory actions taken concerning most pharmaceutical products. Those comments contain useful information reflecting the position of Governments on their regulatory actions in the light of different national priorities, providing context for those actions. UNEP and the International Programme on Chemical Safety, however, are not able to provide similar comments on regulatory actions related to chemicals, because of the large number of products in which the chemicals appear and the many applications of those products. Nevertheless, in the case of pesticides and chemicals covered under the conventions, decision guidance documents, prepared by the Convention secretariats, provide detailed information, including summaries of risk and benefits and reasons for regulatory action.

7. Part II of the Consolidated List contains commercial information relating to a large proportion of the products included in Part I. The commercial data is compiled by the United Nations Secretariat from publicly available sources and includes information on the manufacturers of the products and the generic and, if available, proprietary trade names under which they are marketed worldwide. Only the name

[2] See http://www.ilo.org/public/english/protection/safework/standard.htm#cr_specrisk.

[3] See http://www.codexalimentarius.net.

and location of the parent company are included in the List, even when the actual producer is a subsidiary located in another country. An effort is made to verify collected commercial data with the respective manufacturer before printing the List.

8. Recognizing that all pharmaceutical and chemical products are potentially harmful if not correctly used, it is worthwhile to highlight a number of considerations that may affect the contents of the Consolidated List, such as: (a) the fact that decisions taken by a limited number of Governments on a specific product may not be representative of the policy position of other Governments, particularly in view of differing risk/benefit considerations; (b) the fact that a given product is not included in the List as regulated by a country does not necessarily mean that its use is permitted in that country; rather, it may mean that the relevant regulatory decision to prohibit its use has not yet been communicated to the United Nations, WHO or UNEP; and (c) in the case of pharmaceuticals and pesticides, which are frequently subject to compulsory registration procedures, the product may not have been submitted for registration.

9. As previously noted, information on pharmaceutical products included in the List is provided by WHO, which collects and disseminates it through various exchange mechanisms, among them: (a) the international drug monitoring programme, which collaborates in monitoring suspected adverse drug reactions with the aim of identifying, at the earliest possible moment, the possibility of a drug producing undesirable effects which were not detected during its clinical trials; (b) the WHO certification scheme on the quality of pharmaceutical products moving in international commerce, through which the exporting country is required to certify, on request, the quality control standards for drugs; and in the case of a product not authorized for sale or distribution in the exporting country, the reasons are explicitly stated and, when relevant, grounds for refusal are disclosed; (c) WHO drug information circulars, containing information received from Member States on the safety and efficacy of drugs, including any decision to prohibit or limit the availability of a drug already in use, any decision to refuse the approval of a new drug and any approval when accompanied by restrictive provisions.

10. Information on a considerable number of chemical products and related data included in the Consolidated List have been provided by UNEP from a variety of sources, especially the legal file of the International Register of Potentially Toxic Chemicals and submissions made under the original voluntary prior informed consent procedure. In 1995, however, UNEP ceased updating the legal file. In 1998, when the original voluntary prior informed consent procedure was superseded by the interim procedure, operated in accordance with the provisions of the Rotterdam Convention, it became apparent that virtually all the notifications of bans or severe restrictions previously submitted under the original procedure did not meet the new information requirements, as set out in annex I to that legally binding Convention. Consequently, the Convention secretariat considers as valid only those notifications of bans or severe restrictions that meet the requirements of the Convention. Notwithstanding that the number of products covered under the Convention is still rather limited, it would be useful to continue to provide information on identified restricted products through the List, until the Rotterdam Convention review process can take a decision on the inclusion of many of those products.

11. In connection with the asymmetry between the small number of chemical products currently covered under the chemicals conventions (Rotterdam and

Stockholm) and the large number of chemical products that are included in the Consolidated List (over 500), it is worthwhile to mention that it will take longer to add new products under the conventions, with their legally binding mandates, their focus on specific products and their strict criteria for the inclusion of new products, including detailed documentation. However, the List is an instrument mandated by the General Assembly in its resolution 37/137, and others, with the primary responsibility of disseminating information available within the United Nations system on products harmful to health and the environment on which regulatory actions have been taken by Governments, to as wide an audience as possible.

12. It is also important to note that summaries of notification of regulatory action received by the Rotterdam Convention secretariat, if not satisfying all elements of the criteria specified in annex I to the Convention, are not published; only limited information is circulated. Irrespective of the decision of the Convention secretariat, those notifications are deemed to be valid within respective issuing countries and thus considered for inclusion in the List.

B. Utilization and dissemination

13. In view of the growing amount of data included in the List, at the 1996 inter-agency consultative meeting it was decided to divide the single annual issue into two, to be printed in alternate years, containing chemical and pharmaceutical data. Dividing the List into two separate issues has aided not only in the handling of large and growing databases, but also has made it possible to print the number of copies according to the needs of each group of users, thereby facilitating the distribution of the publication to a more focused group of users every year.

14. The List continues to present, in a unified manner, information available in bodies of the United Nations system on restrictive regulatory decisions taken by Governments on a range of pharmaceutical and chemical products. As such, it is a recognized source of valuable information that enables Governments to ensure access to information that may be useful in taking appropriate regulatory measures for the use of pharmaceutical and chemical products in the light of their particular national circumstances. The provision of information on the trade names under which the products are marketed adds value to the List and makes it easier for national authorities and others monitoring such activities to identify a restricted product available in a local market. The identification of a product with its manufacturer also provides access to safety data sheets and other information available from the manufacturer. In addition, commercial data provides an easy method to cross-reference trade names with recognized common scientific names under which most regulatory information is available. Other users of the List include intergovernmental organizations, academic institutions, concerned non-governmental organizations, the media and other members of civil society. The List has proved to be an important tool for public interest and consumer groups because it brings to the attention of Governments and manufacturers the need to remove hazardous products from the marketplace and raises awareness among public officials and non-governmental organizations of the health-related effects of using certain products.

15. As mentioned previously, in compliance with Economic and Social Council resolution 2001/33, in which the Council requested the Secretary-General to look

into the possibility of online dissemination of the List, the eighth issue of the List, containing complete historical data on pharmaceuticals, was the first to be printed as well as posted on the website of the Office of Economic and Social Council Support and Coordination of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, in September 2003.

16. Since then, two issues, containing the most recent data available on chemicals and pharmaceuticals, have been posted on the Internet and a short version of each has been published containing only information arising or updated since the publication of the respective previous issue. The short version is printed for the benefit of those users, particularly in developing countries, who may not have easy access to the Internet, or those who would like to continue to receive the printed publication for reasons of their own. It is recommended that the short version be used in conjunction with the previous printed issues of the List.

17. Starting with the second issue of the Consolidated List, a questionnaire has been included for the purpose of assisting the Secretariat to determine the use to which it is being put. The List continues to play an important role in facilitating information and decision-making concerning products that are restricted in some countries but still available in others.

III. Developments since the previous triennial report

A. International cooperation mechanisms and chemical conventions

18. Since the adoption of Agenda 21, by the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development,[4] the work of the organizations of the United Nations system has reflected the preoccupation with the environmentally sound management of toxic chemicals. The current work on products harmful to health and the environment is based generally on the principles indicated in chapter 19 of Agenda 21, which encourages increased national and international efforts. The International Programme on Chemical Safety[5] was designated as the nucleus for international cooperation. Chapter 19 calls also for increased coordination of United Nations bodies and other international organizations involved in the assessment and management of chemicals. That has led to the establishment of two new coordination mechanisms, the Inter-Organization Programme for the Sound Management of Chemicals and the Intergovernmental Forum on Chemical Safety, to strengthen coordination at the international level.

19. In September 2002, the World Summit on Sustainable Development[6] adopted the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation,[6] which reflected renewed commitments to the sound management of chemicals and included some new commitments and targets, such as (a) the aim to achieve, by 2020, the use and production of chemicals in ways that lead to the minimization of significant adverse effects on human health

[4] *Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 3-14 June 1992*, vol. I, *Resolutions Adopted by the Conference* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.93.I.8 and corrigendum), resolution 1, annex II.

[5] See http://www.who.int/pcs.

[6] *Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg, South Africa, 26 August-4 September 2002* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.03.II.A.1 and corrigendum), chap. I, resolution 2, annex.

and the environment; (b) the development, by 2005, of a strategic approach to international chemicals management; (c) national implementation of the new globally harmonized system of classification and labelling of chemicals, to be fully operational by 2008; (d) the entry into force of the Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions, by 2003 and 2004, respectively; (e) the development of coherent and integrated information on chemicals, such as through national pollutant release and transfer registers; (f) the reduction of risks posed by heavy metals; and (g) issues related to hazardous waste. The World Summit provided fresh impetus to the ongoing work of the relevant organizations of the United Nations system and intergovernmental processes concerned with the environmentally sound management of chemicals. A brief summary of the activities undertaken by some of those mechanisms since the previous report of the Secretary-General is provided below.

1. Inter-Organization Programme for the Sound Management of Chemicals

20. The Inter-Organization Programme for the Sound Management of Chemicals[7] was established in 1995, in response to the Rio Summit, to serve as a mechanism to coordinate the efforts of intergovernmental organizations in the assessment and management of chemicals. It provides a forum for its seven member and two observer organizations[8] to collaborate as partners in the promotion of international work related to the environmentally sound management of chemicals, within the framework of their own respective mandates. The Intergovernmental Forum on Chemical Safety carries out a number of activities related to the safety of chemicals as a contribution to the Inter-Organization Programme for the Sound Management of Chemicals.

21. An Inter-organization Coordinating Committee brings together representatives of the participating organizations of Inter-Organization Programme for the Sound Management of Chemicals for consultations on the planning, programming, implementation and monitoring of their activities. The Committee has established coordinating groups, which enable interested organizations working in those areas to discuss ways and means of ensuring that their activities are mutually supportive, to monitor progress and to identify issues of concern. Those coordinating groups have dealt with such issues as the harmonization of chemical classification systems; information exchange on chemicals; pollutant release and transfer registers; assessment of existing chemicals; chemical accident prevention, preparedness and response; and identification and management of stockpiles of obsolete pesticides and other chemicals. The Committee has direct responsibility for the coordination of the capacity-building activities of the participating organizations.

2. Intergovernmental Forum on Chemical Safety

22. In 1994, the International Conference on Chemical Safety established the Intergovernmental Forum on Chemical Safety.[9] The Forum brings together public

[7] For further information, see http://www.who.int/iomc.

[8] FAO, ILO, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, UNEP, United Nations Industrial Development Organization, United Nations Institute for Training and Research and WHO, and two observer organizations, United Nations Development Programme and the World Bank.

[9] See http://www.who.int/ifcs.

and private stakeholders, including Governments, intergovernmental bodies, non-governmental organizations and other representatives of civil society, in efforts to arrive at policy guidance and strategies to build partnerships and enhance coordination in the promotion of chemical safety. The Forum, a non-institutional organization, has held five sessions since its inception.

23. At its first session, in 1994, the Forum adopted priorities for action for the effective implementation of the programme areas set out in chapter 19 of Agenda 21. In Ottawa in 1997, at its second session, the Forum provided further recommendations to the General Assembly, at its special session in 1997, for the review of progress in the implementation of Agenda 21. The third session, in 2000, adopted the Bahia Declaration and Priorities for Action beyond 2000.

24. The fourth session, which was held in Bangkok in 2003 under the theme "Chemical safety in a vulnerable world", focused on the topics of children and chemical safety, occupational safety and health, generation and availability of hazard data, acutely toxic pesticides and capacity-building, and adopted resolutions and made recommendations on (a) a globally harmonized system for the classification and labelling of chemicals; (b) the prevention of illegal international traffic in toxic and dangerous products; and (c) a strategic approach to international chemicals management.

25. The fifth session, held in Budapest in September 2006, under the theme "Chemical safety for sustainable development", considered issues including precaution, heavy metals, toys and chemical safety and the future of the Forum. It identified a series of potential next steps to assist developing countries and countries with economies in transition with tools and approaches to applying the precautionary approach in the domestic decision-making processes. The Budapest Statement on Mercury, Lead and Cadmium was issued, which combines the possibility of strengthening the use of voluntary instruments for those three heavy metals and the opportunity to consider a legally binding instrument for mercury to address the risks it poses to human health and the environment. In the light of the final agreement reached on the Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management (see paras. 36-42), a working group was established to prepare a draft decision on the future role and functions of the Intergovernmental Forum on Chemical Safety to avoid duplication and to achieve an efficient institutional assessment that maximizes synergies and cost effectiveness. The decision will be presented to the sixth session, which will take place in Dakar, probably in 2009.

3. Persistent organic pollutants (Stockholm Convention)

26. Persistent organic pollutants,[10] attracted attention owing to evidence that exposure to very low doses can pose a risk to human health and the environment. In 1997, after assessing available information and concluding there was a need for international action, the Governing Council requested that UNEP convene an Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for an International Legally Binding Instrument for Implementing International Action on Certain Persistent Organic Pollutants, beginning with the 12 specified persistent organic pollutants.[11] The

[10] See http://www.chem.unep.ch/pops.

[11] Nine pesticides: aldrin, chlordane, DDT, dieldrin, endrin, heptachlor, mirex and toxaphene; two industrial chemicals: hexachlorobenzene and polychlorinated biphenyls; and two unintended by-products: dioxins and furans.

Committee held five sessions from 1998 to 2000 to conclude negotiations on a convention (the Stockholm Convention), which was signed in May 2001 and entered into force on 17 May 2004.

27. The Convention called for international action on 12 persistent organic pollutants in three categories: pesticides, industrial chemicals and unintended by-products. Governments were asked to promote the best available techniques and best environmental practices to replace existing persistent organic pollutants and prevent the development of new ones. Criteria and procedures have been developed to identify other such chemicals. Other key elements of the Convention included the provision by developed countries of new and additional financial resources; control measures to eliminate the production and use of intentionally produced persistent organic pollutants; the elimination of unintentionally produced persistent organic pollutants, where feasible; environmentally sound management and disposal of persistent organic pollutant wastes; and substitution involving the use of safer chemicals and processes to prevent toxic by-products.

28. The first Conference of the Parties to the Stockholm Convention, which was held in Punta del Este, Uruguay, in May 2005, decided on the evaluation of the continued need for DDT use for disease vector control and established: (a) a review process for entries in the register of specific exemptions; (b) a reporting schedule; (c) arrangements for monitoring data on persistent organic pollutants; and (d) a review committee. It adopted guidelines for the financial mechanism, rules of procedures, financial rules and a budget for the secretariat.

29. The second Conference was held in Geneva, from 1 to 5 May 2006. It adopted 18 decisions on, inter alia, DDT, exemptions, financial resources and mechanisms, implementation plans, technical assistance, synergies and effectiveness evaluation. The third Conference was scheduled to take place in April and May 2007, in Dakar.

30. The first meeting of the Persistent Organic Pollutants Review Committee was held in November 2005, in Geneva, and considered five chemicals proposed for inclusion in the Convention. The Committee agreed that all five chemicals fulfilled the criteria for inclusion and asked the parties to submit information to develop risk profiles. The second Review Committee meeting, held in November 2006, also in Geneva, approved the risk profiles and agreed that the five new proposals submitted for consideration fulfilled the criteria for inclusion.

4. Prior informed consent (Rotterdam Convention)

31. As a result of continuous collaboration that began in 1989 between FAO and UNEP on the principle of prior informed consent,[12] the Conference of Plenipotentiaries, held in the Netherlands on 10 September 1998 adopted the Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade. The Convention was signed by 72 States and one regional economic integration organization and entered into force on 24 February 2004. UNEP and FAO were jointly designated as the secretariat for the Convention.

32. The objective of the Convention is to promote shared responsibility and cooperative efforts among parties in the international trade of certain hazardous

[12] See http://www.pic.int.

chemicals in order to protect human health and the environment from potential harm and to contribute to their environmentally sound use by facilitating information exchange about their characteristics, thereby providing for a national decision-making process on their import and export and disseminating such decisions to the parties. The Convention applies to banned or severely restricted chemicals or pesticides and also includes severely hazardous pesticide formulations that are not otherwise banned or severely restricted by the Convention. It originally covered 27 products,[13] including 17 pesticides, 5 severely hazardous pesticide formulations and 5 industrial chemicals. A total of 39 chemicals are currently subject to the interim prior informed consent procedure, 28 pesticides including severely hazardous pesticide formulations and 11 industrial chemicals.

33. After reviewing notifications of the final regulatory actions to ban or severely restrict 14 chemicals, at its first session, in Geneva in February 2005, the Chemicals Review Committee of the Convention concluded that only one notification on chrysotile asbestos met the information requirement for inclusion in annex III of the Convention and established a workplan for the preparation of a decision guidance document for chrysotile asbestos.

34. The second Conference of the Parties to the Rotterdam Convention, held in Rome in September 2005, adopted 15 decisions on, inter alia: the programme of work and the budget for 2006; operational procedures of the Chemicals Review Committee; the final decision by UNEP and FAO regarding the provision of the secretariat; pilot projects on the delivery of regional technical assistance; and cooperation and synergies between the Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm Convention secretariats. At its second meeting, in Geneva in February 2006, the Chemicals Review Committee of the Convention discussed risk evaluations and trade restrictions under other multilateral environmental agreements and their relevance to chemicals eligible for inclusion in the Convention. The Committee agreed on the draft text of the decision guidance document for chrysotile asbestos, and that endosulfan and tributyl tin compounds had met the requirement for inclusion. It started work on drafting decision-guidance documents and agreed also that once the second notification had been received, as required, alachlor, mirex, cyhexatin and dicofol would meet the requirement for inclusion and that the decision-guidance documents would be drafted for those chemicals.

35. The third Conference of the Parties to the Rotterdam Convention was held from 9 to 13 October 2006, in Geneva. It considered several reports and adopted 16 decisions, including those concerning a programme of work its 2007-2008 budget, the inclusion of chrysotile asbestos, financial mechanisms, non-compliance and cooperation and coordination among the secretariats of the chemicals conventions. The Conference deferred a decision on the inclusion of chrysotile asbestos and did not reach an agreement on the finalization of procedures and mechanisms to address non-compliance with the Convention, owing to a lack of consensus on both issues.

[13] They are 17 pesticides (2, 4, 5-T, aldrin, captafol, chlordane, chlordimeform, chlorobenzilate, DDT, dieldrin, dinoseb and dinoseb salts, EDB (1, 2-dibromoethane), fluoroacetamide, HCH (mixed isomers), heptachlor, hexachlorobenzene, lindane (gamma-HCH), mercury compounds and pentachlorophenol), 5 severely hazardous pesticide formulations (methamidophos, methylparathion monocrotophos, parathions and phosphamidon) and 5 industrial chemicals (crocidolite, polybrominated biphenyls, polychlorinated biphenyls, polychlorinated terphenyls and Tris (2, 3-dibromopropyl) phosphate), which were originally included in the Convention in September 1998.

However, progress was made on important policy and operational issues, including sustainable financing and capacity-building, and synergies on cooperation and coordination among the secretariats of the chemicals conventions. At its third meeting, in Rome from 20 to 23 March 2007, the Chemicals Review Committee recommended two more pesticides, endosulfan and tributyl tin compounds, for inclusion in the prior informed consent procedure under the Convention. The fourth Conference of the Parties will take place in Rome, in October 2008, to decide, inter alia, whether to accept the recommendations of the Committee.

5. Strategic approach to international chemicals management

36. The initiative of UNEP to develop a Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management,[14] based on the Bahia Declaration on Chemical Safety and on the Priorities for Action beyond 2000 adopted by the Intergovernmental Forum on Chemical Safety, was endorsed by the World Summit on Sustainable Development. The Johannesburg Plan of Implementation called for the completion of the process by 2005, in order to achieve effective management of risks throughout the life cycle of production, use and disposal of chemicals, by 2020. The key feature of the process was its engagement of all sectors of society with an interest in chemical safety, including the environment, health, agriculture, labour, industry and development.

37. In February 2003, the UNEP Governing Council endorsed the concept of an international conference, with preparatory meetings, as the basis for developing such an approach through an open, transparent and inclusive process. Both the World Health Assembly, in May 2003, and the International Labour Conference, in June 2003, supported the process. The Intergovernmental Forum on Chemical Safety, at its fourth session, discussed the subsequent development of a Strategic Approach and forwarded a report to the first meeting of the Preparatory Committee.

38. The first meeting of the Preparatory Committee was held in Bangkok, in November 2003. It discussed potential issues to be addressed and examined ways to structure the discussion and considered possible outcomes of the process. There was broad support for a three-tiered process towards a Strategic Approach: a global programme of action with targets and timetables; an overarching policy strategy; and a high-level declaration. The second Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management Preparatory Committee meeting, which took place in October 2004 in Nairobi, discussed elements for an overarching policy strategy for international chemicals management, made progress in creating a matrix of possible concrete measures to include in the global plan of action and provided comments on an initial list of issues for a high-level political declaration. The third meeting of the Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management Preparatory Committee was held in Vienna, in September 2005, where the same three issues, high-level declaration, overarching policy strategy and a global plan of action, were discussed, but agreement could not be reached on several aspects of all three areas, including principles and approaches, description of the Strategic Approach as "voluntary", financial considerations and the timing and frequency of future sessions of the International Conference on Chemicals Management.

[14] See http://www.chem.unep.ch/saicm.

39. The International Conference on Chemicals Management was held in February 2006, in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. Delegates at the Conference, after discussing issues pending from the third meeting of the Preparatory Committee, agreed on a compromise text. The core disagreement was over the application of the precautionary approach to chemicals management and new and additional resources for the implementation of the Strategic Approach. The Conference, after completing negotiations, adopted the Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management, including a high-level declaration, overarching policy strategy and a global plan of action. The implementation of the plan, which included activities with targets and timetables, if widely applied would make a significant contribution towards the achievement of the 2020 targets set in the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development. UNEP was given overall administrative responsibility for the Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management secretariat, in coordination and/or cooperation with Inter-organization Programme for the Sound Management of Chemicals member organizations, the United Nations Development Programme and other intergovernmental organizations.

40. The United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), in cooperation with other bodies, organized a workshop on governance in relation to implementing the Strategic Approach at the national level, in Geneva in June 2006. The overarching policy strategy of the Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management provides that each Government should establish arrangements for implementing the Strategic Approach and should designate a Strategic Approach focal point to facilitate communication, both nationally and internationally. The Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management secretariat invited Governments to designate a national focal point and, as at November 2006, over 100 had been nominated. Canada had proposed a project to develop guidance for the secretariat, in consultations with stakeholders, to assist in the development of reporting modalities, as its contribution to the Strategic Approach. The project will address the preparation of a baseline report, the development of indicators for subsequent progress reports and arrangements for gathering information from stakeholders.

41. The regional meetings called for in the overarching policy strategy by the International Conference on Chemicals Management, in its resolution 1/1, are a key element in the collective efforts to start the implementation process. Following the adoption of the Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management, its secretariat had organized, in collaboration with Governments, four regional meetings (in Cairo, Barcelona, Spain, Riga and Bangkok). Those meetings provided a forum to discuss strategic priorities, share technical experience and exchange information crucial to regions' efforts to implement the Approach. They help in drafting regional action plans, in drawing terms of reference of regional core groups and regional focal points, in selecting regional representatives for the Quick Start Programme Executive Board and in developing regional projects that could be considered for funding under the Quick Start Programme trust fund.

42. The overarching policy strategy on financial considerations provided that initial capacity-building activities for the implementation of the objectives of the Approach would be supported by the establishment of the Quick Start Programme, which would contain a voluntary, time-limited trust fund, administered by UNEP. The objective was to support initial enabling capacity-building and implementation

activities in developing countries, least developed countries, small island developing States and countries with economies in transition. The secretariat is developing a business plan or resource mobilization strategy to help secure the sustainability of the Programme.

B. Other developments

Globally Harmonized System of Classification and Labelling of Chemicals

43. The ongoing work to harmonize the classification and labelling of chemicals was brought under the auspices of the Inter-organization Programme for the Sound Management of Chemicals Coordinating Group for the Harmonization of Chemical Classification Systems, with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in Europe, ILO and the Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee of Experts on the Transportation of Dangerous Goods as active members. It was created in 1999, when the Economic and Social Council broadened the mandate of the main Committee. The Globally Harmonized System was adopted by the Subcommittee in December 2002, and endorsed by the Council in 2003. The System is now being implemented by countries as called for in the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation, to be fully operational by 2008. The UNITAR/ILO/Inter-organization Programme for the Sound Management of Chemicals Globally Harmonized System capacity-building programme has developed partnership activities and is providing support to assist countries to develop and implement the System to achieve the 2008 target.

Heavy metals: mercury, lead and cadmium

44. Based on the work carried out by the Global Mercury Assessment Working Group at its twenty-third session, the Governing Council requested the Executive Director of UNEP to prepare a report for submission to its next session on supply, trade and demand for mercury on the global market, and also to facilitate the establishment of partnerships between Governments and other stakeholders, as one approach to reduce risks to human health and the environment from mercury, and to assist in the mobilization of resources to support those partnerships. The decision also encouraged Governments, intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector to take immediate action to reduce the risks to human health and the environment posed on a global scale by mercury in products and production processes. The Governing Council decided also to assess the need for further action on mercury, including the possibility of a legally binding instrument, partnerships and other actions, at its next session, in 2007. On lead and cadmium, the Governing Council requested to undertake a review of scientific information, focusing on long-range environmental transport, and to continue future discussions on the need for global action on lead and cadmium.

45. At its twenty-fourth session, the UNEP Governing Council, acknowledging the progress made within the mercury programme, outlined priorities in reducing risks from releases of mercury, urged Governments to gather information on means to reduce the risk caused by the supply of mercury and requested the UNEP Executive Director to prepare a report on mercury emissions and ways to strengthen mercury partnerships. The Governing Council established an ad hoc open-ended working group of Government and stakeholder representatives to review and assess options

for enhanced voluntary measures and new or existing international legal instruments, and asked the group to provide a final report at its next session in 2009, for a decision on the matter. At the same session, the Governing Council urged stakeholders to fill gaps regarding lead and cadmium, encouraged Governments to reduce risks posed to human health and the environment and requested the Executive Director of UNEP to compile an inventory of existing risk management measures.

Multilateral environmental agreements

46. Since 1997, the Committee on Trade and Environment of the World Trade Organization has been holding annual information sessions on multilateral environmental agreements, at which the secretariats of agreements, including those of the Stockholm and Rotterdam Conventions, have given presentations on various trade-related aspects of their work, including technical assistance, capacity-building and information exchange. The sessions were intended to enhance understanding of, in particular, compliance mechanisms and dispute settlement provisions in the agreements and in the rules of the World Trade Organization. Of approximately 200 such agreements, about 20, including the Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions, contain trade-related provisions. In 2001, the Doha Ministerial Declaration[15] mandated, among other measures, (a) negotiations on the relationship between existing World Trade Organization rules and specific trade obligations set out in the agreements, and (b) procedures concerning the regular exchange of information among agreement secretariats and the relevant World Trade Organization committees and the criteria for the granting of observer status. The importance of technical assistance and capacity-building was recognized in the area of trade and environment and exchange of expertise and experience was encouraged on national environmental reviews.

47. The Committee on Trade and Environment, through its special sessions, has been conducting negotiations on those issues and some progress was reported at the Fifth World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference, held in Cancun, Mexico, in September 2003. There was general agreement that existing forms of cooperation and an exchange of information between the World Trade Organization and multilateral environmental agreements had proved to be valuable and should be enhanced. The Committee had invited some agreement secretariats, on an ad hoc basis, to its two special sessions in 2003, and hope was expressed that the cooperation would continue. Following the resumption of the Doha Round, the Committee, at its special session held on 1 and 2 March 2007, considered a proposal by the United States of America on information exchange between agreement secretariats and relevant World Trade Organization committees. The proposal also addressed the issue of the observer status of multilateral environmental agreements in other World Trade Organization committees. The United States also proposed granting seven secretariats permanent, rather than the current ad hoc, observer status for the remainder of the Doha Round. At the following meeting of the Committee on Trade and Environment special session, which was held on 3 and 4 May 2007, a Canadian proposal on the observer status of agreements in the World Trade Organization was formally presented, which seeks to bridge the gap among various proposals on the issue within organization proceedings.

[15] See A/C.2/56/7, annex.

IV. Future trends and emerging issues

48. In addition to the entry into force of the Stockholm and the Rotterdam Conventions, in 2004, the adoption of the Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management, in February 2006, provided real impetus to the World Summit on Sustainable Development aim of ensuring that, by 2020, chemicals will be used and produced in ways that minimize significant adverse effects on human health and the environment. It has also emphasized the wide gap that exists between developed and developing countries' ability to implement chemicals management policies. Any meaningful progress towards chemicals management at the national level will ultimately depend on the provision of technical assistance and capacity-building in developing countries, which will require additional financial resources (both domestic and foreign) to support national efforts.

49. Ever since the first meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Rotterdam Convention, in 2004, the issue of synergies within chemicals and waste has been actively explored to improve cooperation among the secretariats of the Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions. Those efforts led to the formation of an ad hoc joint working group on enhancing cooperation and coordination among the Conventions, with the mandate to prepare joint recommendations on enhanced cooperation and coordination for submission to their conferences of the parties. At its first meeting, in March 2007, the joint working group reached agreement on a non-exhaustive list of objectives and guiding principles for its future work. It also agreed on three broad categories: (a) activities already under way to enhance cooperation; (b) activities to enhance further administrative and programmatic cooperation and coordination; and (c) activities relating to decision-making and oversight. At that meeting, the working group focused mainly on the activities under (b) and (c) and agreed to revisit the activities under (a). The next meeting of the joint working group will probably be held in December 2007.

50. The European Parliament, after three years of negotiations, adopted a comprehensive law on the manufacturing, marketing, import and use of chemical substances on 18 December 2006. The Regulation concerning the registration, evaluation, authorization and restriction of chemicals aims to protect consumers and the environment from the adverse effects of chemicals found in such products as paint, detergent, cars and computers. Under the Regulation, 30,000 chemicals produced in or imported into the European Union will be registered over the next 10 years with a central agency, to be established in Helsinki. The most hazardous chemicals will be subject to testing, and their use will require authorization. Persistent, bio-accumulative and toxic chemicals will be phased out if suitable alternatives exist. If not, companies will have to submit a plan for the development of such alternatives. The legislation places the burden of proof on the chemicals industry, with the public sector responsible for oversight. Thousands of chemicals that have been in use for years without testing will now undergo screening. The Regulation will enter into force on 1 June 2007.

51. One of the main activities of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) in fostering the Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management is the promotion of chemical leasing business models through the worldwide cleaner production network, a service-oriented business model that shifts the focus from increasing sales volumes of chemicals towards a value added approach. The producer mainly sells the functions performed by the

chemical and the functional units are the main basis for payment. UNIDO, in cooperation with others, is presently implementing chemical leasing pilot projects in the Russian Federation, Egypt and Mexico. In this business model, the supplier takes responsibility for the use of the chemical, its recycling and its treatment and disposal. The results of the pilot projects are very encouraging and have demonstrated that chemical leasing is a win-win situation, in which chemicals are used more efficiently and risks to human health and the environment are reduced.

V. Conclusions and recommendations

52. There are thousands of chemicals available on the market and hundreds more are added each year, which poses a huge challenge for Governments, especially in developing countries, related to the monitoring and management of potentially dangerous substances that are essential in the everyday lives of their citizens. Generally, in the past, a piecemeal approach had been employed in dealing with the management of hazardous products. However, with the life-cycle management approach, which aims to achieve an effective management of risks throughout the life cycle of a chemical, from production and use to the treatment and disposal of waste, as the cornerstone of the Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management process, Member States must fully implement national development strategies consistent with the Approach to achieve the 2020 targets, as endorsed by the World Summit on Sustainable Development.

Recommendation 1

53. **The Economic and Social Council may wish to recommend that Member States fully implement national development strategies to achieve the 2020 target on the use and production of chemicals in ways that lead to the minimization of significant adverse effects on human health and the environment.**

54. Recent positive developments in the environmentally sound management of hazardous chemicals, through the implementation of the Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions and the adoption of the Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management, in 2006, all point to the overwhelming need for technical assistance and capacity-building in order for developing countries not only to comply with existing international mechanisms, but also to make further progress at the national level in the area. The expansion of capacity-building activities will be contingent upon the availability of substantial new financial resources to support national activities in the management of products harmful to health and the environment.

Recommendation 2

55. **The Council may wish to recommend to multilateral and bilateral agencies the continuation of the strengthening of capacity-building and technical assistance activities in developing countries and to urge donor agencies to provide additional financial resources in support of national efforts to improve the environmentally sound management of toxic chemicals.**

56. The Rotterdam Convention has put an effective system in place to avoid many of the dangerous practices of the past decades, when people were less aware of the dangers of toxic chemicals. The Convention offers parties, particularly in

developing countries, the tools they need to protect their citizens and strengthen their management of chemicals. They can now decide which potentially hazardous chemicals they want to import and which to exclude because they cannot manage them safely. Also, in the light of the additional information available, electronically and otherwise, under other chemicals conventions, such as the Stockholm and Basel Conventions, the publication of the List is redundant, although as noted in the recommendations in his report on the review of mandates, the Secretary-General considered that over the years the List had served its purpose very well.

Recommendation 3

57. **The Council may wish to consider recommending the elimination of the mandate of regularly updating the List, as contained in General Assembly resolution 37/137.**

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Implementation of the Programme of Action for the Least Developed Countries for the Decade 2001-2010

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The fifth results-oriented annual progress report shows continued strong economic performance by least developed countries, with fewer countries, mainly Pacific islands, lagging behind. Social indicators are also improving, but overall socio-economic progress in African least developed countries has been significantly compromised by continuing population growth driven by the highest fertility in the world. International support for health is paying dividends in African least developed countries, but malnutrition appears to be worsening, particularly in rural areas where agriculture can hardly keep up with rapid population growth, environmental degradation and challenges associated with climate change. As a result, African least developed countries increasingly face food shortages, disruption of food supplies and famine.

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Achieving the objectives of the Brussels Programme of Action requires greater donor focus on enhancing the productive capacity of least developed countries particularly in agriculture. Donors should also increase allocation of aid to physical infrastructure and technological development to increase the productivity and competitiveness of least developed countries. Above all, donors need to make significant efforts to increase their aid volumes in order to achieve the internationally agreed goals of 0.15 to 0.20 per cent of their gross national income as official development assistance to least developed countries by 2010 and improve aid effectiveness (ownership, harmonization, alignment, results and mutual accountability) as agreed in Rome and Paris.

Strong commitment by least developed countries and their development partners to the objectives, goals and targets of the Programme and full adherence to the principles of country ownership, an integrated approach, result-orientation, genuine partnership and market considerations in its implementation are crucial to further progress.

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I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Economic and Social Council resolution 2006/41 and General Assembly resolution 61/211 in which the Secretary-General was requested to submit an annual analytical and results-oriented progress report on the further implementation of the Programme of Action of Least Developed Countries for the Decade 2001-2010.

2. The report assesses the implementation of the Programme of Action by measuring progress made by least developed countries and development partners towards achieving 30 international development goals and the targets contained therein. To the extent possible, it also provides information about the implementation of commitments: measures adopted by least developed countries and their development partners aimed at achieving the objectives, goals and targets of the Programme of Action.

3. As in the past, the report follows the structure of the Programme of Action and contains a statistical annex with country data. All sources are provided at the bottom of each table.

4. As for graduation, in the 2006 triennial review (E/2006/33), the Committee for Development Policy recommended that Papua New Guinea be included in and Samoa be graduated from the list of least developed countries. However, in its decision 2006/266, the Council, upon the request of the Government of Papua New Guinea,[1] decided to defer consideration of the Committee recommendation on Papua New Guinea to its substantive session of 2007. Furthermore, in its decision 2007/212, the Council also requested that the Committee examine the issues raised by Samoa and submit its report and recommendation to the Council (see E/2007/12). The same review also found Equatorial Guinea, Kiribati, Tuvalu and Vanuatu eligible for graduation for the first time. In accordance with the established procedures, they will be considered for graduation at the next triennial review.

II. Implementation of the Programme of Action

Commitment 1
Fostering a people-centred policy framework

5. The overarching objective of the Brussels Declaration and Programme of Action for the Least Developed Countries for the Decade 2001-2010 is to halve the proportion of people living in extreme poverty and hunger by 2015 and promote sustainable development of least developed countries through significant and steady economic growth. To this end, it set targets of at least 7 per cent annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth and a 25 per cent ratio of investment to GDP per annum for least developed countries.

6. Remarkably, in 2005, 30 least developed countries met or were on track to the 7 per cent growth target, compared to 24 in the period 2000 to 2004, and the number of countries experiencing negative growth declined from five from 2000 to 2004 to two in 2005. At the regional level, the African least developed countries easily met or were close to the 7 per cent growth target, while the Asian least developed

[1] Inclusion in the list of least developed countries is subject to a country's acceptance.

countries accelerated modestly and the Pacific island least developed countries slipped from slow to near-zero growth during the period from 1995 to 2005. However, fast growth in African least developed countries has been seriously compromised by rapid population growth, while the economies of Asian least developed countries grew at a rate almost three times greater than did their populations, and the countries were able to benefit even from modest economic growth.

7. In 2005, 30 least developed countries achieved or were on track to reach the target of a 25 per cent ratio of investment to GDP, compared to 25 during the period from 2003 to 2004. However, the number of least developed countries with low ratios increased from 9 in 2003/2004 to 11 in 2005.

8. The latest data for a limited number of least developed countries suggests significant declines in the extreme poverty rate since 1990 in a greater number of least developed countries than previously reported. If confirmed and sustained in other least developed countries, these trends could serve as the first indication of a reversal of the increases in extreme poverty in least developed countries observed over the last two decades.

9. Fewer least developed countries than last year are making significant progress towards the goal of halving the proportion of people suffering from hunger as a result of low agricultural productivity and recurrent natural disasters, but in an increasing number of least developed countries, undernourishment is relatively moderate.

10. Pro-poor growth and poverty reduction have been integrated into national poverty reduction strategies and poverty reduction strategy papers of least developed countries. As of 31 January 2007, 36 least developed countries had participated in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper process. Seven of them had interim poverty reduction strategy papers and 22 had prepared their first poverty reduction strategy papers. Seven other least developed countries have prepared their second poverty reduction strategy papers and Burkina Faso submitted its first progress report on the implementation of its second poverty reduction strategy paper.

11. Consistent with the 2005 World Summit Outcome (General Assembly resolution 60/1) in which world leaders resolved to adopt, by 2006, and implement comprehensive national development strategies to achieve the internationally agreed development goals and objectives, including the Millennium Development Goals, at least 4 least developed countries have been completing their national development strategies and 18 least developed countries have been refining their poverty reduction strategy papers with a view to achieving international development goals. Another 25 least developed countries, including 15 in Africa, are at the initial stage of this process and completing their needs assessment, with the support of the United Nations Development Programme. Four least developed countries (Cape Verde, Mozambique, Rwanda and the United Republic of Tanzania) are among the first eight pilot countries for the One United Nations programme, which aims to ensure greater coherence and effectiveness of United Nations development efforts at the country level.

Commitment 2
Good governance at the national and international levels

12. The Brussels Programme of Action underscores the critical importance of good governance at the national and international levels for achieving its objectives, goals and targets. Although the least developed countries have made substantial efforts to improve governance, the challenges that remain are still enormous (see http://www.un.org/ohrlls).

13. Analysis of *Worldwide Governance Indicators 2006*, the most comprehensive source of aggregate indicators for measuring governance,[2] shows that political stability and non-violence, the rule of law and control of corruption have been improving, but performance on voice and accountability and government effectiveness has been weakening in least developed countries since 1996. In 2005, Bhutan, Kiribati, Samoa, Tuvalu and Vanuatu scored highest among the least developed countries on political stability and the rule of law. The same countries, minus Bhutan, scored the highest on voice and accountability, while Bhutan scored the highest among all least developed countries on control of corruption. All least developed countries had very low scores in regulatory quality and government effectiveness. Overall, compared to other groups of countries, least developed countries performed slightly better than low-income countries in 2005, but worse than lower middle-income countries and significantly worse than upper-middle-income countries.

14. In 2005, 46 least developed countries were eligible for external lending from the International Development Association. The Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) rating of good governance performance is the major determinant in the allocation of interest-free credits and Association grants to eligible countries. It measures economic and social policies aimed at promotion of growth and poverty reduction on a scale from one (weak) to six (strong). The 2005 CPIA rating shows that least developed countries scored 3.4 on economic management (macroeconomic, fiscal policy and debt policy); 3.3 on structural policies (trade, financial sector, business regulatory environment); 3.2 on policies for social inclusion/equity; and 3.0 on public sector management and institutions (property rights and rule-based government, quality of budget and finance management, efficiency of revenue mobilization, quality of public administration, transparency and accountability and corruption in public sector).

15. The average Association country performance rating of least developed countries, derived from their overall CPIA and portfolio performance (development project and programme management), shows that 11 out of 46 least developed countries eligible for Association grants demonstrated strong (above 3.5) governance performance in 2005, but the remaining 35 had weak (below 3.5) governance performance for the same year. Very strong (above five) governance performance was demonstrated only by Bhutan and Samoa. By comparison, 9 out of 43 least developed countries eligible for an Association grant[3] demonstrated strong

[2] The indicators, derived from 276 variables, are drawn from 31 sources and 25 organizations. They measure good governance performance on the scale from -2.5 to 2.5 in the following six areas: (a) voice and accountability; (b) political stability and absence of violence; (c) government effectiveness; (d) regulatory quality; (e) rule of law; and (f) control of corruption. For more information, see info.worldbank.org/wbi//governance.

[3] Afghanistan, Liberia, Myanmar, Somali and Timor-Leste were not rated in 2004 CPIA exercise.

governance performance and 34 least developed countries had weak governance performance in the 2004 CPIA rating. In the 2003 rating, 8 out of 43 least developed countries eligible for an Association grant demonstrated strong governance performance and 35 least developed countries had weak governance performance.[4] This suggests steady but very slow progress by least developed countries.

16. Poor governance (weak legal and regulatory framework, weak institutions, lack of transparency and accountability, checks and balances, etc.) often results in corruption, which can take the form of misuse of public office for private gain. Corruption, in turn, leads to the depletion of domestic resources, deters new investments, causes public services to deteriorate, leads to economic stagnation and, ultimately, exacerbates poverty and human suffering.

17. Since corruption leaves no paper trail and takes many forms (rent seeking, graft, bribery, extortion, cronyism, nepotism, patronage, embezzlement, kickbacks, etc.), perceptions of corruption based on individual experience are sometimes the only source of information. The Kaufmann-Kraay Control of Corruption Index and the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index provide the most comprehensive tools for measuring corruption. The 2006 Transparency International Index rating on a scale from ten (very clean) to zero (very corrupt) shows that eight out of ten of the worst performers are least developed countries. Even the least developed countries with the best results score below three. Bhutan is the only least developed country which scores relatively high (six). The Kaufman-Kraay Index, which measures control of corruption on a scale from -2.5 to +2.5, with a higher score indicating a higher degree of control of corruption, shows that except for Bhutan (0.69), all 34 least developed countries included in the rating scored well below zero.

18. More than half of least developed countries adopted at least one reform in 2006 in order to improve their business climate. Several least developed countries have adopted significant reforms, including Tanzania, which introduced reforms in four areas (starting a business, registering property, protecting investors and cross-border trade), thereby joining the list of top world reformers. However, compared to other categories of countries, least developed countries were the most difficult countries in which to do business. All 10 world bottom performers in that category in 2006 were least developed countries, except one.[5]

19. Many least developed countries undertook measures and adopted policies in order to attract foreign investments. As of October 2005, 40 least developed countries had established national Investment Promotion Agencies to promote foreign direct investment, and 28 least developed countries joined the World Association of Investment Promotion Agencies, with a view to networking and sharing experience related to foreign direct investment. While most of the agencies established by least developed countries are focused on disseminating information about their countries as favourable locations for foreign direct investment, some assist foreign investors with the preparation of pre-investment feasibility studies and environmental impact assessments as part of their investment promotion package.

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[4] 2003 CPIA and country performance rating for IDA 12 and 2003 CPIA and country performance rating for IDA 12 were disclosed on a quintile basis. In 2004, CPIA rating methodology was revised. Accordingly, the 2003 CPIA data was also revised to ensure comparability of the scores across years.

[5] *Doing Business in 2007: How to Reform* (World Bank, 2006).

Other agencies (those of Madagascar and the Sudan) serve as one-stop shops that establish rules and regulations for foreign direct investment, approve projects and facilitate the entry of foreign firms by assisting foreign investors in obtaining licences and registration, dealing with local and provincial governments, joint venture partners, suppliers, tax and customs authorities and line ministries. Several agencies also provide project implementation and post-investment services to ensure that foreign investors who have already entered will stay and expand, either in the same industry or another one.

20. To avoid the resource curse of the past, when windfall revenues from natural resources exploitation often increased poverty and fuelled conflicts, some least developed countries have joined the two major global transparency initiatives: the Extractive industries transparency initiative, for transparency in the use of revenues from natural resources, and the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for the prevention of conflict diamond production.

21. As of January 2007, ten natural resource-rich least developed countries had endorsed the Extractive industries transparency initiative principles and pledged to adhere to them: to publish regularly all payments by companies and all material revenues received by the Government in a form which is accessible and comprehensible to the public; to make all payments and revenues subject to credible, independent audit, consistent with international standards; to have a credible, independent administration reconcile payments and revenues in a manner consistent with international standards; to engage civil society in the design, implementation, monitoring and review of the Extractive industries transparency initiative process; and to develop a public and financially sustainable workplan with measurable targets. Some least developed countries have set up multi-stakeholder committees and developed workplans, but only Guinea has published its revenues. No least developed country has yet published a report or held a review, as required by the Extractive industries transparency initiative.

22. With the support of international partners, Liberia has established a National Diamond Task Force and the Liberian Diamond Authority in order to regain full control of diamond extraction and trade, and has expressed interest in joining the Kimberley process. In April 2007, the Security Council recognized that Liberia met the minimum requirements for joining the Kimberley process and unanimously adopted a resolution in which it noted the progress made by Liberia and lifted the ban on diamond exports (see Security Council resolution 1743 (2007)).

23. As of November 2006, 10 least developed countries were participating in the Kimberley process and 2 least developed countries (Cape Verde and Mali) were in the process of accession to it. The latest triennial review of the process concluded that while a significant number of diamond-producing and trading centres were operating within the Kimberley process, illicit diamond extraction and trading by rebel factions and militias continued in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

24. Some least developed countries have also adopted fiscal policies and taken measures to cushion the impact of large windfall revenues on inflation and to prevent Dutch disease. Thus, Chad established the Future Generations Fund, a savings mechanism which by December 2005 had accumulated about $36 million. Timor-Leste established the Petroleum Fund to ensure transparency in the use of oil and gas revenues.

Commitment 3
Building human and institutional capacities

25. In 2005, the total population of the least developed countries reached 767 million people, up 12.9 per cent from 2000. The rapid population growth rate was driven by the highest fertility in the world. It is projected that at the current fertility rate the population of least developed countries could surpass 2.7 billion by 2050, and would still double, reaching as high as 1.7 billion, at a reduced fertility rate.

26. A large proportion of children and a very small proportion of older persons mean that least developed countries have the youngest populations in the world, with a median age of 19 years old. Among them, Mali, Niger and Uganda, have populations whose median age is at or below 16 years. It is estimated that by 2050, the median age will reach about 28 and children will account for 29 per cent of the total population, while older persons will account for 10 per cent of the population in least developed countries.

27. A high overall dependency ratio as a result of this population structure could increase extreme poverty, but could also provide a demographic window of opportunity for least developed countries by increasing the economic support ratio (the number of effective producers per effective consumer) and improve the standard of living. However, this scenario can work only if jobs are created for the additional workforce and Governments pursue reproductive policies aimed at reducing fertility (see E/CN.9/2007/3). Two thirds of least developed countries report that such policies are in place.[6]

28. Life expectancy at birth in least developed countries is increasing, but remains the lowest (51 years) in the world. Worse, in 10 African least developed countries, life expectancy is declining. High under-five mortality rates (45 per cent) among children and low mortality rates (16 per cent) among persons aged 65 and over suggest that the least developed countries are still in the early stage of the epidemiological transition when, due to improved hygiene, nutrition and treatment of diseases, child deaths are being shifted to older people. This largely explains low life expectancy in least developed countries. Extreme poverty, malnutrition, HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and civil conflicts are also contributing factors.

29. As a result of better prevention and treatment policies, an increasing number of least developed countries (24 in 2005, as compared to 16 in 2004) has either met or is making substantial progress towards the goal of reducing the under-five mortality rate by 2015. Yet in the remaining least developed countries there has been minimal or no progress, and five least developed countries have strong negative trends. The number of countries with very high estimated infant mortality rates has also continued to fall, from 20 in 2004 to 18 in 2005. However, significant increases in infant mortality rates were reported in four least developed countries in 2005.

30. Estimates based on the latest available data show that only five least developed countries are close to achieving the target for reduction of maternal mortality by 2015. In the remaining 45 least developed countries, the maternal mortality ratios are currently too high for this target to be met. New estimates expected later in 2007

[6] *World Population Policies 2005* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.06.XIII.5).

are likely to confirm the general overall severity of the situation in the sub-Saharan African countries, where maternal mortality has been extraordinarily high.

31. Access to and completion of primary education play a crucial role in empowering poor people. Based on the revised data for the period 2002-2004, 27 least developed countries are on track or making rapid progress towards the goal of universal primary enrolment, up from 22, a figure based on earlier data covering fewer countries. The number of countries making slow progress has also declined from seven, based on earlier data, to six based on revised data for 2002-2004. However, for 16 of 17 other countries for which trend data is lacking, current general levels of development suggest that they will be unable to achieve the goal.

32. The Gender Parity Index, defined as the ratio of female to male enrolment rates, shows that in 2005, the ratio of female to male enrolment in primary education was 0.89 per cent, but in secondary and tertiary education it was 0.79 per cent and 0.63 per cent respectively. The Gender Parity Index in adult literacy was 0.72 per cent, suggesting that in 2005, fewer than three women for every four men in least developed countries were literate. Maldives is the only least developed country which has gender parity in adult literacy, while Lesotho has in fact surpassed the target, reporting more literate women than men in 2005.

33. Adult literacy in least developed countries as a whole has improved, but remains the lowest (53 per cent) in the world. It ranges from 19 per cent in Mali to 99 per cent in Samoa. In three out of four countries for which data is available, the rates are still below 70 per cent, and 13 least developed countries report that more than half of their adult population is illiterate. Six least developed countries have literacy rates below 30 per cent.

34. Most least developed countries have achieved or are on track to achieve the target on access to improved water supply in urban areas, but only 28 least developed countries have achieved or are on track to achieve this target in rural areas.

35. Twenty-eight least developed countries are on track to achieve the sanitation target in urban areas, up from 26 in 2002, but little progress is observed in the remaining least developed countries. Worse, the situation in rural areas appears to be deteriorating, as the number of least developed countries which were on track to the sanitation target dropped from 16 in 2002 to 10 in 2004.

36. Declines in HIV/AIDS incidence as a result of effective prevention measures were registered in 2005 in three fifths of least developed countries for which data is available. Rates above 4 per cent are estimated in seven least developed countries compared to 16 in 2003. Yet in seven African and two Asian least developed countries incidence of HIV is increasing.

37. Half of the 30 least developed countries which have trend data for 1990-2003 report a marked improvement in malaria prevalence, but another half report deterioration as well as an increase in malaria deaths. High prevalence occurs mainly in Southern and South-Eastern Asian least developed countries, and in African least developed countries, while most deaths occur in African least developed countries, notably among children. Extremely high numbers of deaths are found in 10 countries and high numbers of deaths in 9 countries.

38. Progress in the use of treated mosquito nets for prevention continues to lag, with only six least developed countries reporting 10 per cent or more children sleeping under treated mosquito nets and about half of least developed countries for which data is available reporting less than 5 per cent of children sleeping under treated mosquito nets. Treatment with anti-malarial drugs is much more widespread, with most least developed countries reporting their use by children with fever in the past two years.

39. Tuberculosis prevalence and death rates have declined substantially in some least developed countries, especially in high-burden countries.[7] Prevalence has declined to under 100 per 100,000 in four countries compared to 6 in 2003, and only six countries in 2005 have rates over 600 per 100,000 compared to 12 in 2003. However, progress from 1990 to 2003 has been difficult to sustain, as an increasing number of countries report relatively high levels of tuberculosis prevalence and death rates in 2003-2005. As HIV rates begin to decline, tuberculosis rates are also expected to fall, as their co-infection has been high.

40. Treatment of tuberculosis under the directly observed short course strategy continues to make good progress, with 17 least developed countries achieving the treatment target in 2004, and an additional 14 on track to achieve. However, case detection is lagging in least developed countries with fewer countries achieving or on track to the target in 2005 than was the case in 2003.

Commitment 4
Building productive capacities to make globalization work for the least developed countries

41. Globalization has opened unprecedented opportunities for the movement of goods, services and people. Yet the 50 least developed countries have failed to reap its benefits, mainly due to the structural weaknesses of their economies and lack of capacities related to sustained growth and sustainable development, particularly productive capacities.[8] As a result, least developed countries have been further marginalized in the mainstream development process.

42. According to a United Nations Conference on Trade and Development study,[9] the production structure of least developed countries remains strongly oriented towards exploitation of natural resources without forward or backward linkages to the rest of the economy. While exports of manufactures are increasing, they are limited to the export of low-skilled, labour-intensive, low-technology and, hence, low value-added products, such as garments. Services, although expanding, are mostly in low value-added petty trade and commercial services.

43. Although the share of value-added activities in industry and services in the GDP has been increasing, agriculture remains the backbone of the economy in least developed countries. Some least developed countries have an abundance of land, while others have a shortage, and a significant proportion of the population of these countries survives on fragile lands, with serious constraints for intensive agriculture.

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[7] According to WHO, 22 high-burden countries represent 80 per cent of the global burden of tuberculosis.

[8] Productive capacities are defined by UNCTAD as "productive resources, entrepreneurial capabilities and production linkages which together determine the capacity of a country to produce goods and services and enable it to grow and develop". The Least Developed Countries Report 2006. UNCTAD/LDC/2006, Sales No. E.06.II.D.9.

[9] Ibid.

Nonetheless, a common feature of many least developed countries is severe underutilization of land resources and extremely low land productivity due to insufficient investment in agriculture, particularly in irrigation, as well as low modern inputs, particularly fertilizers, and unequal access to land, even in the land-abundant least developed countries.

44. Inadequate infrastructure is a major barrier to development of the productive capacities of least developed countries. The latest available data on roads show increases over the period from 1999 to 2003 in the number of least developed countries with 15 per cent or more of roads paved (23 countries compared to 15), but little or no change is observed in the overall length of roads since 1990. Fourteen least developed countries show increases greater than 20 per cent, but in most (24 of 38 with data), the increase has been less than 20 per cent, or negative since 1990. Railway lengths are low in most least developed countries and only seven have lengths over 1,000 kilometres. Moreover, existing railways are underused: only five least developed countries registered freight over 400 thousand km-tons. According to the latest data, for the period from 1990 to 2004, which covers 33 least developed countries, the number of countries with an increase of more than 2 per cent in aircraft departures was seven, while in the remaining 26 least developed countries, there were increases of 2 per cent or less, or declines. Significant transport of air freight (10 million ton-kms or more) is reported in only eight least developed countries out of 31 least developed countries for which data is available.

45. Only 14 per cent of African and 21 per cent of Asian least developed countries population has access to electricity. Although electric power consumption per capita in least developed countries has increased steadily since 2000 and reached 112 kWh per capita in 2003, an abysmal gap remains between least developed countries and the rest of the world, where the consumption was 2,510 kWh per capita. Energy use in least developed countries has also been increasing since 2000, reaching 306 kg of oil equivalent per capita in 2003. However, this level is far lower than that of the rest of the world (1,734 kg of oil equivalent per capita) during the same period. Charcoal and firewood remain the main energy sources for least developed countries.

46. In 2005, only three least developed countries met the target of five telephone lines per 100 population and two more were on track to meet it by 2010. These were mainly small island least developed countries which achieved high tele-density as a result of liberalization of the telecommunication sector and attraction of foreign investments in facilities upgrades and network expansion, in response to increased tourist demand. However, the number of least developed countries with more than two lines per 100 people, a minimal level of service, remained at 12 in 2005. With less than two main lines per 100, very few of the remaining 32 countries have any prospect of meeting the 2010 target.

47. Due to long waiting periods, the number of fixed telephones grew slowly, albeit steadily in least developed countries (two additional lines per 100 inhabitants annually), while the number of cellular subscribers in least developed countries has increased by a factor almost 21 since 2000. Twenty-eight least developed countries had reached five main lines and cellular subscribers combined per one hundred population in 2005, compared to eighteen countries in 2003-2004. Ongoing expansion is strong but short of the target in 13 least developed countries and minimal in 3 least developed countries.

48. Mobile phones overtook fixed phones in least developed countries due to their easy availability, especially in rural areas, the introduction of prepaid cards, short message services and the reduction of phone call charges as a result of competition. According to the International Telecommunication Union, competition in cellular, Internet access and Very Small Aperture Terminal was authorized in 80 per cent of least developed countries. By comparison, competition in basic services was authorized in just over 40 per cent of least developed countries. The most expensive charges for cellular mobile phone calls were registered in Myanmar and Uganda.

49. The number of Internet users per 100 population has grown considerably since 2000, but there appears to be no significant or at least measurable change from 2004 to 2005 in most least developed countries. In fact, in 2005, more than half of least developed countries had Internet penetration below one per 100.

Commitment 5
Enhancing the role of trade in development

50. The share of least developed countries in world exports, in value terms, increased from 0.68 per cent in 2004 to 0.79 per cent in 2005, but this increase was entirely due to oil exports. If oil exports are not counted, the share of least developed countries exports in world merchandise exports in 2005 remained at exactly the same level (0.36 per cent) as in 2004. Exports from least developed countries grew much faster (36 per cent) than those of the rest of the world (14 per cent) in 2005, and faster than their own imports (21 per cent), but there was significant variance from country to country. Thus, exports of five oil exporters (Angola, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Sudan and Yemen) continued to grow rapidly, reaching 58 per cent in 2005. Exports of manufacturing least developed countries also grew rapidly, but stalled at 17 per cent, a figure reached in 2004. Export growth of commodity producers slowed to 14 per cent, the lowest rate since 2002. Two least developed countries (Lesotho and Madagascar) among exporters of manufacturers and seven least developed countries among exporters of commodities (Burkina Faso, Comoros, the Gambia, Maldives, Sao Tome and Principe, Togo and Tuvalu) experienced negative export growth in 2005.

51. Apart from Bangladesh and Cambodia, least developed countries exports in clothing and textiles decreased 5 per cent annually from 2004 to 2006. The sharpest (14 per cent) drop in clothing and textile exports took place in 2005, the year when the quota regime under the World Trade Organization Agreement on Textile and Clothing (ATC) was terminated. While some least developed countries began to show signs of recovery, there is a danger that others endowed with natural resources and lured by high commodity prices will lose interest in diversifying in textiles and clothing and eventually lose ground in that area.

52. As in 2004, 79 per cent of all imports from least developed countries, not counting arms and oil, were admitted duty-free to the markets of developed countries in 2005, an increase of only 1 per cent since 1996.

53. The utilization rate of the Generalized System of Preferences by least developed countries ranged widely (from 40 to 100 per cent), depending on the importing country and the sector, but was about 70 per cent on average, largely due to the supply side constraints of least developed countries.

Table 1
Proportion of total developed-country imports from developing countries and least developed countries admitted free of duty, 1996-2005
(Percentage)

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Excluding arms										
Developing countries	53	54	54	62	63	67	66	71	76	76
Least developed countries	68	69	81	76	75	78	75	78	81	82
Excluding arms and oil										
Developing countries	54	55	54	63	65	64	68	70	75	75
Least developed countries	78	77	78	72	70	71	70	73	79	79

Source: Calculations prepared by the International Trade Centre, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and World Trade Organization.

54. In 2005, China, India and Brazil announced duty-free access to their markets for products from least developed countries. Overall, only 72.2 per cent of least developed countries exports enter developing country markets duty-free, due to high tariffs and high tariff escalation in developing countries. Duty-free market access to China for least developed countries exports appears higher (93.3 per cent) but when oil is excluded, it is only 48.4 per cent. In 2005, China announced new market measures favouring least developed countries. It is estimated that these measures will result in the increase of duty-free exports of least developed countries to 95.2 per cent, or, if oil is excluded, 62.3 per cent (see WT/COMTD/LDC/W/38).

55. Tariffs of developed countries on imports from least developed countries have declined modestly in the last 10 years. Average tariffs on textiles have fallen by more than 50 per cent, while average tariffs on clothing and agricultural products, strategically important to least developed countries, decreased much less in the same period.

Table 2
Developed countries' average tariffs on imports of key products from developing countries, 1996-2004
(Percentage)

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Agricultural goods										
Developing countries	10.6	10.0	10.0	9.6	9.4	9.3	9.5	9.4	9.2	8.9
Least developed countries	4.0	3.9	3.7	3.8	3.7	2.7	2.8	2.8	3.2	3.1
Textiles										
Developing countries	7.3	7.2	7.0	6.6	6.6	6.6	6.0	5.8	5.2	5.3
Least developed countries	4.5	4.5	4.3	4.2	4.0	3.8	3.8	3.4	3.2	3.2
Clothing										
Developing countries	11.4	11.3	11.2	10.9	10.8	11.3	10.7	10.4	9.2	8.9
Least developed countries	8.1	8.1	8.0	7.9	7.8	7.7	8.1	7.7	6.6	6.6

Source: Calculations prepared by the International Trade Centre, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and World Trade Organization.

56. In August 2006, 42 least developed countries were at different stages of the integrated framework, aimed at assisting least developed countries in mainstreaming trade in their national development strategies and poverty reduction strategy papers. Twenty had validated their Diagnostic Trade Integrated Studies and identified their priorities, 11 had started the Diagnostic Trade Integrated Studies Process, 6 held technical reviews and 5 submitted their requests for inclusion in the programme.

57. A more effective, enhanced integrated framework[10] will begin at the end of 2007. The estimated funding for the enhanced integrated framework is US$ 400 million (approximately US$ 8 million per country over five years), including US$ 77 million for tier I (core function support costs) and US$ 320 million for tier II (action matrix implementation support costs). This represents a tenfold increase in financial resources to the integrated framework. Although there have been no formal pledges to the enhanced integrated framework, the integrated framework saw an increase in pledges at the end of 2006 from some $35 million to almost $52 million, while cumulative contributions rose from approximately $34 million to approximately $49.5 million.

Commitment 6
Reducing vulnerability and protecting the environment

58. With almost 72 per cent of population living in rural areas and dependent on income from agriculture, least developed countries are highly susceptible to land degradation, drought, desertification, deforestation, water and air pollution and climate change.

59. Thus, 36 out of 41 least developed countries for which data is available suffer from moderate (5-10 per cent) to very severe (50-100 per cent) human-induced land degradation. The severest (over 70 per cent) land degradation is in Burundi and Rwanda, countries with high population densities. Ten out of 30 of the world's lowest-ranked countries according to land resource potential and constraints are least developed countries. In seven of them, deserts and dry lands occupy more than 95 per cent of total land, which suggests the existence of severe desertification problems.[11] Recurrent droughts further exacerbate these problems by reducing agricultural production and causing food shortages and migration of population.

60. Under the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in Countries Experiencing Severe Drought and/or Desertification, particularly in Africa, the affected developing countries that are parties to the Convention were required to prepare National Action Programmes and mainstream sustainable land management in their poverty reduction and national development strategies. The same Convention also established the global mechanism designed to increase financial resources to affected developing countries. As of January 2007, 38 least developed countries had ratified and another 12 least developed countries had acceded to the Convention. Twenty-nine least developed countries have adopted their National Action Programmes and 18 least developed countries received assistance from the

[10] Key elements of the enhanced integrated framework include: (a) increased, additional, predictable financial resources to implement Action Matrices; (b) strengthened in-country capacities to manage, implement and monitor the integrated framework process and (c) enhanced integrated framework governance.

[11] *World Soil Resources Report: Land Resource Potential and Constraints at Regional and Country Levels* (FAO, Rome, 2000) (see ftp://ftp.fao.org/agl/agll/docs/wsr.pdf).

Global Mechanism in mainstreaming National Action Programmes in poverty reduction and national development strategies.

61. Although least developed countries are the countries which are least responsible for global warming, they are hardest hit by climate change, especially small island States and those in Africa. Recent studies[12] provide compelling evidence that Africa, due to its multiple stresses and low adaptive capacity, is the continent most vulnerable to global warming. Impacts of climate change in Africa include increased water stress, reduced agricultural production, disrupted food supplies and increased malnutrition. The studies also confirm that climate change can affect the local resources of small islands, such as fishery resources, reduce their value as destinations for tourism, cause the deterioration of coastal conditions, lead to coral bleaching, threaten vital infrastructure and reduce fresh water resources, inter alia.

62. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change requires that all Parties adopt national policies and take corresponding measures on the mitigation of climate change. Recognizing the high vulnerability and special needs of least developed countries in adapting to climate change, the same Convention established the Least Developed Countries Fund to provide technical and financial support for the preparation of their National Adaptation Programmes of Action. As of August 2006, 14 least developed countries had completed their National Adaptation Programmes of Action and the remaining least developed countries were expected to complete them in 2007-2008. The Fund has provided financial support to 44 National Adaptation Programmes of Action and two global projects worth $11.6 million. Four remaining least developed countries (Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Myanmar and Nepal) eligible for National Adaptation Programmes of Action support had yet to submit their proposals for funding and one least developed country had not yet provided information about National Adaptation Programmes of Action preparation. As of 28 April 2006 total available resources of the Fund, including new contributions and pledges, had reached $89.9 million. Additional pledges have since been made by France and Italy.

Commitment 7
Mobilizing financial resources

63. Despite recent pledges, donors are falling behind the target of 0.20 per cent of gross national income/official development assistance by 2010. In 2005, only 6 out of 22 donors met the 0.20 per cent target, down from 7 in 2004, and an additional 1 donor was on track to meet it in 2010, down from 3 in 2004. The remaining 15 donors were far from achieving the target, including 7 with declining or unchanged gross national income/official development assistance. Total net flows of official development assistance to least developed countries continued to increase by 6-9 per cent per year, in line with the goal, but the share of aid to least developed countries in total official development assistance remained unchanged (24 per cent) from 1994-1995 and dropped by 6 percentage points from 2004.

64. Almost all Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development/ Development Assistance Committee official development assistance to least

[12] See fourth assessment report on global warming prepared by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change; a report entitled "Stern review: the economics of climate change"; and a report on an African regional workshop on adaptation held in Accra from 21 to 23 September 2006.

developed countries was provided in grant form. Furthermore, aid has been untied beyond the coverage of the 2001 Development Assistance Committee recommendation, which excludes food aid and technical cooperation. In addition, the Development Assistance Committee has also abolished the thresholds below which the official development assistance can be untied, encouraging local and regional procurement of goods and services in least developed countries.

65. Donor support for trade relations capacity-building in least developed countries fell by 59 per cent from 2004, even as trade relations capacity-building support from official development assistance to developing countries increased by 12 per cent. From 2004 to 2005, the increase in total trade relations capacity-building was 4 per cent, but the increase to least developed countries was only one half of 1 per cent.

66. Aid allocation by donors was characterized by selectivity and high concentration. Thus, 9 least developed countries accounted for 43.7 per cent of donors aid in 2005. In 14 least developed countries, official development assistance was a significant part of gross national income in 2005. These were largely small island least developed countries with few natural resources, and least developed countries emerging from conflicts, burdened by heavy debt. High (over 20 per cent of gross national income) aid dependency not only makes these countries extremely vulnerable in their development, but also reduces the responsibility of Governments for tax collection and reduces Government accountability to citizens.



67. Delivery of heavily indebted poor countries initiative commitments by the World Bank increased in 2006, from $1.29 billion early in the year to $2.80 billion by August, reaching 42 per cent of commitments in terms of net present value. International Monetary Fund delivery, already at 81 per cent in early 2006, increased to 83 per cent, or $1.22 billion. As a result of debt relief measures, debt service as a percentage of exports has decreased significantly since 1990. Thirty

least developed countries in 2005, compared to 27 in 2004 and only 14 in 1990, had a ratio of debt to exports below 10 per cent. Further, only 2 countries in 2005, compared to 6 in 1990, had debt ratios over 20 per cent.

68. The sharp increase in foreign direct investment in least developed countries observed in 2004 was sustained in 2005 in only a few countries. In 2005, foreign direct investment exceeded 5 per cent of gross domestic product in 11 least developed countries, down from 12 in 2004, and was less than 1 per cent of gross domestic product or negative in 18 countries. In an upward trend since 1990, 15 least developed countries hosted foreign direct investment inflows in the range of 1-4.9 per cent of gross domestic product in 2005.

69. Migrant remittances[13] to least developed countries reached $11.4 billion in 2005, due entirely to an increase of remittance inflows to Bangladesh. If Bangladesh is not considered, net inflows of remittances to least developed countries remained at exactly the same level ($10.4 billion) as in 2004. It is noteworthy that South-South remittances exceed North-South remittances to least developed countries, despite high transaction and high foreign exchange commissions at both ends. Income differences, proximity and community ties (ethnic, linguistic, religious, family) with neighbouring developing countries are major determinants of South-South migration which drives remittances in the Bangladesh-India migration corridor, the second largest in the world, as well as remittances from South Africa to Lesotho and Mozambique, from Saudi Arabia to Yemen and Sudan and from India to Nepal. However, higher income difference encourages migration to the North, with such migration resulting in tenfold income increases. The United States of America remains the largest single source of North-South remittances to least developed countries. Significant North-South remittance inflows to least developed countries also originated in the euro area, mainly due to the euro-dollar exchange.[14]

70. In June 2005, at the South-South Summit, Qatar launched the South fund for development and pledged $20 million to this new financing facility. Though not a donor country, it committed itself to achieving the 0.7 per cent gross national income/official development assistance target to developing countries and the 0.15-0.20 per cent target gross national income/official development assistance to least developed countries by 2006.

III. Conclusions and recommendations

71. Economic performance of least developed countries continued to improve, and fewer countries, mainly Pacific islands, were lagging behind. Social indicators are also improving, but overall socio-economic progress in African least developed countries has been significantly compromised by continuing population growth due to the highest fertility in the world. International support for health is paying dividends in African least developed countries, but malnutrition appears to be worsening, particularly in rural areas, where agriculture can hardly keep up with rapid population growth, environmental degradation and the challenges associated

[13] Migrant remittances are defined as the sum of workers remittances, compensation of employees, and migrants' transfers as recorded in the International Monetary Fund balance of payments.

[14] It is estimated that the appreciation of the euro from US$ 0.89 per euro in 2001 to US$ 1.19 per euro in end-2005 accounted for US$ 5.7 billion or 7 per cent of remittances received by all developing countries in 2001-2005.

with climate change. As a result, African least developed countries increasingly face the danger of food shortages, disruption of food supplies and famine.

72. **Achieving the objectives of the Programme of Action requires greater donor focus on enhancing the productive capacity of least developed countries, in particular in agriculture. Donors also need to increase allocation of aid to physical infrastructure and technological development, as a means of increasing productivity and competitiveness of least developed countries. Above all, donors need to make significant efforts to increase their aid volumes in order to achieve the internationally agreed goal of 0.15-0.20 per cent of their gross national income as official development assistance to least developed countries by 2010 and improve aid effectiveness (ownership, harmonization, alignment, results and mutual accountability), as agreed in Rome and in Paris.**

73. **Developed countries must adhere fully to their commitment of providing duty-free and quota-free market access to all products from least developed countries and trade-related technical assistance, including through Aid for trade and the enhanced integrated framework, aimed at addressing supply-side constraints of least developed countries and mainstreaming trade in their national development plans and poverty reduction strategies. Improving the effectiveness of preferential market access requires improvement of the coverage and predictability of preference schemes and liberalization (simplification, harmonization and relaxation) of rules of origin. Granting the most generous and non-discriminatory treatment to all least developed countries on a lasting and unconditional basis could further boost the utilization of non-reciprocal preference schemes of developed countries. Developing countries could consider (a) granting non-reciprocal preferences to least developed countries and (b) reducing tariffs on all non-agricultural products from least developed countries.**

74. **For their part, least developed countries should strengthen their country ownership by promoting broad-based and inclusive dialogue on development with civil society and the private sector and on effective domestic resource mobilization and aid management, enhanced transparency and accountability, coordination and coherence and outcome-driven implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of the Brussels Programme at the country level. As they embark, with United Nations Development Programme support, on the preparation of the second generation of poverty reduction strategy papers, the Millennium Development Goals-based national development strategies and new United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks also need to establish synergies at the country level between the Millennium Development Goals, the Brussels Programme and regional initiatives like the New Partnership for Africa's Development, to ensure their complementarity and mutual reinforcement.**

75. **Fighting corruption should become an integral part of the fight against poverty in least developed countries. To be effective, the anti-corruption strategies need to be country-driven and must be viewed in the broader context of good governance. Simplification of procedures, transparency and accountability of decision-making, engaging civil society and a third honest party (domestic or international) which monitors or enforces the law can also**

improve a national system of checks and balances, prevent corruption, improve the delivery of public services and attract investments.

76. Pro-poor policies of least developed countries need to include policies aimed at increasing agriculture and labour productivity. To this end, least developed countries should pursue favourable economic, trade and investment policies and ensure the access of the poor, particularly women, to credit, land and markets. Creating this level playing field is important for promoting competition among suppliers of essential inputs, such as seeds and fertilizers, and creating incentives for private entrepreneurs to invest in agribusiness and for farmers to adopt new and sustainable technology and diversify into higher-value crops which will raise their incomes and help them escape poverty. Elimination of trade-distorting agricultural subsidies and transfer of appropriate agricultural technology and practices by developed countries should complement the efforts of least developed countries.

77. Pro-poor policies of least developed countries should also include sustainable development (construction, rehabilitation and maintenance) of transport infrastructure (rural, national and cross-border). Closing the physical infrastructure divide in least developed countries requires a comprehensive approach to infrastructure development and increased public investments in (a) rural infrastructure, which is important for increasing agricultural productivity and fostering rural growth linkages between agricultural and non-agricultural activities; (b) national transport infrastructure, critical for growth of the formal economy, diversification, structural change and integration into world trade; and (c) cross-border infrastructure, important for regional integration.

78. Improving access to electricity in least developed countries requires overcoming multiple challenges in generation, transmission and distribution at the national level by creating an enabling environment, adopting an effective policy and regulatory framework, improving management capacity and creating financially healthy utilities. It also requires focusing on cost-effective regional supply projects (hydro, coal and gas) and regional integration to promote energy trade. In addition, immediate energy generation solutions and pain relief to mitigate high energy costs must be provided to the most affected least developed countries. Scaling up electricity access in the least developed countries also requires development of a broader multi-year strategy of grid expansion as well as syndicated financing to ensure sustainable and predictable adequate support to the energy sector.

79. Bridging the digital divide between least developed countries and the rest of the world requires that policymakers, regulators, telephone operators and service providers adapt to the new challenges and opportunities offered by information and communications technology. Pricing is a critical factor in narrowing the digital gap. New technology, privatization and competition can reduce price, but they need an effective, transparent and predictable regulatory framework that would create a favourable investment climate, promote market opportunities and facilitate the realization of the full benefits of information and communications technology in the interest of the poor. To involve the private sector in deployment of information and communications technology in remote, rural areas sufficient incentives such as tax breaks, waivers of customs

duties on information and communications technology equipment, easy access to universal service funds, etc., are required.

80. Attracting more foreign direct investment to least developed countries requires (a) further improvement of their business and investment climate and public administration, (b) mitigation of their non-commercial risks, (c) entry of least developed countries into aid-supported regional and subregional currency arrangements, (d) adoption of targeted investment promotion strategies, and (e) basic necessary infrastructure. Identifying new niches beyond traditional areas (oil, gas and minerals) and former colonial markets (e.g., tourism, information and communications technology-based industries and services, etc.) is also an important element of successful foreign investment strategy for least developed countries.

81. South-South cooperation holds great potential for poverty reduction in least developed countries and should be further nurtured. Experience shows that cooperation between countries with similar conditions (environment, culture, economy) often results in the transfer of more appropriate technology. When the cooperation takes place between neighbouring countries, operating (personnel, transportation, etc.) costs are significantly reduced. South-South aid assistance expands aid uses and increases overall aid resources. As is the case with North-South investments, South-South investments can increase productivity and tax revenues. However, South-South cooperation should be viewed not as an alternative but rather as a valuable complement to North-South cooperation.

Annex

Statistical tables

Annex table 1

Economic growth and fixed capital formation

Least developed countries	GDP average annual growth in constant US dollars, per cent			Per capita GDP in constant US dollars		Per capita GDP in current US dollars	Gross fixed formation percentage perc. GDP	Foreign direct investment, net inflows, as perc of GDP			Total population (000s)	Population growth, per cent per year
	1990-95	1995-00	2000-05	1990	2005	2005	2004/2005	1990	2004	2005	2005	2000-2005
Africa												
Angola [a]	-4.20	6.11	6.83	977	1 004	1 309	12	-3.3	7.3	-4.0	16 095	2.89
Benin	4.01	5.31	3.89	356	430	500	20	3.4	2.7	0.5	8 490	3.22
Burkina Faso	4.93	5.23	4.59	335	458	348	19	0.0	0.3	0.4	13 933	3.19
Burundi	-2.12	-1.21	2.29	203	149	93	15	0.1	0.0	0.1	7 859	3.29
Cape Verde	5.21	8.36	4.07	867	1 462	1 947	28	0.1	2.2	5.5	507	2.35
Central African Republic	0.75	2.51	-1.15	432	361	330	6	0.0	-1.0	0.4	4 191	1.63
Chad [a]	4.26	2.46	11.82	254	396	426	38	0.5	11.1	12.9	10 146	3.62
Comoros	-0.55	0.04	1.70	475	341	427	21	0.2	0.0	0.3	798	2.65
Democratic Republic of the Con	-7.25	-3.91	2.74	248	108	115	19	0.2	10.2	5.7	58 741	2.95
Djibouti	2.07	0.40	2.42	819	747	852	16	..	5.8	3.2	804	1.94
Equatorial Guinea [a]	6.30	34.20	20.16	462	4 899	7 845	64	8.4	51.4	57.6	484	2.34
Eritrea	..	0.84	2.88	..	342	187	22	..	-1.2	1.2	4 527	4.12
Ethiopia	2.18	5.32	3.24	159	182	106	22	0.1	5.6	2.4	78 986	2.59
Gambia	2.51	5.54	3.18	356	391	281	19	4.5	14.2	11.3	1 617	3.11
Guinea	3.74	4.26	2.35	453	509	421	11	0.6	2.4	3.1	9 003	1.86
Guinea-Bissau	3.95	-1.45	-1.12	230	162	176	13	0.8	0.6	3.3	1 597	3.06
Lesotho	3.98	2.86	2.59	388	547	764	44	2.8	9.0	6.3	1 981	0.99
Liberia	-22.50	34.53	-1.78	180	134	146	10	58.6	41.6	35.4	3 442	2.28
Madagascar	-0.33	3.85	1.46	256	217	222	19	0.7	0.4	0.6	18 643	2.83
Malawi	5.32	2.39	1.35	185	217	165	7	1.2	0.0	0.1	13 226	2.58
Mali	3.80	4.11	5.30	282	365	377	18	0.2	2.1	3.0	11 611	2.98
Mauritania	4.84	4.35	3.41	503	635	416	14	0.7	0.3	6.2	2 963	2.88
Mozambique	1.92	7.92	7.54	202	323	328	15	0.4	4.1	1.6	20 533	2.42
Niger	1.53	2.78	3.23	296	269	199	15	1.6	0.9	0.4	13 264	3.52
Rwanda	-8.49	10.17	4.05	358	363	205	18	0.3	0.4	0.4	9 234	2.43
Sao Tome and Principe	1.44	2.10	3.80	493	540	447	52	..	-2.5	9.9	153	1.71
Senegal	1.41	5.38	3.78	714	840	672	23	1.0	1.0	0.7	11 770	2.60
Sierra Leone	-5.39	-3.73	4.97	159	97	196	17	5.0	5.7	4.9	5 586	4.23
Somalia	-7.20	1.73	2.41	149	105	262	20	0.6	..	..	8 196	3.00
Sudan [a]	4.77	1.64	5.21	626	811	562	32	-0.2	7.0	8.4	36 900	2.02
Togo	1.19	1.61	2.04	396	333	348	20	1.1	2.8	0.1	6 239	2.88
Uganda	7.45	6.45	4.63	206	322	280	22	-0.1	3.3	2.9	28 947	3.18
United Republic of Tanzania	3.99	7.23	5.34	144	224	297	18	0.0	4.2	3.9	38 478	2.56
Zambia	-2.03	2.72	3.19	487	429	463	25	6.2	4.4	3.6	11 478	1.88

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Annex table 1

Economic growth and fixed capital formation

Least developed countries	GDP average annual growth in constant US dollars, per cent			Per capita GDP in constant US dollars		Per capita GDP in current US dollars	Gross fixed formation percentage perc. GDP	Foreign direct investment, net inflows, as perc.of GDP			Total population (000s)	Population growth, per cent per year
	1990-95	1995-00	2000-05	1990	2005	2005	2004/2005	1990	2004	2005	2005	2000-2005
Asia and Pacific												
Afghanistan	-6.44	-8.92	7.70	299	99	184	22	..	..	..	25 067	3.79
Bangladesh	4.49	5.34	4.20	306	454	443	24	0.0	0.8	1.3	153 281	1.89
Bhutan	5.57	6.45	5.46	173	315	388	46	0.5	0.1	0.1	637	2.63
Cambodia	6.45	5.09	4.11	174	264	316	22	..	2.5	6.1	13 956	1.76
Kiribati	4.09	5.64	1.43	396	504	815	8	..	..	..	92	1.81
Lao People's Democratic Repu	6.41	6.17	4.55	186	305	419	25	0.7	0.7	1.0	5 664	1.62
Maldives	6.68	8.34	5.51	1 000	1 810	2 345	36	2.6	1.9	1.2	295	1.57
Myanmar	5.84	8.28	4.87	127	260	219	11	..	..	..	47 967	0.89
Nepal	5.19	4.82	1.96	184	238	245	19	0.2	0.0	0.0	27 094	2.08
Samoa	0.08	3.92	..	1 247	1 541	1 968	40	5.9	0.6	-0.9	184	0.70
Solomon Islands	7.68	-2.38	-0.70	657	553	585	19	4.9	0.4	-0.3	472	2.57
Timor-Leste	1.12	-4.57	2.98	244	197	370	27	..	..	..	1 067	5.31
Tuvalu	3.04	1.90	4.38	1 012	1 451	2 141	56	..	..	..	10	0.50
Vanuatu	4.54	1.29	-0.25	1 023	969	1 405	29	8.7	6.3	3.9	215	2.54
Yemen [a]	4.85	5.86	3.17	335	393	643	14	-2.7	1.1	-1.8	21 096	2.97
Latin America and the Caribbean												
Haiti	-4.05	2.06	-1.27	381	263	471	13	0.3	0.2	0.2	9 296	1.62

Sources: Gross domestic product growth and per capita, United Nations Statistics Division, *National Accounts Main Aggregates Database*, http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snama/dnlist.asp, with additional calculations prepared by the Statistics Division; foreign direct investment, World Bank, *World Development Indicators 2007*, table 6.1 (Washington, D.C.); population, United Nations Population Division, *World Population Prospects—The 2006 Revision*, print and CD-ROM (document ESA/P/WP.202).

a Refers to an oil-exporting country.

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Annex table 2

Poverty and hunger

Least developed countries	Per capita consumption less than $1 (PPP) per day, percentage of population		Proportion of population which is undernourished			Percentage difference in proportion of population undernourished		Life expectancy at birth, years		Change in life expectancy at birth (years)
	1990-1996	1997-2004	1990-1992	2000-2003	2002-2004	1990-1992 to 2000-2003	1990-1992 to 2002-2004	1990/1995	2000/2005	1990-2005
Africa										
Angola	..	..	58	38	35	-20	-23	39.8	40.7	0.9
Benin	..	31.0	20	14	12	-6	-8	53.5	53.8	0.3
Burkina Faso	63.0	27.0	21	17	15	-4	-6	46.8	47.4	0.6
Burundi	45.0	55.0	48	67	66	19	18	42.4	43.5	1.1
Cape Verde	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	66.4	70.2	3.8
Central African Republic	67.0	..	50	45	44	-5	-6	46.7	39.4	-7.3
Chad	..	..	58	33	35	-25	-23	46.2	43.6	-2.6
Comoros	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	57.9	63.0	5.1
Congo, Democratic Republic	..	..	32	72	74	40	42	44.7	43.1	-1.6
Djibouti	..	..	53	26	24	-27	-29	51.2	52.7	1.5
Equatorial Guinea	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	45.9	43.5	-2.4
Eritrea	..	..	..	73	75	..	..	49.4	53.5	4.1
Ethiopia	31.0	23.0	..	46	46	..	..	47.2	47.6	0.4
Gambia	54.0	59.0	22	27	29	5	7	51.4	55.5	4.1
Guinea	..	..	39	24	24	-15	-15	48.7	53.6	4.9
Guinea-Bissau	..	..	24	37	39	13	15	43.0	44.6	1.6
Lesotho	39.5	..	17	12	13	-5	-4	58.3	36.7	-21.6
Liberia	..	..	35	49	50	14	15	40.5	42.5	2.0
Madagascar	46.0	61.0	35	38	38	-27	3	52.0	55.3	3.3
Malawi	..	42.0	50	34	35	-16	-15	45.2	39.6	-5.6
Mali	72.0	..	29	28	29	-1	0	46.7	47.8	1.1
Mauritania	39.0	26.0	15	10	10	-5	-5	49.4	52.5	3.1
Mozambique	38.0	..	66	45	44	-21	-22	43.6	41.9	-1.7
Niger	51.5	..	41	32	32	-9	-9	40.6	44.3	3.7
Rwanda	..	52.0	44	36	33	-8	-11	23.6	43.6	20.0
Sao Tome and Principe	..	..	18	12	10	-6	-8	62.0	62.9	0.9
Senegal	33.5	..	23	23	20	0	-3	54.1	55.6	1.5
Sierra Leone	..	..	47	50	51	3	4	38.4	40.6	2.2
Somalia	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	39.7	46.2	6.5
Sudan	..	..	32	27	26	-5	-6	53.4	56.3	2.9
Togo	..	..	33	25	24	-8	-9	57.7	54.2	-3.5
Uganda	86.0	85.0	24	19	19	-5	-5	43.6	46.8	3.2
United Republic of Tanzania	49.0	58.0	37	44	44	7	7	52.4	46.0	-6.4
Zambia	70.7	76.0	48	47	46	-1	-2	43.4	37.4	-6.0

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Poverty and hunger

Least developed countries	Per capita consumption less than $1 (PPP) per day, percentage of population		Proportion of population which is undernourished			Percentage difference in proportion of population undernourished		Life expectancy at birth, years		Change in life expectancy at birth (years)
	1990-1996	1997-2004	1990-1992	2000-2003	2002-2004	1990-1992 to 2000-2003	1990-1992 to 2002-2004	1990/1995	2000/2005	1990-2005
Asia and Pacific										
Afghanistan	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Bangladesh	30.7	36.0	35	30	30	-5	-5	45.5	46.0	0.5
Bhutan	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	56.3	62.6	6.3
Cambodia	..	55.0	43	33	33	-10	-10	55.9	62.7	6.8
Kiribati	..	..	9	6	7	-3	-2	55.0	56.0	1.0
Lao People's Democratic Republi	8.0	27.0	29	21	19	-8	-10	..	..	..
Maldives	..	..	17	11	10	-6	-7	50.8	54.5	3.7
Myanmar	..	..	10	5	5	-5	-5	61.0	66.3	5.3
Nepal	39.0	..	20	17	17	-3	-3	56.7	60.1	3.4
Samoa	..	..	11	4	4	-7	-7	55.9	61.4	5.5
Solomon Islands	..	..	33	20	21	-13	-12	66.0	70.0	4.0
Timor-Leste	..	..	11	8	9	-3	-2	60.9	62.2	1.3
Tuvalu	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	47.8	55.1	7.3
Vanuatu	..	..	12	12	11	0	..	..	..	..
Yemen	4.0	16.0	34	37	38	3	4	65.1	68.4	3.3
Latin America and the Caribbean										
Haiti	..	54.0	65	47	46	-18	-19	55.7	60.3	4.6
								48.2	51.5	3.3

Sources: World Bank, *World Development Indicators 2007*, table 2.6 (Washington, D.C.), with additional data to 16 April 2007 calculated by the Data Development Division from the World Bank's Povcal Net, http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/jsp/index.jsp; Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, *The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2006, Eradicating world hunger—taking stock ten years after the World Food Summit (Rome, 2006)*, with updates from *FAOSTAT* database, *Food Security Statistics*, http://www.fao.org/foodsecurity/index_en.htm , accessed 1 March 2007, and United Nations Population Division, World Population Prospects—The 2006 Revision, print and CD-ROM (document ESA/P/WP.202).

Annex table 3

Reproductive health and health services

Least developed countries	Births attended by skilled health personnel, perc. 1997/2005	Women reporting at least one antenatal visit to a skilled practitioner, perc. 1997/2005	Maternal mortality ratio (per 100,000) 2000	Contraceptive use among currently married women aged 15-49, any method, perc. 1990/1995	1997/2005
Africa					
Angola	45	66	1 700	8	6
Benin	66	81	850	16	19
Burkina Faso	38	73	1 000	8	14
Burundi	25	78	1 000	..	16
Cape Verde	89	99	150	..	53
Central African Republic	44	62	1 100	15	28
Chad	14	39	1 100	..	3
Comoros	62	74	480	21	26
Congo, Democratic Republic	61	68	990	8	31
Djibouti	61	67	730	..	9
Equatorial Guinea	65	86	880	..	..
Eritrea	28	70	630	5	8
Ethiopia	6	27	850	4	8
Gambia	55	91	540	12	18
Guinea	56	82	740	2	7
Guinea-Bissau	35	62	1 100	..	8
Lesotho	55	90	550	23	37
Liberia	51	85	760	..	10
Madagascar	51	80	550	17	27
Malawi	56	92	1 800	13	33
Mali	41	57	1 200	..	8
Mauritania	57	64	1 000	3	8
Mozambique	48	85	1 000	..	17
Niger	14	41	1 600	4	14
Rwanda	39	94	1 400	21	17
Sao Tome and Principe	76	91	100 [a]	..	29
Senegal	58	79	690	7	12
Sierra Leone	42	68	2 000	..	4
Somalia	25	32	1 100	..	..
Sudan	87	60	590	10	7
Togo	61	85	570	..	26
Uganda	39	92	880	..	20
United Republic of Tanzania	43	78	1 500	10	26
Zambia	43	93	750	15	34
Asia and Pacific					
Afghanistan	14	16	1 900		10
Bangladesh	13	49	380	40	58
Bhutan	37	51	420	19	31
Cambodia	32	38	450	13	24
Kiribati	85	88	56 [a]	..	88
Lao People's Democratic Republic	19	27	650	19	27
Maldives	70	81	110	..	39
Myanmar	57	76	360	17	34
Nepal	15	28	740	23	38
Samoa	100	..	130	..	30
Solomon Islands	85	..	130	..	11
Timor-Leste	18	61	660	..	10
Tuvalu	100	..	-	..	32
Vanuatu	88	..	130	..	28
Yemen	27	41	570	7	23
Latin America and the Caribbean					
Haiti	24	79	680	..	28

Sources: United Nations Children's Fund, *The State of the World's Children 2007: Women and Children, The Double Dividend of Gender Equality* (New York, 2007), table 8, and United Nations Population Division, *World Contraceptive Use 2005* (CD-ROM and wall chart).

[a] As reported by the country.

Annex table 4

Universal primary education and gender equality in education

A. Enrolment

Least developed countries	Enrolment ratio in primary education, net, per 100			Ratio of girls to boys enrolment ratios in primary education			Ratio of girls to boys enrolment ratios in secondary education		Ratio of girls to boys in tertiary education		
	1990/91	2002/03	2004	1990/91	2002/03	2004	1990/91	2004	1990/91	2002/03	2004
Africa											
Angola	58	...	...	0.95	..	..	..	..	..	0.65	0.63
Benin	45	...	83	0.52	..	0.78	0.41	0.49	0.14	..	..
Burkina Faso	26	36	40	0.63	0.74	0.77	0.52	0.67	0.29	0.75	0.27
Burundi	53	57	57	0.85	0.84	0.89	0.58	0.75	0.36	0.34	0.36
Cape Verde	94	99	92	0.95	0.98	0.99	..	1.06	..	0.40	1.14
Central African Republic	54	...	...	0.66	..	..	0.40	...	0.15	1.09	..
Chad	37	61	57	0.45	..	0.68	0.20	0.32	..	..	..
Comoros	57	...	...	0.73	..	..	0.65	0.75	..	..	0.80
Congo, Democratic Republic	55	...	...	0.78	..	..	..	..	..	0.77	..
Djibouti	31	...	33	0.72	0.81	..	0.66	0.67	..	..	0.83
Equatorial Guinea	91	...	85	0.97	..	0.85	..	0.56	0.14	0.80	..
Eritrea	16	45	48	0.99	0.86	0.85	..	0.56	..	..	0.25
Ethiopia	23	47	56	0.75	0.81	0.94	0.75	0.64	0.22	0.15	0.33
Gambia	48	79	75	0.71	..	1.06	0.49	0.82	..	0.33	0.25
Guinea	26	65	64	0.51	0.79	0.84	0.33	0.45	..	..	0.20
Guinea-Bissau	38	...	...	0.56	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Lesotho	73	86	86	1.24	1.07	1.06	1.47	1.27	1.22	0.57	2.00
Liberia	..	...	...	...	..	..	..	..	..	1.46	..
Madagascar	65	79	89	1.00	1.01	1.00	0.97	..	0.82	0.83	0.91
Malawi	50	...	95	0.92	..	1.05	0.46	0.82	0.33	0.41	0.55
Mali	20	44	46	0.61	0.78	0.85	0.51	0.59	0.16	..	0.44
Mauritania	35	68	74	0.74	0.99	0.99	0.46	0.82	0.16	0.27	0.29
Mozambique	45	55	71	0.76	0.91	0.90	0.57	0.69	..	0.47	0.47
Niger	24	38	39	0.58	0.69	0.71	0.43	0.64	..	..	0.33
Rwanda	67	87	73	0.99	1.04	1.04	0.76	0.92	..	0.46	0.67
Sao Tome and Principe	..	...	98	..	..	1.00	..	1.00	..	..	..
Senegal	47	69	66	0.74	0.93	0.95	0.53	0.72	..	..	..
Sierra Leone	41	...	...	0.73	..	..	0.57	..	..	..	0.50
Somalia	..	...	...	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Sudan	43	...	...	0.75	..	..	0.79	0.89	0.88	..	..
Togo	75	79	79	0.71	0.84	0.85	0.34	0.49	0.16	..	..
Uganda	53	..	..	0.82	..	..	0.56	0.79	0.39	0.52	0.63
United Republic of Tanzania	50	69	91	1.01	0.99	0.98	0.70	..	..	0.44	0.43
Zambia	79	68	80	0.97	0.99	1.00	0.67	0.79	..	..	..
Asia and Pacific											
Afghanistan	27	...	...	0.55	..	..	0.52	0.19	0.48	..	0.27
Bangladesh	71	84	94	0.87	1.05	1.03	0.52	1.04	0.20	0.50	0.47
Bhutan	..	...	...	..	..	..	..	0.82	..	..	..
Cambodia	67	93	98	0.83	0.95	0.96	0.43	0.67	..	0.45	0.45
Kiribati	..	...	...	..	..	..	..	1.13	..	..	..
Lao People's Democratic Republ	63	85	84	0.85	0.93	0.94	0.62	0.72	..	..	0.62
Maldives	87	92	90	1.00	1.01	1.01	1.02	1.08	..	..	2.50
Myanmar	98	84	88	0.96	1.01	1.02	0.98	0.96	..	..	..
Nepal	..	...	79	..	..	0.87	0.44	0.82	0.32	0.34	0.38
Samoa	..	98	90	..	..	1.00	1.22	1.11	1.00	..	..
Solomon Islands	83	72	80	0.86	..	0.99	0.63	0.75	..	..	..
Timor-Leste	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1.00
Tuvalu	..	...	...	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Vanuatu	71	94	94	1.02	..	0.98	0.79	0.82	..	..	0.57
Yemen	52	72	75	0.38	0.70	0.73	0.21	0.45	..	..	0.35
Latin America and the Caribbean											
Haiti	22	...	...	1.05	..	..	0.96	..	..	..	..

Annex table 4

Universal primary education and gender equality in education

B. Adult literacy

Least developed countries	Adult literacy (aged 15+) Percentage literate 1990 Women	Men	Total	2000/2004 Women	Men	Total	Change in gender difference, perc. points 1990 to 2000/04 *	Change in adult literacy, perc. points 1990 to 2000/04 *
Africa								
Angola	...	...	...	53.8	82.1	66.8	...	...
Benin	15.5	38.1	26.4	23.0	48.0	35.0	2.4	8.6
Burkina Faso	...	...	...	15.0	29.0	22.0	...	...
Burundi	26.6	48.4	37.0	52.0	67.0	59.0	-6.8	22.0
Cape Verde	54.3	76.2	63.8	71.0	87.0	78.0	-5.9	14.2
Central African Republic	20.7	47.1	33.2	33.5	64.7	48.6	4.8	15.4
Chad	18.8	37.0	27.7	13.0	41.0	26.0	9.8	-1.7
Comoros	46.4	61.4	53.8	...	...	...	...	...
Congo, Democratic Republic of th	34.4	61.4	47.5	54.0	81.0	67.0	...	...
Djibouti	39.7	66.8	53.0	...	...	...	...	...
Equatorial Guinea	61.1	85.8	73.3	80.0	93.0	87.0	...	...
Eritrea	34.8	58.5	46.4	...	...	...	...	...
Ethiopia	19.8	37.3	28.6	38.0	52.0	45.0	-3.5	16.4
Gambia	19.7	31.7	25.6	...	...	...	...	...
Guinea	12.9	42.3	27.2	18.0	43.0	29.0	...	...
Guinea-Bissau	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Lesotho	89.5	65.4	78.0	90.3	73.7	81.4	7.5	3.4
Liberia	22.8	55.4	39.2	...	...	...	...	...
Madagascar	49.8	66.4	58.0	65.0	77.0	71.0	...	...
Malawi	36.2	68.8	51.8	54.0	75.0	64.0	-11.6	12.2
Mali	...	...	...	11.9	26.7	19.0	...	...
Mauritania	23.9	46.3	34.8	43.0	60.0	51.0	-5.4	16.2
Mozambique	18.4	49.3	33.5	...	...	...	...	...
Niger	5.1	18.0	11.4	15.0	43.0	29.0	15.1	17.6
Rwanda	44.0	62.9	53.3	60.0	71.0	65.0	-7.9	11.7
Sao Tome and Principe	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Senegal	18.6	38.2	28.4	29.0	51.0	39.0	2.4	10.6
Sierra Leone	...	...	...	24.0	47.0	35.0	...	...
Somalia	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Sudan	32.0	60.0	45.8	52.0	71.0	61.0	-9.0	15.2
Togo	28.7	60.5	44.2	38.0	69.0	53.0	-0.8	8.8
Uganda	43.5	69.3	56.1	58.0	77.0	67.0	-6.8	10.9
United Republic of Tanzania	51.0	75.5	62.9	62.0	78.0	69.0	-8.5	6.1
Zambia	58.7	78.6	68.2	60.0	76.0	68.0	-3.9	-0.2
Asia and Pacific								
Afghanistan	...	...	...	13.0	43.0	28.0	...	...
Bangladesh	23.7	44.3	34.2	33.0	52.0	43.0	-1.6	8.8
Bhutan	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Cambodia	48.8	77.7	62.0	64.0	85.0	74.0	9	12.0
Kiribati	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Lao People's Democratic Republic	42.8	70.3	56.5	61.0	77.0	69.0	-11.5	12.5
Maldives	94.6	95.0	94.8	96.0	96.0	96.0	-0.4	1.2
Myanmar	74.2	87.4	80.7	86.0	94.0	90.0	-5.2	9.3
Nepal	14.0	47.4	30.4	35.0	63.0	49.0	-5.4	18.6
Samoa	97.4	98.5	98.0	99.0	99.0	99.0	-1.1	1.0
Solomon Islands	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Timor-Leste	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Tuvalu	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Vanuatu	...	...	...	...	...	74.0	...	...
Yemen	12.9	55.2	32.7	33.0	72.0	53.0	-3.3	20.3
Latin America and the Caribbean								
Haiti	36.9	42.6	39.7	...	...	...	...	...

Sources: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, *Education for All, EFA Global Monitoring Report 2007—Strong Foundations, Early Childhood Care and Education* (Paris, 2007), tables 12 and 13. Data refer to the latest year available in the period 2000-2004.
Where primary data are not available, UNESCO relies on national and international estimates; gender ratios for 1990-1991 from United Nations Statistics Division, *Millennium Indicators Database*, indicator 9 (accessed 1 February 2006).

*A negative (-) sign indicates a decrease in gender difference; a positive (+) sign indicates an increase.

Annex table 5

Infant and child health

Least developed countries	Under-5 mortality rate			Infant mortality rate			Percentage of 1-year old children immunized, Measles		Percentage of 1-year old children immunized, DPT3		Percentage of children under 6 months who are exclusively breastfed		Prevalence of moderately or severely under- weight children under five	
	1990	2004	2005	1990	2004	2005	2004	2005	2004	2005	1996–2004	2005	1996–2004	2005
Africa														
Angola	260	260	260	154	154	154	84	45	59	47	23	11	31	31
Benin	185	152	150	111	90	89	64	85	83	93	11	38	31	23
Burkina Faso	210	192	191	113	97	96	78	84	88	96	23	19	40	38
Burundi	190	190	190	114	114	114	84	75	74	74	56	62	47	45
Cape Verde	60	36	35	45	27	26	72	66	75	73	..	57	..	..
Central African Republic	168	193	191	102	115	115	91	35	40	40	20	17	32	24
Chad	201	200	208	120	117	124	50	23	50	20	35	2	28	37
Comoros	120	70	71	68	52	53	57	80	76	80	12	21	46	25
Democratic Republic of the Congo	205	205	205	129	129	129	84	70	64	73	15	34	32	31
Djibouti	175	126	133	116	101	88	64	65	64	71	52	..	40	27
Equatorial Guinea	170	204	205	103	122	123	98	51	53	53	57	24	14	19
Eritrea	147	82	78	88	52	50	55	84	83	83	30	52	24	40
Ethiopia	204	166	164	131	110	109	60	59	60	69	24	49	23	38
Gambia	151	122	137	103	89	97	69	84	98	88	50	26	20	17
Guinea	240	156	150	145	101	98	36	59	69	69	..	27	18	26
Guinea-Bissau	253	203	200	153	126	124	59	80	80	80	36	37	48	25
Lesotho	101	82	152	81	61	102	61	85	78	83	1	36	40	20
Liberia	235	235	235	157	157	157	85	94	31	87	44	..	22	5
Madagascar	188	123	119	103	76	74	59	59	61	61	18	67	25	42
Malawi	221	175	125	131	110	79	54	82	89	93	56	53	13	22
Mali	250	219	218	140	121	120	70	85	76	85	..	25	19	33
Mauritania	153	125	..	85	78	78	78	61	70	71	15	20	19	32
Mozambique	235	152	175	158	104	100	40	77	72	72	84	30	27	24
Niger	320	259	256	191	152	150	56	83	62	89	62	1	45	40
Rwanda	173	203	203	103	118	118	97	89	89	95	80	90	13	23
Sao Tome and Principe	118	118	118	75	75	75	87	88	99	97	63	56	23	13
Senegal	148	137	136	90	78	77	77	74	87	84	24	34	17	17
Sierra Leone	302	283	282	175	166	166	75	67	61	64	40	4	23	27
Somalia	225	225	225	133	133	133	90	35	30	35	67	9	42	26
Sudan	120	91	90	74	63	62	71	60	55	59	19	16	38	41
Togo	152	140	139	88	78	78	77	70	71	82	37	18	25	25
Uganda	180	138	136	93	80	79	73	86	87	84	24	63	31	23
United Republic of Tanzania	161	126	122	102	78	76	84	91	95	90	..	41	39	22
Zambia	180	182	182	101	102	102	91	84	80	80	68	40	48	20
Asia and Pacific														
Afghanistan	260	257	257	168	165	165	80	64	66	76	25	..	33	39
Bangladesh	149	77	73	100	56	54	48	81	85	88	10	36	30	48
Bhutan	166	80	75	107	67	65	30	93	89	95	12	..	45	19
Cambodia	115	141	143	80	97	98	94	79	90	82	41	12	22	45
Kiribati	88	65	65	65	49	48	73	56	62	62	16	50	17	..
Lao People's Democratic Republic	163	83	79	120	65	62	42	41	45	49	24	23	19	40
Maldives	111	46	42	79	35	33	56	97	96	98	65	10	21	30
Myanmar	130	106	105	91	76	75	73	72	82	73	31	15	40	7
Nepal	145	76	74	100	59	56	51	74	80	75	38	68	23	48
Samoa	50	30	29	40	25	24	75	57	68	64	9	..	28	..
Solomon Islands	38	56	29	31	34	24	78	72	80	80	2	65	28	..
Timor-Leste	177	80	61	133	64	52	25	48	57	55	..	31	..	46
Tuvalu	54	51	38	42	36	31	80	62	98	93	21	..	25	..
Vanuatu	62	40	38	48	32	31	74	70	49	66	4	50	27	..
Yemen	139	111	102	98	82	76	70	76	78	86	25	12	17	46
Latin America and the Caribbean														
Haiti	150	117	120	102	74	89	64	54	43	43	17	24	24	17

Source: United Nations Children's Fund, *The State of the World's Children 2007: Women and Children, The Double Dividend of Gender Equality* (New York, 2007), tables 1-3.

Annex table 6
HIV/AIDS prevalence and prevention

Least developed countries	HIV prevalence rate, adults aged 15-49		Condom use at last high risk sex, 1998/2004				Condom use rate of the contraceptive prevalence rate	Percentage aged 15-24 years comprehensive correct knowledge of HIV/AIDS, 2005		AIDS orphans (one or both parents died from AIDS)		Orphans school attendance ratio to non-orphans
	2001	2005	Women	Men	2005 Women	2005 Men	1998/2004	Women	Men	2003	2005	1998/2005
Africa												
Angola	3.7	3.7	-	-	55	64	5	35	43	110	160	90
Benin	1.9	1.8	19	34	50.8	60	1	8.1	10.6	34	62	
Burkina Faso	4.2	2.0	34	57	-	-	15			260	120	109
Burundi	6.2	3.3	-	-	46	55	1	3.6	4	200	120	70
Cape Verde	..	..	-	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	
Central African Republic	13.5	10.7	-	-	61	83	3		-	110	140	91
Chad	4.9	3.5	-	-	-	-	0		-	98	57	105
Comoros	..	<0.1	-	-	-	-	3		-	-	-	59
Congo, Democratic Republic	4.2	3.4	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	770	680	72
Djibouti	2.8	3.1	-	-	-	-	..	-	-	5	6	
Equatorial Guinea	..	3.2	-	-	-	-	..		-	-	5	90
Eritrea	2.8	2.4	-	-	-	-	8		-	39	36	83
Ethiopia	4.1	..	11	30	14.6	36	4	-	-	720	-	60
Gambia	1.2	2.4	-	-	-	-	1		-	2	4	65
Guinea	2.8	1.5	11	32	-	-	10	-	-	35	28	113
Guinea-Bissau	..	3.8	-	-	-	-	1		-	-	11	103
Lesotho	29.6	23.2	-	-	50	49	6		-	100	97	95
Liberia	5.1	..	-	-	-	-	..	-	-	36	-	
Madagascar	1.3	0.5	5	12	-	-	2	19	16	30	13	76
Malawi	14.3	14.1	32	38	33	46	5	23.5	36	500	550	93
Mali	1.9	1.7	14	30	-	-	4			75	94	104
Mauritania	0.5	0.7	-	-	-	-	10	-	-	2	1	..
Mozambique	12.1	16.1	29	33	-	-	5			470	510	80
Niger	1.1	1.1	1	30	-	-	0		-	24	46	
Rwanda	5.1	3.1	23	39	-	-	3			160	210	82
Sao Tome and Principe	..	-	-	-	-	-	0		-	-	-	
Senegal	0.5	0.9	-	-	-	-	1		-	17	25	74
Sierra Leone	..	1.6	-	-	-	-	2		-	-	31	71
Somalia	..	0.9	-	-	-	-	..	1.9	1.3	-	23	65
Sudan	1.9	1.6	-	-	-	-	..	-	-	-	-	96
Togo	4.3	3.2	22	41	-	-	6		-	54	88	98
Uganda	5.1	6.1	44	62	-	-	8			940	1000	95
United Republic of Tanzania	9	6.5	42	47	-	-	11			980	1100	82
Zambia	16.1	17.0	53	42	26.1	38	11	40.5	46.1	630	710	92
Asia and Pacific												
Afghanistan	..	<0.1	-	-	-	-		-	-	-	-	
Bangladesh	..	<0.1	-	-	-	-		-	-	-	-	
Bhutan	..	<0.1	-	-	-	-	..	-	-	-	-	
Cambodia	2.1	1.6	-	-	-	-			-	-	-	71
Kiribati	..	-	-	-	-	-	..	-	-	-	-	
Lao People's Democratic Rep.	0.1	0.1	-	-	-	-		-	-	-	-	
Maldives	..	-	-	-	-	-		-	-	-	-	
Myanmar	1	1.3	-	-	-	-		-	-	-	-	
Nepal	0.4	0.5	-	-	-	-		-	-	-	-	
Samoa	..	-	-	-	-	-	..	-	-	-	-	
Solomon Islands	..	-	-	-	-	-	..	-	-	-	-	
Timor-Leste	..	-	-	-	-	-	..	-	-	-	-	
Tuvalu	..	-	-	-	-	-	..	-	-	-	-	
Vanuatu	..	-	-	-	-	-	..	-	-	-	-	
Yemen	..	..	-	-	-	-		-	-	-	-	
Latin America and the Caribbean												
Haiti	5.5	3.8	19	30	-	-			28	-	-	87

Sources: UNAIDS, *2006 Report on the global AIDS epidemic, fifth global report* (Geneva, 2006); United Nations Children's Fund, *The State of the World's Children 2007: Women and Children, The Double Dividend of Gender Equality (New York, 2007)*, tables 4 and and 8, and United Nations Population Division, *World Contraceptive Use 2005* (United Nations publication, Sales No. 2006.XVIII.4).

Annex table 7

Malaria and tuberculosis prevalence, mortality, prevention and treatment

Least developed countries	Reported malaria cases per 1000 population *		Number of reported deaths from malaria *	Children under 5 years: Sleeping under treated net (%)	Children under 5 years: Perc. with fever receiving anti-malaria drugs	Estimated prevalence of tuberculosis per 100,000 population			Estimated tuberculosis deaths per 100,000 population			DOTS * Proportion of TB cases detected, per cent		DOTS * Proportion of detected cases cured, per cent	
	1990	2000/2003	2000/2003	1999/2005	1999/2005	1990	###	###	1990	2003	2005	2003	2005	2002	2004
Africa															
Angola	26.1	106.9	11 344	2	63	453	272	333	59	25	36	102	68	74	68
Benin	20.0	122.0	670	7	60	171	144	144	21	15	14	50	42	80	83
Burkina Faso	55.7	114.9	4 417	2	50	285	315	461	46	45	59	12	11	64	67
Burundi	16.6	274.0	330	1	31	234	558	602	36	92	83	29	26	79	78
Cape Verde	0.2	0.3	..	..	..	366	329	327	42	40	37	41	31	..	71
Central African Republic	59.3	24.7	..	2	69	225	548	483	33	113	91	31	24	..	91
Chad	24.7	47.7	1 001	..	44	397	456	495	51	66	70	24	23	72	69
Comoros	..	5.1	16	9	63	193	103	89	22	8	7	23	30	96	94
Congo, Democratic Republic	..	83.1	16 498	1	45	263	564	541	37	81	73	44	46	78	85
Djibouti	6.1	7.2	..	..	..	1 338	###	..	160	115	..	63	48	82	80
Equatorial Guinea	72.3	31.3	..	1	49	341	374	355	44	63	47	..	..	..	..
Eritrea	..	17.4	78	4	4	493	444	515	59	62	69	42	28	82	85
Ethiopia	..	8.0	..	1	3	269	533	546	33	79	73	47	46	76	79
Gambia	237.7	100.5	..	15	55	432	341	352	50	41	46	58	53	74	86
Guinea	3.6	109.5	441	4	56	264	407	431	32	54	52	33	30	72	72
Guinea-Bissau	80.5	134.6	780	7	58	364	312	293	43	43	40	56	51	48	75
Lesotho	..	..	..	..	..	416	588	588	47	109	107	91	83	52	69
Liberia	..	301.5	..	..	..	430	507	507	58	78	70	..	34	..	70
Madagascar	..	121.5	759	..	34	434	331	396	50	41	45	51	41	74	71
Malawi	409.3	240.4	6 993	15	28	523	551	518	78	107	98	48	46	72	71
Mali	27.5	62.2	1 309	8	38	655	593	578	81	75	71	12	12	50	71
Mauritania	13.3	59.6	100	2	33	531	668	590	61	77	69	..	22	..	22
Mozambique	..	269.7	3 569	..	15	332	636	597	44	129	124	33	36	78	77
Niger	152.0	59.1	1 096	6	48	290	276	294	34	33	35	38	33	..	61
Rwanda	189.2	102.1	..	5	13	251	664	673	40	104	91	19	21	58	77
Sao Tome and Principe	..	393.5	..	..	61	309	256	258	36	28	27	..	..	..	..
Senegal	..	119.3	1 337	14	29	452	432	466	53	50	54	38	31	66	74
Sierra Leone	..	95.4	..	2	61	497	809	905	58	102	111	25	25	81	82
Somalia	..	2.4	10	..	..	751	755		89	126	..	23	68	89	91
Sudan	301.2	91.8	2 479	0	50	404	364		47	62	..	34	33	78	77
Togo	234.6	92.2	791	54	60	799	696	753	94	98	101	10	11	68	67
Uganda	..	477.9	8 450	0	..	270	652	559	55	96	91	39	37	60	70
United Republic of Tanzania	411.1	289.7	14 156	16	58	371	524	496	53	86	75	45	45	80	81
Zambia	235.8	..	5 763	7	52	492	638	618	104	122	118	76	68	83	83

Annex table 7

Malaria and tuberculosis prevalence, mortality, prevention and treatment

Least developed countries	Reported malaria cases per 1000 population *		Number of reported deaths from malaria *	Children under 5 years: Sleeping under treated net (%)	Children under 5 years: Perc. with fever receiving anti-malaria drugs	Estimated prevalence of tuberculosis per 100,000 population			Estimated tuberculosis deaths per 100,000 population			DOTS †: Proportion of TB cases detected, per cent		DOTS †: Proportion of detected cases cured, per cent	
	1990	2000/2003	2000/2003	1999/2005	1999/2005	1990	###	###	1990	2003	2005	2003	2005	2002	2004
Asia and Pacific															
Afghanistan	23.0	24.7	..	..	..	693	671	288	75	93	35	17	42	87	89
Bangladesh	0.5	0.4	574	..	..	741	490	406	65	57	47	24	37	84	90
Bhutan	5.6	1.7	15	..	..	626	194	174	55	21	19	41	44	86	83
Cambodia	12.7	5.0	492	..	..	1 584	762	703	123	95	87	39	49	92	91
Kiribati	..	..	..	..	..	392	60	426	30	4	49	540	87	94	94
Lao People's Dem. Rep.	5.3	3.3	187	18	9	497	327	306	37	26	24	31	40	78	86
Maldives	..	..	..	..	..	542	39	53	48	2	3	96	76	95	95
Myanmar	24.4	14.5	2 476	..	..	514	187	170	45	25	15	90	119	81	84
Nepal	1.2	0.4	3	..	..	636	318	244	56	29	23	58	64	86	87
Samoa	..	..	..	..	..	145	44	27	11	5	3	51	65	84	100
Solomon Islands	..	189.9	71	..	..	392	60	201	30	4	23	103	58	90	87
Timor-Leste	..	40.9	8	..	19	1 674	754	713	147	96	88	64	71	81	80
Tuvalu	..	..	..	..	..	145	59	495	11	6	55	954	38	..	100
Vanuatu	192.7	71.9	..	..	..	392	71	84	30	8	10	82	58	79	90
Yemen	1.0	13.2	29	..	..	286	151	136	31	12	10	56	32	82	82
Latin America and the Caribbean															
Haiti	0.7	1.2	16	..	12	647	415	405	89	71	58	52	49	78	80

Sources: United Nations Children's Fund and World Health Organization, *World Malaria Report 2005* (Geneva, 2005); World Health Organization, *Global tuberculosis control—surveillance, planning, financing 2007*; and United Nations Children's Fund, *The State of the World's Children 2007: Women and Children, The Double Dividend of Gender Equality* (New York, 2007), table 3.

* Data for malaria cases and deaths are the same as reported last year. Updates are not yet available.
† The international recommended strategy for TB control.

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Annex table 8
Improved water and sanitation

Least developed countries	Percentage of population		Percentage of population with access to improved sanitation				Percentage of population with access to improved drinking water			
			Urban		Rural		Urban		Rural	
	1990	2005	1990	2004	1990	2004	1990	2004	1990	2004
Africa										
Angola	26.1	37.2	61	56	18	16	23	75	40	40
Benin	34.5	46.1	32	59	2	11	73	78	57	57
Burkina Faso	13.6	18.6	32	42	3	6	61	94	34	54
Burundi	6.3	10.6	42	47	44	35	97	92	67	77
Cape Verde	44.1	57.6	..	61	..	19	..	86	..	73
Central African Republic	37.5	43.8	34	37	17	12	74	93	39	43
Chad	21.1	25.8	28	24	2	4	41	41	13	82
Comoros	27.9	36.3	62	41	20	29	98	92	91	96
Congo, Democratic Republic	27.9	32.7	53	42	1	25	90	82	25	29
Djibouti	75.3	84.6	88	88	50	50	76	76	59	59
Equatorial Guinea	34.5	50.0	..	60	..	46	..	45	..	42
Eritrea	15.8	20.8	44	32	0	3	62	74	39	57
Ethiopia	12.7	16.2	13	44	2	7	61	81	15	11
Gambia	24.9	26.1	..	72	..	46	96	96	..	77
Guinea	25.3	36.5	27	31	10	11	71	78	34	35
Guinea-Bissau	23.8	35.6	..	57	..	23	..	79	..	49
Lesotho	17.2	18.2	61	61	32	32	..	92	..	78
Liberia	42.0	47.9	59	49	24	7	85	72	34	52
Madagascar	23.6	27.0	27	48	10	26	80	77	27	35
Malawi	11.6	17.2	52	66	34	42	90	98	33	66
Mali	23.8	33.7	50	59	32	39	50	78	29	36
Mauritania	44.0	64.3	42	49	22	8	32	59	43	44
Mozambique	21.1	38.0	49	53	1	19	83	72	24	26
Niger	16.1	23.3	35	43	2	4	62	80	35	36
Rwanda	5.3	21.8	49	56	36	38	88	92	57	69
Sao Tome and Principe	36.5	37.9	..	32	..	20	..	89	..	73
Senegal	40.0	51.0	53	79	19	34	89	92	49	60
Sierra Leone	30.0	40.2	..	53	..	30	..	75	..	46
Somalia	29.4	35.9	..	48	..	14	..	32	..	27
Sudan	26.6	40.8	53	50	26	24	85	78	57	64
Togo	40.9	57.0	71	71	24	15	81	80	37	38
Uganda	21.7	37.5	54	51	41	41	80	87	40	56
United Republic of Tanzania	7.8	7.8	52	53	45	43	85	85	35	49
Zambia	39.4	36.5	63	59	31	52	86	90	27	40
Asia and Pacific										
Afghanistan	18.2	24.3	7	49	2	29	10	63	3	31
Bangladesh	19.8	25.0	56	51	12	35	83	82	69	72
Bhutan	5.5	9.1	..	65	..	10	..	86	..	60
Cambodia	12.6	19.7	..	53	..	8	..	64	..	35
Kiribati	34.6	50.2	33	59	21	22	76	77	33	53
Lao People's Democratic Republi	15.4	21.6	..	67	..	20	..	79	..	43
Maldives	25.9	29.7	100	100	..	42	100	98	95	78
Myanmar	24.8	30.6	48	58	16	72	86	80	47	77
Nepal	8.9	15.8	48	62	7	30	95	96	67	89
Samoa	21.5	22.5	100	100	98	100	99	90	89	87
Solomon Islands	13.7	17.1	98	98	..	18	..	94	..	60
Timor-Leste	28.5	36.3	..	66	..	33	..	77	..	56
Tuvalu	11.2	12.4	83	93	74	84	79	94	89	92
Vanuatu	18.5	23.7	..	78	..	42	82	86	53	52
Yemen	21.3	26.3	82	86	19	28	84	71	68	65
Latin America and the Caribbean										
Haiti	29.5	38.8	25	57	23	14	60	52	27	24

Sources: United Nations Children's Fund, *The State of the World's Children 2007: Women and Children, The Double Dividend of Gender Equality* (New York, 2
and United Nations
Population Division, *World Population Prospects—The 2006 Revision* (New York, document ESA/P/WP.202, and CD-ROM in preparation).

Annex table 9
Communications

Least developed countries	Permanent and mobile post offices per 100,000 population			Telephone lines and cellular subscribers per 100 population							Internet users per 100 population	
				Main lines			Cellular		Total			
	1990	2004	2005	1990	2003/04	2005	2003/04	2005	2003/04	2005	2004	2005
Africa												
Angola	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.8	0.7	0.6	6.7	10.4	7.4	11.0	1.2	0.6
Benin	2.9	2.2	..	0.3	1.1	1.0	3.4	10.0	4.4	11.0	1.5	5.7
Burkina Faso	0.7	0.6	0.5	0.2	0.6	0.7	3.0	4.8	3.6	5.5	0.4	0.5
Burundi	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.9	2.0	1.2	2.4	0.4	0.5
Cape Verde	15.1	10.9	..	2.4	15.6	15.0	13.9	17.2	29.5	32.2	5.3	6.1
Central African Rep.	0.9	0.6	0.6	0.2	0.3	0.3	1.5	2.5	1.8	2.7	0.2	0.3
Chad	0.8	1.0	0.4	0.1	0.2	0.1	1.4	2.2	1.5	2.3	0.7	0.4
Comoros	6.1	3.7	..	0.8	1.7	2.1	0.3	2.0	1.9	4.1	1.0	2.5
Congo, Democratic Republic	0.7	0.2	..	0.1	0.0	..	1.9	4.8	1.9	..	..	0.2
Djibouti	1.8	1.4	1.4	1.1	1.6	1.6	3.4	6.4	5.1	7.9	1.3	1.5
Equatorial Guinea	5.9	4.1	..	0.4	1.8	2.0	11.0	19.3	12.7	21.3	1.0	1.4
Eritrea	1.1	1.6	1.5	..	0.9	0.9	0.5	0.9	1.4	1.8	1.2	1.8
Ethiopia	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.3	0.6	0.8	0.3	0.5	0.9	1.3	0.2	0.2
Gambia	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.7	2.7	2.9	12.0	16.3	14.6	19.2	3.4	3.4
Guinea	1.3	0.7	0.9	0.2	0.3	0.3	1.4	2.4	1.8	2.7	5.8	0.6
Guinea-Bissau	2.3	1.4	1.3	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.1	7.1	0.9	7.9	2.0	2.3
Lesotho	8.4	8.5	7.7	0.7	2.1	2.7	8.8	13.9	10.9	16.6	2.4	2.4
Liberia	2.1	0.6	0.0	0.4	0.2	..	1.4	4.9	1.6	..	..	..
Madagascar	10.5	4.2	4.0	0.3	0.4	0.4	1.9	2.7	2.2	3.1	0.5	0.5
Malawi	3.1	2.6	2.5	0.3	0.8	0.8	1.8	3.3	2.6	4.1	0.4	0.4
Mali	1.3	0.9	0.8	0.1	0.7	0.7	3.6	7.7	4.3	8.3	0.5	0.5
Mauritania	2.7	0.9	..	0.3	1.4	1.3	17.5	24.3	18.9	25.6	0.5	0.7
Mozambique	2.8	1.5	1.4	0.3	0.4	0.4	3.7	6.2	4.2	6.5	0.7	0.7
Niger	0.7	0.4	0.3	0.1	0.2	0.2	1.2	2.2	1.4	2.3	0.2	0.2
Rwanda	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	1.6	3.2	1.9	3.5	0.5	0.6
Sao Tome and Principe	8.0	6.5	..	1.9	4.6	4.6	3.2	7.7	7.8	12.3	12.2	13.1
Senegal	1.5	1.2	1.2	0.6	2.2	2.3	9.9	14.8	12.2	17.1	4.7	4.6
Sierra Leone	1.7	0.8	..	0.3	0.4	..	2.3	2.2	2.7	..	0.2	0.2
Somalia	0.0	0.0	..	0.2	1.7	1.2	4.2	6.1	5.8	7.3	1.7	1.1
Sudan	2.1	0.6	0.5	0.3	3.0	1.9	3.0	5.2	6.0	7.1	3.3	8.0
Togo	1.2	0.9	0.9	0.3	1.2	1.2	4.4	8.6	5.6	9.8	4.4	5.9
Uganda	1.6	1.2	1.0	0.2	0.3	0.3	4.4	4.6	4.6	4.9	0.8	1.7
United Republic of Tanzania	1.9	1.1	1.1	0.3	0.4	0.4	4.4	8.8	4.8	9.2	0.9	0.9
Zambia	5.0	1.6	2.7	0.8	0.8	0.8	2.8	8.1	3.5	8.9	2.1	2.0

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Annex table 9
Communications

Least developed countries	Permanent and mobile post offices per 100,000 population			Telephone lines and cellular subscribers per 100 population							Internet users per 100 population	
				Main lines			Cellular		Total			
	1990	2004	2005	1990	2003/04	2005	2003/04	2005	2003/04	2005	2004	2005
Asia and Pacific												
Afghanistan	1.8	1.4	1.8	0.2	0.2	0.3	2.4	4.0	2.6	4.4	0.1	0.1
Bangladesh	7.0	7.2	..	0.2	0.6	0.8	2.9	6.4	3.4	7.1	0.2	0.3
Bhutan	5.8	5.2	17.3	0.4	1.3	4.0	0.8	4.7	2.0	8.7	0.9	3.1
Cambodia	0.8	0.6	0.6	0.0	0.3	0.2	3.5	7.6	3.8	7.8	0.3	0.3
Kiribati	31.8	25.7	..	1.7	4.0	5.1	0.6	0.7	4.6	5.8	2.4	..
Lao People's Democratic Republic	2.9	4.0	5.9	0.2	1.3	1.3	3.5	10.8	4.9	12.0	0.4	0.4
Maldives	88.8	67.2	72.8	2.9	9.6		34.5	..	44.1	..	5.8	5.8
Myanmar	2.7	2.7	0.4	0.2	0.8	0.9	0.2	0.3	1.0	1.3	0.1	0.1
Nepal	11.6	15.1	..	0.3	1.6	1.8	0.7	0.8	2.3	2.6	0.7	0.8
Samoa	22.8	19.6	19.6	2.6	7.3	10.5	5.8	13.0	13.1	23.5	3.3	3.2
Solomon Islands	33.1	5.8	4.2	1.5	1.3	1.6	0.3	1.3	1.6	2.8	0.6	0.8
Timor-Leste	..	..	..	..	..		..	..	..	..	..	..
Tuvalu	92.4	86.6	..	1.3	7.0		0.0	..	7.0	..	..	30.0
Vanuatu	3.6	15.9	20.0	1.8	3.1	3.2	4.8	5.9	8.0	9.1	3.5	3.5
Yemen	2.8	1.5	1.2	1.1	3.9	3.9	5.2	9.5	9.0	13.4	0.9	0.9
Latin America and the Caribbean												
Haiti	1.7	0.7	0.0	0.7	1.7	1.7	4.7	4.9	6.4	6.6	5.9	7.0

Sources: Universal Postal Union, *Postal Statistics Database*, http://www.upu.org, accessed 1 March 2007 (Geneva); International Telecommunications Union, *ITU Statistics*, http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/statistics/, accessed 10 March 2007.

Annex table 10
Transportation facilities

Least developed countries	Roads: Total road network kms 1990	Roads: Total road network kms 1999/2003	Roads: Paved roads (%) 1999/2003	Railways: Route kms 2000/2004	Railways: Freight ton-kms 2000/2004	Air transport: Departures (thousands) 1990	Air transport: Departures (thousands) 2004	Air freight (mil. ton-kms) 1990	Air freight (mil. ton-kms) 2004
Africa									
Angola	..	51 429	10.4	2 761	..	6.9	4.8	40	64
Benin	6 787	6 787	20.0	438	86	0.5	0.7	18	7
Burkina Faso	9 840	12 506	16.0	622	..	2.2	1.4	18	7
Burundi	..	14 480	7.1	..	..	0.9	..	..	..
Cape Verde	1 100	1 100	78.0	..	..	6.7	9.6	..	..
Central African Republic	23 648	23 810	2.7	..	..	3.8	0.7	18	7
Chad	29 700	33 400	0.8	..	..	1.2	0.7	18	7
Comoros	..	880	76.5	..	..	1.0	..	..	..
Congo, Democratic Republic	..	157 000	..	4 499	491	5.1	5.2	57	7
Djibouti	2 879	2 890	12.6	..	..	3.9	..	<1	..
Equatorial Guinea	2 550	2 880	..	..	..	0.4	..	<1	..
Eritrea	3 560	4 010	21.8	306	..	..	..	..	..
Ethiopia	27 901	33 856	12.9	..	..	0.6	29.5	67	117
Gambia, The	2 386	3 742	19.3	..	..	..	..	..	..
Guinea	29 620	44 348	9.8	837	..	1.1	0.6	<1	1
Guinea-Bissau	4 100	4 400	10.3	..	..	1.2	..	<1	..
Lesotho	5 090	5 940	18.3	..	..	4.6	2.1	<1	..
Liberia	9 320	10 600	6.2	490	..	2.3	..	<1	..
Madagascar	34 800	49 827	11.6	883	12	17.2	18.0	30	13
Malawi	10 204	28 400	18.5	710	88	3.5	5.6	1	1
Mali	13 400	15 100	12.1	733	189	1.1	0.7	..	7
Mauritania	7 300	7 660	11.3	717	..	3.6	1.7	18	..
Mozambique	27 000	30 400	18.7	2 072	808	5.6	8.6	9	5
Niger	11 696	10 100	7.9	..	..	0.5	0.7	18	7
Rwanda	13 173	12 000	8.3	..	..	0.5	..	..	..
Sao Tome and Principe	..	320	68.1	..	..	12.7	0.3	..	<1
Senegal	13 800	13 576	29.3	906	371	3.5	6.4	18	..
Sierra Leone	11 300	11 300	8.0	..	..	0.5	0.2	2	8
Somalia	20 800	22 100	11.8	..	..	1.6	..	9	..
Sudan	10 420	11 900	36.3	5 478	889	9.1	6.4	13	41
Togo	7 390	7 520	31.6	568	..	0.5	0.7	18	7
Uganda	..	70 746	23.0	259	218	2.0	0.3	22	27
United Republic of Tanzania	55 900	78 891	8.6	2 600	1 351	7.5	6.4	1	2
Zambia	35 300	91 440	22.0	1 273	554	6.5	4.9	30	..
Asia and Pacific									
Afghanistan	21 000	34 789	23.7	..	..	5.3	3.4	9	8
Bangladesh	188 000	239 226	9.5	2 745	..	13.8	7.3	70	180
Bhutan	2 336	8 050	62.0	..	..	..	..	..	<1
Cambodia	35 800	12 323	16.2	650	92	..	3.9	..	4
Kiribati	..	670	..	..	..	2.9	..	..	..
Lao People's Democratic Republic	13 971	32 620	14.1	..	..	3.4	8.5	1	2
Maldives	..	..	..	..	..	0.8	4.2	..	13
Myanmar	25 000	27 966	78.0	..	..	13.8	24.9	1	3
Nepal	6 840	15 905	53.9	59	..	25.8	5.9	11	7
Samoa	..	790	42.0	..	..	..	10.5	..	3
Solomon Islands	1 210	1 360	2.5	..	..	11.1	9.8	..	2
Timor Leste	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Tuvalu	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Vanuatu	..	1 070	23.9	..	..	0.3	1.5	..	2
Yemen	51 119	67 000	11.5	..	..	14.1	16.1	12	60
Latin America and the Caribbean									
Haiti	3 695	4 160	24.3	..	..	0.8	..	4	..

Sources: World Bank, *World Development Indicators 2007* (Washington, D.C.), table 5.9, compiled from data of the International Road Federation, the World Bank and the International Civil Aviation Organization.

Annex table 11

Official development assistance

Country	ODA, net to LDCs, million US dollars				ODA, net to LDCs, as perc. of total				ODA, net to LDCs, as perc. of OECD/DAC donors' gross national income				ODA for trade capacity -building as perc. of total ODA		
	1990	2000	2004	2005	1990	2000	2004	2005	1990	2000	2004	2005	2001	2004	2005
Australia	171	293	350	419	17.9	29.7	24.0	25	0.34	0.27	0.25	0.06	2.1	1.2	1.0
Austria	106	113	168	245	63.1	25.7	24.8	16	0.11	0.23	0.23	0.08	..	1.3	2.4
Belgium	367	221	645	609	41.3	27.0	44.1	31	0.46	0.36	0.41	0.16	2.4	7.4	4.4
Canada	740	308	702	1048	30.0	17.7	27.0	28	0.44	0.25	0.27	0.09	9.3	3.0	1.0
Denmark	462	537	735	814	39.4	32.3	36.1	39	0.94	1.06	0.85	0.31	0.6	0.3	..
Finland	317	112	153	245	37.5	30.2	23.3	27	0.65	0.31	0.35	0.13	1.0	..	3.2
France	2 286	1 144	3 169	2392	33.3	27.9	37.4	24	0.60	0.30	0.41	0.11	0.4	1.6	2.4
Germany	1 769	1 212	2 312	1884	28.0	24.1	30.7	19	0.42	0.27	0.28	0.07	2.6	1.6	2.1
Greece	..	19	65	79	..	8.4	14.0	21	..	0.20	0.23	0.04	..	0.2	0.0
Ireland	21	114	322	365	36.7	48.7	53.0	51	0.16	0.29	0.39	0.21	0.3	0.2	0.2
Italy	1 382	389	788	1407	40.7	28.3	32.0	28	0.31	0.13	0.15	0.08	1.4	1.4	0.3
Japan	1 753	2 159	1 684	2326	19.4	16.0	18.9	18	0.31	0.28	0.19	0.05	0.6	0.4	0.7
Luxembourg	10	46	87	106	39.4	37.4	36.9	41	0.21	0.71	0.83	0.34	..	..	..
Netherlands	834	794	1 453	1658	33.0	25.3	34.6	32	0.92	0.84	0.73	0.27	2.7	3.2	3.3
New Zealand	18	29	65	70	18.9	25.6	30.6	25	0.23	0.25	0.23	0.07	10.8	10.7	9.5
Norway	532	427	837	1029	44.2	33.8	38.1	37	1.17	0.76	0.87	0.35	4.1	2.8	3.3
Portugal	100	171	878	210	70.3	63.2	85.2	56	0.24	0.26	0.63	0.12	0.7	1.1	1.2
Spain	194	144	424	817	20.1	12.1	17.4	27	0.20	0.22	0.24	0.07	0.1	..	0.6
Sweden	775	532	762	1101	38.7	29.6	28.0	33	0.91	0.80	0.78	0.31	0.9	0.8	2.4
Switzerland	325	270	399	405	43.3	30.3	25.8	23	0.32	0.34	0.41	0.10	6.3	8.2	9.5
United Kingdom	834	1 426	2 988	2705	31.7	31.7	37.9	25	0.27	0.32	0.36	0.12	4.8	1.4	2.2
United States	2 199	1 989	4 504	5687	21.6	20.0	22.9	21	0.21	0.10	0.17	0.05	6.7	3.4	4.8

Sources: Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, *International Development Statistics CD-ROM 2007* (Paris, in preparation).

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Annex table 12

World Bank/IMF debt relief under HIPC Initiative, and public and publicly guaranteed debt service

Least developed countries	LDCs in HIPC Initiative and debt relief status with World Bank and IMF, August 2006								Debt service as perc. of LDC exports of goods, services and income abroad		
	To be considered	Completion point	World Bank ($million NPV*)			IMF ($million)					
			Committed	Delivered	% delivered	Committed	Delivered	% delivered	1990	2004	2005
Africa											
Angola	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	7.1	13.5	9.0
Benin	..	Mar-03	124.3	41.3	33.2	18.4	20.1	109.2	9.2	7.6	4.4
Burkina Faso	..	Apr-02	236.7	157.5	66.5	44.0	46.0	104.5	7.8	7.7	6.8
Burundi	..	Aug-05 *(D)*	424.8	10.0	2.4	19.3	0.1	0.5	41.7	99.8	30.5
Cape Verde	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	8.9	7.2	8.3
Central African Republic	X	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	12.5	..	..
Chad	..	May-01 *(D)*	68.1	26.7	39.2	14.3	8.6	60.1	3.8	1.8	0.9
Comoros	X	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2.5	..	..
Congo, Democratic Republic	..	Jul-03 *(D)*	855.5	468.3	54.7	228.3	3.4	1.5	..	8.2	6.9
Djibouti	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Equatorial Guinea	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	11.5	..	..
Eritrea	X	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Ethiopia	..	Apr-04	801.7	159.7	19.9	45.1	46.7	103.5	37.6	6.6	6.1
Gambia	..	Dec-00 *(D)*	22.3	11.1	49.8	1.8	0.1	5.6	21.8	23.2	17.1
Guinea	..	Dec-00 *(D)*	151.4	62.1	41.0	24.2	5.2	21.5	19.6	7.5	11.3
Guinea-Bissau	..	Dec-00 *(D)*	93.3	27.0	28.9	9.2	0.5	5.4	22.1	7.4	4.4
Lesotho	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	4.2	4.7	5.0
Liberia	X	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Madagascar	..	Oct-04	256.2	86.3	33.7	14.7	16.4	111.6	44.4	5.0	3.9
Malawi	..	Dec-00 *(D)*	330.9	105.8	32.0	23.1	11.6	50.2	28.0	13.5	12.2
Mali	..	Mar-03	185.1	115.9	62.6	45.3	49.3	108.8	14.7	6.4	7.1
Mauritania	..	Jun-02	99.9	37.8	37.8	34.8	38.4	110.3	28.8	8.7	6.7
Mozambique	..	Sep-01	429.4	509.2	118.6	106.9	108.0	101.0	17.3	3.2	3.2
Niger	..	Apr-04	231.5	59.9	25.9	31.2	34.0	109.0	6.6	4.2	3.9
Rwanda	..	Jun-05	357.4	76.1	21.3	46.8	50.6	108.1	10.7	9.8	7.4
Sao Tome and Principe	..	Dec-00 *(D)*	23.7	6.4	27.0	..	..	..	28.7	11.6	29.3
Senegal	..	Apr-04	123.6	77.5	62.7	33.8	38.4	113.6	18.3	7.6	5.7
Sierra Leone	..	Mar-02 *(D)*	121.5	29.8	24.5	98.5	66.0	67.0	10.1	10.2	9.3
Somalia	X	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Sudan	X	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	4.8	8.1	7.8
Togo	X	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	11.5	2.5	..
Uganda	..	May-00	531.0	334.3	63.0	68.1	70.2	103.1	78.6	10.5	10.8
United Republic of Tanzania	..	Nov-01	694.7	265.1	38.2	89.0	96.4	108.3	31.3	6.6	5.4
Zambia	..	Apr-05	493.2	132.2	26.8	468.8	508.3	108.4	14.5	18.3	6.7
Total	..	..	6656.2	2800.0	42.1	1465.6	1218.3	83.1	..	..	..

Annex table 12

World Bank/IMF debt relief under HIPC Initiative, and public and publicly guaranteed debt service

Least developed countries	LDCs in HIPC Initiative and debt relief status with World Bank and IMF, August 2006								Debt service as perc. of LDC exports of goods, services and income abroad		
	To be considered	Completion point	World Bank ($million NPV*) Committed	Delivered	% delivered	IMF ($million) Committed	Delivered	% delivered	1990	2004	2005
Asia and Pacific											
Afghanistan	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Bangladesh	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	34.8	6.9	7.2
Bhutan	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Cambodia	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	0.8	0.7
Kiribati	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Lao People's Democratic Republic	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	8.5	..	..
Maldives	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	4.0	4.5	6.7
Myanmar	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	18.2	3.3	..
Nepal	X	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	15.2	8.9	8.1
Samoa	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	10.6	5.8	4.7
Solomon Islands	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	11.3	..	..
Timor-Leste	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Tuvalu	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Vanuatu	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1.6	1.5	1.0
Yemen	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	7.1	4.3	3.0
Total	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Latin America and the Caribbean											
Haiti	X	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	9.1	19.8	9.6
Total	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..

Sources: International Development Association and International Monetary Fund, "Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative—Statistical Update", 21 March 2006, tables 5A an 6A, and "Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI)—Status of Implementation", 21 August 2006, annex V, tables 6A and 67A; debt service statistics of non-HIPC countries from the World Bank's Debtor Reporting System, published in *Global Development Finance* (World Bank, annual and online) and *World Development Indicators* (annual and online), and of HIPC countries from the progress reports cited above.

Note: "D" refers to date of decision point.

* World Bank figures are in terms of "net present value" (NPV).